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Although fair use is an intentionally vague doctrine, its
application to education has been described as only one of two
categories where outcomes remain “quite difficult to predict.” To
combat this uncertainty, courts have looked to negotiated
educational guidelines, which Congress included in its House of
Representatives Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976.
Courts’ use of the guidelines has had two unintended and
destructive consequences. First, it erroneously gave the guidelines
the appearance of law under § 107’s fair use analysis, sometimes
inadvertently characterizing them as setting maximum limits on
permissible copying. Second, it forced educational institutions to
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rely on the guidelines as the law, improperly crafting their own
copyright policies to reflect the guidelines’ contours. Educational
institutions began using the guidelines as maximum limits on
allowable copying under their policies, constraining their
instructors’ ability to teach effectively.
To remedy these problems, this Article proposes a new model
for evaluating educational fair use: the administrative agency.
Although previous scholars have delineated new approaches to
copyright infringement and fair use, few deal explicitly with fair
use in education. That is exactly what this Article does. Building
off of a previous scholar’s suggestion that Congress create an
agency to administer fair use, this Article takes an additional step
by creating a model that develops and enforces regulations
specific to educational fair use. This new agency is likely to
reduce uncertainty for educators, slenderize educators’ risk of
litigation—thereby simultaneously decreasing educational
expenses and increasing the amount of time and money spent on
educational advancement—and substantially ameliorate, if not
eliminate, the guidelines’ negative effects on education.
INTRODUCTION
As a devoted teacher, you constantly seek new and innovative
ways to educate your students. This often requires using
copyrighted materials. After reading a fascinating book, for
example, you may want to use two of its chapters, which include
photographs, in your class on modern contemporary art. Or maybe
it was the first, fourth, and last chapters of the book you just
finished on modern African tribal warfare that you wanted to copy
for your African history class. Perhaps it was a twelve-minute clip
(or two six-minute clips or four three-minute clips) from Seinfeld
that you thought would illustrate several important points in your
annually-taught freshman class, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and
Sartre. Because you do not know whether these uses are legal, you
guess at where you might find the answer: maybe your school has
a copyright or copying policy.
You think that it probably does, but you do not know for sure,
and, if it does, you are unaware of its contents. But you are
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conscientious and want to comply with the law (never mind that
the school policy is not the law). So you search for it. Once you
find the copying policy, you read something about “Classroom
Guidelines endorsed by Congress” and something else about
“brevity” and lots of terms you do not fully comprehend.1 Even if
you do understand these “Guidelines,” though, you notice that
these are the maximum amounts of allowable copying under your
copyright policy.2 If you want to make copies outside these
“Guidelines,” you have to go to the “General Counsel,” which you
take to mean the school’s “main lawyer,” even though you have
never met her.3
This means that all of the above uses are technically
impermissible under your school’s policy unless you seek the
permission of the school’s lawyer, who may deny your request.
Even if your request is likely to be granted—a likelihood you have
no way of ascertaining—contacting the school’s lawyer seems
intimidating. You also think that constantly asking administrators
and lawyers for permission to use certain portions of works in class
makes you appear meddlesome and officious. After all, you are up
for tenure in the spring, and why risk ruffling the administrative
feathers for a helpful text? Instead, you forgo the use(s) and
choose to skip that segment in your class. As a result, the students,
as well as society, do not receive their benefit—and maybe the
authors and copyright owners lose some publicity as well.
Scenarios like those just described happen in practice—and
they happen repeatedly over the course of many semesters and
school years: that makes the effect of the restrictive guidelines, in
terms of deterrence and educational benefits, even more
And, despite educational institutions’ use of
pronounced.4

1

For a more complete description of how these policies function, see infra Part I.C.
While the Educational Guidelines state that they are the minimum permissible
copying, see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5681–82, schools—and some courts—apply them as the maximum limit on copying. See
infra Part I.
3
This is a popular component of copying policies at universities. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying note 134.
4
This scenario is reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s statement in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942), that,
2
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restrictive policies to protect themselves from liability, there are no
hard-and-fast rules in fair use. Indeed, these examples illustrate
how the mystery of copyright law scares educators and educational
institutions into thinking that they need permission to use or copy
almost any segment, however small, of copyrighted works.
In the educational milieu, copyright law is misunderstood and
maligned. Many educators have little or no understanding of
copyright law, its basic principles, or its application to their
classrooms.
This lack of understanding can have serious
consequences for teachers, school districts, universities, and
students.
Teachers without a solid understanding of copyright law’s
demands and requirements create a liability risk for themselves and
their schools: teachers will either blithely violate the law or
drastically limit their use of copyrighted materials to avoid doing
so. Either of these reactions renders a school district’s fair use
policy irrelevant; that, in turn, means that the school may become
liable as a result of risk-taking teachers. Or, perhaps worse,
teachers’ risk aversion will reduce the educational benefits students
receive. Because the copyright policy of an institution is one
indication of good faith, violation of this policy could defeat the
“innocent infringer” defense, escalating statutory damages to
astronomical amounts.5
Furthermore, students who are instructed by teachers with an
inadequate understanding of copyright law learn either that
copyright law should not be taken seriously, or that it should be
taken so seriously that it may limit student learning. The latter
lesson—where the law “chills” students’ or teachers’ uses of
copyrighted materials—may erroneously teach students that the

even if [an individual’s] activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might
at some earlier time have been defined as “direct” or “indirect.”
In other words, if a practice, even a “small” and “local” one, becomes widespread, it can
have large-scale effects.
5
See Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to
Photocopy Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 205–06 (1998).
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law’s boundaries, whether in copyright or elsewhere, are narrower
than they actually are.
These problems result from copyright law itself. Prior to 1976,
teachers had almost no guidance on how to determine whether
their uses of copyrighted materials were “fair.”6 At that point,
“fair use” was a common law doctrine—made and elucidated by
judges.7 Some clarity came when Congress enacted the Copyright
Act of 19768 (“Copyright Act” or “Act”), codifying the doctrine of
fair use.9 Although this doctrine is somewhat amorphous, the
House of Representatives Report (“House Report”) accompanying
the Act did note that a committee had convened and created fair
use guidelines that applied to non-profit educational institutions.10
Courts have misapplied and misused these guidelines, mostly
at the behest of copyright owners.11 These judicial errors have
created unworkable and faulty standards that restricted fair use in
the educational environment,12 which demands a more expansive
view of this doctrine. The limitations imposed upon teachers have
hampered their ability to use copyrighted material to prepare for or
teach a class, thereby undermining the mission of teachers seeking
to effectively and legally educate their students.
Although numerous scholars have suggested alterations or
modifications to fair use,13 little scholarship or legislative activity
has been directed toward assisting teachers to determine what uses
are fair. To that end, this Article explores a new model for
evaluating educational fair use. To do this, the courts’ use of the
guidelines appearing in the House Report to assess educational
uses of copyright is examined. Then, this Article analyzes how
this treatment has affected the conduct of educational institutions,
6

See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105
(1990).
7
See Robert Kasunic, Fair Use and the Educator’s Right to Photocopy Copyrighted
Material for Classroom Use, 19 J.C. & U.L. 271, 281–84 (1993).
8
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
9
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65–66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5678–79.
10
Id. at 68.
11
See infra note 80 and accompanying text; infra Part I.B.
12
See infra Part I.C.
13
See infra Part II.
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showing that the effects largely are negative. Because the adoption
of these guidelines has not benefited educators or students, this
Article reviews the current proposals to modify fair use and then
proposes the development of a new administrative agency—
designed specifically for defining and regulating educational fair
uses of copyrighted material—that sets standards and rules by
which teachers can assess their uses of copyrighted material.
Part I reviews the basics of fair use and how the doctrine
applies to educators. It also inspects the 1976 Act’s language and
legislative history, including the fair use educational guidelines14
developed for educators as stated in the House Reports. It further
assesses and criticizes these guidelines, beginning by reviewing
and examining how courts have analyzed and used them in
determining fair use. This analysis demonstrates that court
decisions have pressed educational institutions to accept the
guidelines as law, which, in turn, has distorted and deformed their
purpose, implementation, and use.
After this analysis, Part II evaluates the possible approaches
taken to modify the current state of the law. It examines both
modifications to the infringement analysis as well as fair use.
Focusing on infringement, adding new elements to the
infringement cause of action is explored. As to fair use, a variety
of approaches are reviewed, including adding a burden-shifting
component; modifying the fair use factors and their application;
developing a code of best practices; and creating a new entity to
resolve fair use disputes. The problems with each of these
approaches as applied to educational fair use are explored vis-à-vis
the problems of educational fair use outlined in Part I.
Part III proposes a solution to the problems of educational fair
use. Building off a recent scholar’s suggestion that Congress
create an executive agency to “administer fair use,”15 a fuller
14

These guidelines are discussed in more detail infra Part I.
Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 415 (2009).
Others also have argued, to varying degrees, for a siphoning off particular “sectors” of
fair uses and providing a modified framework for them. See, e.g., Edward
Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535389 (abstract) (arguing that current fair use law is illequipped to deal with new technologies and proposing that the four fair use factors be
15
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account of how Congress and this new agency might address
educational fair use is developed. Focusing on the use of positive
law, this Part proposes that Congress enact a specific fair use law
that, among other things, creates a specific agency to administer
educational fair uses of copyrighted materials. This model is
designed to provide teachers with more guidance when using
copyrighted materials in conjunction with educational activities. It
also seeks to dispel the mysticism surrounding, and the
misunderstanding that many educators and educational
administrators have about, copyright law and fair use. In sum, this
model is designed to enhance education though certainty and
practicality.
Finally, Part IV raises and responds to possible objections.
These include the increased cost of creating a new agency; the
need for an agency specific to education; the rigid nature of fair
use rules; and the complexity that may result from promulgating
rules on educational fair use. After each objection is addressed,
the Article concludes that these are not sufficient reasons to discard
the model proposed in Part III, which will enhance education by
promoting fair use.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM: FAIR USE, JUDICIAL
TREATMENT OF THE CLASSROOM GUIDELINES, AND THE
EDUCATIONAL RESPONSE
Fair use in the educational context is in danger, and this Part
outlines why. That explanation requires a brief introduction to fair
use and the educational guidelines—which the House of
Representatives included in its report accompanying the Copyright
Act—that govern fair use. After explaining the educational
guidelines’ origins, this section examines how courts have treated
them. This analysis shows that courts have continually reinforced
the idea that the guidelines are law. This, in turn, has caused
educational institutions to limit their uses of copyrighted materials,
tailored to address these technologies); David A. Simon, Reasonable Perception and
Parody in Copyright Law (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1516378 (abstract) (arguing that parody should be its own category of fair use and
proposing a new test for parody that discards the four fair use factors).
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which inhibits teachers’ ability to effectively instruct their students
and jeopardizes the educational mission.
A. A Brief Primer: Fair Use and the Educational Guidelines
Although Congress passed the first Copyright Act in 1790,16
and the doctrine of fair use had been recognized in England under
the Statute of Anne,17 it was not until 1841 that any United States
court applied the doctrine.18 Since its application in Folsom v.
Marsh, however, fair use has changed, if not in substance then in
form.19 In 1976, Congress amended the Copyright Act, codifying
the common-law doctrine of fair use.20 Under current law, the
Copyright Act defines fair use this way:
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
16

Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 24 (repealed 1831); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1A: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY (2009), http://www.copy
right.gov/circs/circ1a.html (“Congress enacted the first federal copyright law in May
1790, and the first work was registered within two weeks.”).
17
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994); Leval, supra
note 6, at 1112 (quoting Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (P.C.)).
18
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Leval, supra note 6, at
1105.
19
See Leval, supra note 6, at 1105–12.
20
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codifying fair use, inter
alia, at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)).
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.21
While the fair use provision provided a framework for courts to
assess whether the educational use of a copyrighted work was
infringing, Congress did specifically exempt some educational uses
of copyrighted works in § 110(1) and 110(2).22
Section 110(1) exempts the performance or display of images
used in teaching.23 Section 110(2) also exempted certain uses,24
and “was enacted in 1976 on the basis of a policy determination
that certain performances and displays of copyrighted works in
connection with systematic instruction using then-known forms of
distance education should be permitted without a need to obtain a
license or rely on fair use.”25 As the Senate Report notes, this was
a policy choice, grounded in neither case law nor substantive legal
doctrine. Congress later made an additional policy choice when it
decided educational institutions needed further protection, and, in
2002, expanded § 110(2) to cover unanticipated technologies.26
21

17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis added).
Id. § 110(1)–(2).
23
Id. § 110(1) (exempting from infringement “[the] performance or display of a work
by instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit
educational institution, in a classroom or similar place devoted to instruction, unless, in
the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, the performance, or the display of
individual images, is given by means of a copy that was not lawfully made under this
title, and that the person responsible for the performance knew or had reason to believe
was not lawfully made”).
24
Id. § 110(2).
25
S. REP. NO. 107-031, at 4 (2001).
26
This amendment was titled, Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization
Act (TEACH Act), Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1910 (2002) (amending 17 U.S.C. §
110(2)). It was designed to “facilitate the growth and development of digital distance
education” by “updat[ing] the distance education provisions of the Copyright Act for the
21st century.” S. REP. NO. 107-031, at 3–4. Congress sought to achieve this objective by
“expand[ing] the exempted copyright rights, the types of transmissions, and the
categories of works that the exemption covers beyond those that are covered by the
existing exemption for performances and displays of certain copyrighted works in the
course of instructional transmissions.” Id. at 4.
Section 110(2) also exempts, under certain conditions, “the performance of a
nondramatic literary or musical work or reasonable and limited portions of any other
work, or display of a work in an amount comparable to that which is typically displayed
in the course of a live classroom session, by or in the course of a transmission.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 110(2). For this exception to apply, the performance or display of the work must be
22

C02_SIMON_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

TEACHING WITHOUT INFRINGEMENT

3/31/2010 1:05 PM

463

The Copyright Act, therefore, explicitly provides an exemption
for the use of copyrighted materials for teachers performing or
displaying a copyrighted work in their class.27 The specific
exemption provided by § 110(2), however, covers a limited
situation: where the teacher performs or displays a work;28 it fails
to cover other more prevalent situations, such as the creating
multiple copies of articles or book chapters for classroom use.
That is where the doctrine of fair use, codified by § 107,
operates to protect teachers.29 As noted above, § 107 specifically
mentions “teaching” as a favored use that may be considered “fair”
and, therefore, not infringing.30 That, however, does not mean that
all educational uses are non-infringing. The statute provides that
every use must be assessed using the factors articulated in § 107.31
Furthermore, the exempted use for “teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use)” 32 is vague. It does not define teaching,
state how much of a copyrighted work may be copied, or explain
how many copies are permissible.

made by an instructor as part of the curriculum under 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(A), and must be
“directly related and of material assistance to the teaching content of the transmission.”
Id. § 110(2)(B). Additionally, the transmission of this material must be made and
received by students enrolled in the course for which it is being shown. Id. § 110(2)(C)
(“[T]he transmission is made solely for, and, to the extent technologically feasible, the
reception of such transmission is limited to—(i) students officially enrolled in the course
for which the transmission is made; or (ii) officers or employees of governmental bodies
as a part of their official duties or employment . . . .”). The institution transmitting the
material must have adequate copyright policies in place and inform its “faculty, students
and relevant staff” of its policies and how to comply with copyright law. Id. § 110(2)(D).
There also are additional technological measures that an educational institution must take
to prevent subsequent retention of and infringing uses of the copyrighted material. See id.
27
17 U.S.C. § 110(1).
28
Id. § 110(2).
29
Id. § 107.
30
See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236–37 (1990) (explaining the specific
examples of fair use provided by Congress in § 107); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling
Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2580 (2009) (“Teaching, scholarship, and research
are three of the six favored uses in the preamble to § 107.” (footnote omitted)).
31
17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating that “[i]n determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use[,] the factors to be considered shall include” and
enumerating the four fair use factors (emphasis added)).
32
Id.
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1. The Ad Hoc Committee
The ambiguity inherent in the fair use provision did not go
unnoticed during the drafting of the Copyright Act, and section
110(2)(A)’s guiding principle—a specific exemption provided to
teachers by law33—was not lost on the educational community.
Educators clamored for specific fair use provisions that permitted
copying, which author and publisher groups opposed.34 Although
the House Report rejected “‘a specific exemption freeing certain
reproductions of copyrighted works for educational and scholarly
purposes from copyright control,’” it recognized that teachers
needed guidance when it came to fair use.35 The Senate Report,
written a year prior to the House Report, also noted that “there are
few if any judicial guidelines” for “copying by teachers.”36 To that
end, Congress urged educators and members of the media industry
to meet and devise a potential compromise that accommodated all
interests.37 Of course, neither Houses of Congress participated in
the negotiations; instead, various individuals from education and
media convened to form the Ad Hoc Committee of Educational
Institutions and Organizations on Copyright Law Revision (“The
Ad Hoc Committee”).38
33

Id. § 110(2)(A).
Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 615 n.62 (2001).
35
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66–67 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5680.
36
S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975). The Copyright Office has noted that “[t]he House
Report was written later than the Senate Report, and in many cases it adopted the
language of the Senate Report, updating it and conforming it to the version of the bill that
[Congress] enacted into law.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 21: REPRODUCTION OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS BY EDUCATORS AND LIBRARIANS 4 (2009), http://www.copy
right.gov/circs/circ21.pdf.
37
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67; see Crews, supra note 34, at 614–19.
38
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67. The Ad Hoc Committee’s history began in 1955,
when Congress commenced its efforts to reform copyright law. HARRY N. ROSENFIELD,
MAJOR PROBLEMS OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS VIEWED BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 1 (1970) (on file with the author), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/3
3/74/6f.pdf. That effort resulted in several reports, conferences, and draft bills—and, in
1963, the National Education Association called an exploratory Conference on Copyright
Law Revision, which “fifty-two individuals representing forty-seven national educational
organizations attended.” Id. at 1–2; see id. at ex.1 (listing participating organizations).
The participants discussed how copyright could best accommodate educators. One
34
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From 1963 until 1976, the Ad Hoc Committee convened
several times and consulted with numerous interest groups,
including trade and textbook publishers; music publishers; film
producers; librarians; and authors.39 The Ad Hoc Committee noted
that educators face special problems with respect to fair use, in
part, because “good teaching practice may not always be legal
copyright practice,”40 and, in part, because “it is legally risky for
teachers to rely wholly on fair use.”41 The primary issue,
according to the Ad Hoc Committee, was “the need to legitimize
current and developing reasonable educational practices so that
teachers will not be forced either to drop them or to continue them
‘under the table.’”42
Originally, the Ad Hoc Committee pushed for a broad fair use
exemption for educational uses.43 In the minds of educators, the
flexibility of the fair use provisions was a liability, not a benefit—
in a broad exemption they sought safety.44 Ultimately, they were
rebuffed; authors wanted a case-by-case review and the
establishment of a “Copyright Royalty Tribunal” (“CRT”).45 To
create the certainty that educators sought, the Committee
eventually agreed on a set of educational guidelines.46 Despite this
representative suggested the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, which convened
for its first meeting on September 5, 1963. Id. at 3.
39
ROSENFIELD, supra note 38, at 4.
40
Id. at 6.
41
Id. at 51.
42
Id. at 7.
43
Kasunic, supra note 7, at 279–80.
44
Id.
45
Id. The CRT was enacted by the 1976 Copyright Act. The Tribunal’s principal duty
was to determine statutory royalty rates. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 92: CHAPTER
8 OF 1976 ACT: PROCEEDINGS BY COPYRIGHT ROYALTY JUDGES (1976), http://www.
copyright.gov/title17/92chap8.html. In 1993, Congress replaced the CRT with the
Copyright Arbitration and Royalty Panel (“CARP”). Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304 (amending, inter alia, ch. 8 of 17
U.S.C.). On November 30, 2004, Congress enacted the Copyright Royalty and
Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341, replacing CARP
“with a system of the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), which determines rates and terms
for the copyright statutory licenses and makes determinations on distribution of statutory
license royalties collected by the Copyright Office.” U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panels, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/index.html#general (last
visited July 18, 2009).
46
Crews, supra note 34, at 616–17.
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apparent agreement, the agreed-upon “guidelines were negotiated
with little participation by educators and no participation by
students, and were adopted over the opposition of major
universities and scholarly organizations, such as the American
Association of Law Schools.”47
2. The Educational Guidelines
The House Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976
included an agreed-upon recommendation from the Ad Hoc
Committee’s meetings occurring between September 1975 and
March 1976, which was entitled, Agreement on Guidelines for
Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions
(“The Classroom Guidelines” or “The Guidelines”);48 “it refer[red]
only to copying from books and periodicals, and [was] not
intended to apply to musical or audiovisual works.”49 The House
Report also contained guidelines for the educational use of music
(“Music Guidelines”).50 Additionally, a 1979 House Report
47
Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93
VA. L. REV. 1899, 1958 (2007).
48
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67–68 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5681–82.
49
Id. at 67.
50
Like the Classroom Guidelines, infra, “[t]he purpose of the [Music] [G]uidelines is
to state the minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use.” H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1476, at 70. The Music Guidelines, like the Classroom Guidelines, divide uses
into two categories. Instead of the single/multiple copy dichotomy used by the
Classroom Guidelines, however, the Music Guidelines divide uses into “permissible
uses” and “prohibitions.” See id. at 71–73. There are five types of permissible uses. Id. at
71. First, teachers may make an “emergency copy to replace a purchased copy” but must
eventually replace that copy with a purchased one. Id. Second, teachers may, for
“academic purposes other than performance,” make one copy per pupil of music excerpts,
which may never exceed 10% of the total work. Id. The teacher may, for teaching or
scholarship purposes, make one copy of an “entire performable unit (section, movement,
aria, etc.) that is” out of print or available only in a larger work. Id. Third, teachers may
edit or simplify “printed copies which have been purchased” so long as the edits do not
distort the “fundamental character of the work.” Id. Fourth, teachers may make single
copies of the recording of student performances “for evaluation or rehearsal purposes.”
Id. The school can retain this copy. Id. Fifth, teachers may make, and the school or
teacher may retain, a copy of sound recordings owned by the school or an individual
teacher to “[construct] aural exercises or examinations.” Id. These guidelines address fair
use as to the “copyright [in] the music itself,” but not the sound recording. Id. Compare
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006) (copyright exists in “musical works, including any
accompanying words”), with id. § 102(a)(7) (copyright subsists in “sound recordings”),
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articulated guidelines for off-air recording of broadcast
programming for educational purposes (“Off-Air Guidelines”).51
This Article focuses mainly on the Classroom Guidelines52 because
courts have discussed these most frequently,53 and because
educators photocopy works frequently as part of their teaching
duties.
Prior to stating the terms of the Classroom Guidelines, the Ad
Hoc Committee cautioned that the Guidelines “state[d] the
minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use
under Section 107.”54 It also warned that the Classroom
Guidelines did not proscribe any uses articled by case law or those
that may arise in the future, even if those uses fall outside the
Classroom Guidelines.55
and id. § 101 (“‘Sound recordings’ are works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.”).
51
The Off-Air Guidelines were developed after the Photocopying and Music
Guidelines. Similar to those Guidelines, the Off-Air Guidelines were developed by “a
Negotiating Committee consisting of representatives of education[al] organizations,
copyright proprietors, and creative guilds and unions.” H.R. REP. NO. 97-495, at 8 (1982).
Unlike the other two sets of Guidelines, however, the Off-Air Guidelines were not
preceded by a cautionary statement that they represented the minimum standard of fair
use. See id. at 3–9. Instead, the report stated that “[t]he purpose of establishing these
guidelines,” which apply only to non-profit schools, “is to provide standards for both
owners and users of copyrighted television programs.” Id. at 8.
These Guidelines allow schools to record television programs, which must include a
copyright notice, id. at 9, and retain a copy of them for forty-five consecutive days, after
which time the copy must be destroyed. Id. at 8–9. Within the first ten days of copying,
teachers may use these recordings once in a classroom or similar place, and once more
“only when instructional reinforcement is necessary.” Id. at 9. After the first ten days of
recording, schools can use the copy only to evaluate its necessity in the curriculum. Id.
Schools cannot make off-air recordings at the request of anyone except a teacher, cannot
regularly record programs “in anticipation of requests,” and cannot record the same
program “more than once at the request of the same teacher.” Id. The Off-Air Guidelines
also prohibit altering the copies or merging copies to “constitute teaching anthologies or
compilations.” Id. Schools are expected to create further procedures to ensure
compliance with the guidelines. Id.
52
All of these guidelines are referred to collectively as “the Educational Guidelines.”
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68.
53
See, e.g., infra Part I.B.
54
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 70.
55
See id. at 68 (“The parties agree that the conditions determining the extent of
permissible copying for educational purposes may change in the future; that certain types
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The Ad Hoc Committee divided the Classroom Guidelines for
reproduction of books and periodicals into two groups: “single
copying for teachers,” and “multiple copies for classroom use.”56
The Classroom Guidelines permit teachers to make single copies
of the following for scholarly research or use in preparing for or
teaching a class:
A chapter from a book;
An article from a periodical or newspaper;
A short story, short essay or short poem, whether or
not from a collective work;
A chart graph, diagram, drawing cartoon or picture
from a book, periodical, or newspaper.57
As to multiple copies, the Classroom Guidelines permit
teachers to make not more than one copy per student for use in
their class if three conditions are met.58 The first condition
requires that the use satisfy the tests of “spontaneity” and
“brevity.”59 The Classroom Guidelines state that spontaneity
consists of two components.60 First, “[t]he copying [must be] at
the instance and inspiration of the individual teacher.”61 Second,
“[t]he inspiration and decision to use the work and the moment of
its use for maximum teaching effectiveness are so close in time

of copying permitted under these guidelines may not be permissible in the future; and
conversely that in the future other types of copying not permitted under these guidelines
may be permissible under revised guidelines. Moreover, the following statement of
guidelines is not intended to limit the types of copying permitted under the standards of
fair use under judicial decision and which are stated in Section 107 of the Copyright
Revision Bill. There may be instances in which copying which does not fall within the
guidelines stated below may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.”).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 69.
59
Id. at 68. The Senate Report also contained comments suggesting that spontaneity
should be a primary concern in determining fair use. It stated that “[t]he fair use doctrine
in the case of classroom copying would apply primarily to the situation of a teacher who,
acting individually and at his own volition, makes one or more copies for temporary use
by himself or his pupils in the classroom.” S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 63 (1975).
60
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68.
61
Id.
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that it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request
for permission.”62
The “brevity” requirement is more detailed and changes
depending on the type of work used.63 For poetry, the teacher may
copy “(a) [a] complete poem if less than 250 words and if printed
on not more than two pages or, (b) from a longer poem, an excerpt
of not more than 250 words.”64 For prose, the teacher may copy
“(a) [e]ither a complete article, story or essay of less than 2,500
words, or (b) an excerpt from any prose work of not more than
1,000 words or 10% of the work, whichever is less, but in any
event a minimum of 500 words.”65 Brevity for illustrations means
a copy of “[o]ne chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon or picture
per book or per periodical issue.”66 For so-called “special
works,”—“[c]ertain work in poetry, prose or in ‘poetic prose’
which often combine language with illustrations and which are
intended sometimes for children and at other times for a more
general audience [that] fall short of 2,500 words in their
entirety”—teachers “may not . . . reproduce[] [them] in their
entirety.”67 They may, “however, [make copies of] an excerpt
comprising not more than two of the published pages of such
special work and containing not more than 10% of the words found
in the text.”68
The second condition for multiple classroom copies requires
the use to satisfy the “cumulative effect” test.69 This test has three
requirements. First, the teacher may make copies “for only one
course in the school in which the copies are made.”70 Second, the
teacher cannot copy “more than one short poem, article, story,
essay or two excerpts . . . from the same author, nor more than
three from the same collective work or periodical volume during

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 69.
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one class term.”71 Finally, the teacher cannot make multiple copies
of works more than nine times for one course during one term.72
The Classroom Guidelines state that these latter two requirements
of the cumulative effect test do not apply to current newspapers
and periodicals.73
The final condition requires each copy bear a notice of
copyright.74 In addition to these three conditions for making
multiple copies, the Classroom Guidelines provide express
prohibitions on particular uses of works.75 Among these are
prohibitions on copying designed to replace compilations or
anthologies, “consumable workbooks,” or the purchase of books
generally.76 Under the Guidelines, students cannot be charged
more than the cost of copying the work.77
B. Judicial Treatment of the Guidelines
The Educational Guidelines discussed above have an allure—a
certain mathematical character that makes their application seem
mechanical and almost algebraic.78 At least they seem that way
compared to the fair use factors, which lend themselves to judicial
decisions that employ post-hoc rationale.79 Indeed, some courts
endorse the certainty-enhancing characterization of the

71

Id.
Id. (“There shall not be more than nine instances of such multiple copying for one
course during one class term.”).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 68.
75
Id. at 69–70.
76
Id. at 69.
77
Id. at 70.
78
Kate Irwin, Note, Copyright Law—Librarians Who Teach: Expanding the Distance
Education Rights of Libraries by Applying the Technology Education and Copyright
Harmonization Act of 2002, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 875, 894 (2007) (opining that
“[t]he Classroom Guidelines provide a more mathematical and rigid scheme than the
four-factor fair use test for determining whether a use of copyrighted material is
justified”).
79
See Scott M. Martin, Photocopying and the Doctrine of Fair Use: The Duplication
of Error, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 345, 352–54 (1992) (describing Professor David
Nimmer’s criticism of the fair use test as a method for courts to engage in post-hoc
rationalization and arguing that this is exactly the kind of fluidity that the fair use test
facilitates and encourages).
72
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Guidelines.80 This mechanical appearance has influenced the
courts’ use of the Classroom Guidelines in their analysis of cases
involving educational fair uses.81 That treatment affects the way
educational institutions view and use the Guidelines. This subpart
first explores the cases in which the Classroom Guidelines have
been discussed, delineating three categories of uses the courts have
carved out. This analysis sets up the discussion in the next section,
which describes how this treatment has influenced educators’ use
(or lack thereof) of copyrighted works for teaching purposes.
1. The Guidelines as Pseudo Law
Several courts have used the Classroom Guidelines in one form
or another, as discussed below. Regardless of how the courts
applied them, the courts are using the Guidelines. Prior to
examining them, however, courts disclaim the Guidelines’ status as
positive law.82 Nevertheless, that disclaimer does not change the
practical effect of the courts’ discussion: they are legitimatizing the
Guidelines as pseudo law.83
In Marcus v. Rowley,84 for example, the Ninth Circuit analyzed
whether the defendant, a teacher, had made “fair use” of the
plaintiff’s booklet.85 To do this, the court walked through each of
the fair use factors, eventually finding that the defendant did not

80
See, e.g., Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The guidelines
were designed to give teachers direction as to the extent of permissible copying and to
eliminate some of the doubt which had previously existed in this area of copyright . . . .”).
81
See infra Part I.B.2.
82
See Rowley, 695 F.2d at 1178 (“Thus, while [the Guidelines] are not controlling on
the court, they are instructive on the issue of fair use in the context of this case.”).
83
See id.
84
695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
85
In Rowley, the plaintiff was a public school teacher who had published, and owned
the registered copyright in, a booklet on cake decorating. Id. at 1173. The defendant also
was a schoolteacher, though she previously had been a student of the plaintiff. Id. In
addition to taking the plaintiff’s course and purchasing the plaintiff’s booklet, the
defendant used the plaintiff’s booklet to compile a packet for the food service careers
class that she taught. Id. The booklet she made was “twenty-four pages and was designed
to be used by students who wished to study an optional section of her course devoted to
cake decorating.” Id. The defendant made fifteen copies of her work, which used about
50% of the plaintiff’s booklet, and placed them on file for her students. Id. She used
these packets for three consecutive years. Id.
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engage in fair use.86 After explaining each factor, the court, in a
separate section entitled, “The Congressional Guidelines,” applied
the Classroom Guidelines.87 Prior to this application, the court
explained that Congressional concern over educational use was so
great that “it approved a set of guidelines with respect to [this
use].”88 The court stated that, “while [the Guidelines] are not
controlling on the court, they are instructive on the issue of fair use
in the context of this case.”89 Before proceeding to its analysis, the
court correctly noted that “[t]he [Classroom] [G]uidelines were
intended to represent minimum standards of fair use,” and “were
designed to give teachers direction as to the extent of permissible
copying and to eliminate some of the doubt which had previously
existed in this area of copyright law[].”90
So, while the court noted that the Guidelines were not the law,
it touted their benefits and analyzed them anyway.91 In so doing, it
considered the Guidelines’ strictures as per se limits on the
“fairness” of a use, noting that “copying is permissible if three tests
are met”: brevity and spontaneity; cumulative effect; and notice.92
It found that “[the defendant’s] copying would not be permissible
under either” the test for brevity or spontaneity.93
Then,
classifying the defendant’s book as a “special work,” the court
found it still failed the brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect
tests.94 “In conclusion,” the court stated, “it appears that [the
86

See id. at 1175–78.
See id. at 1178–79.
88
Id. at 1178.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
See id. at 1178–79.
92
Id. at 1178.
93
Id.
94
Id. Rather than cease its inquiry, the court attempted to find an alternative basis
upon which these tests could be satisfied by classifying the plaintiff’s booklet as a
“special work.” Id. (As explained supra Part.I.A.2, “special works” are those that
combine images and text, and are intended for children or a general audience, an
impossibly vague standard.) It then tested the special work for brevity, finding that “[the
defendant’s] copying would not be permissible under this test.” Id. Moving to
spontaneity, the court found that the “[d]efendant compiled her [work] during the
summer of 1975 and first used it in her classes during the 1975–76 school year. She also
used [her work] for the following two school years.” Id. As a result, her “copying [did]
not meet this requirement.” Id. Next it assessed the “cumulative effect” test. Id. The
87
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defendant’s] copying would not qualify as fair use under the
[G]uidelines.”95
Other courts have taken a similar tack and treated the
Guidelines as legislative history that constituted “persuasive
authority.”96 The court in Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics
Corp.,97 like the Rowley court, first examined the four fair use
factors.98 Then it stated that the Guidelines were part of the
legislative history,99 which demonstrated a “Congress[ional]
[attempt to avoid] the maelstrom [of dispute over photocopying
that was] beginning to churn and . . . to clarify, through a broad
mandate, its intentions.”100 Like the Rowley court, the court in
Basic Books proceeded to apply the Guidelines.101 Although the
court properly noted that the Guidelines represented the minimum
standard and were “more or less permissive,”102 it found that the
defendant’s uses violated all three tests—brevity and spontaneity,
court noted that, because the defendant copied only one piece of the plaintiff’s work,” the
“[d]efendant’s conduct . . . satisf[ied] the second test under the [G]uidelines.” Id. Finally,
the court found that the “defendant’s [work] did not acknowledge plaintiff’s authorship or
copyright and therefore [failed] . . . [the third] test.” Id.
95
Id. By treating any use that falls outside the Guidelines as militating against fair
use, the court used the Guidelines as the maximum permissible limits of copying.
96
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc. (MDS), 99 F.3d 1381, 1390
(6th Cir. 1996). Blackwell Publishing, Inc. v. Excel Research Group, LLC, 661 F. Supp.
2d 786 (E.D. Mich. 2009), is the most recent Sixth Circuit case that relies on MDS’s
reasoning. The opinion, however, does not employ or even mention the Guidelines.
97
758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The defendant in Basic Books was a copy
shop, which, at the behest of university professors for twenty years, made course
“packets” by copying and then compiling excerpts of various copyrighted works without
the copyright owners’ consent. Id. at 1526. The defendant was a for-profit business that
marketed its services to university professors. Id. at 1529.
98
See id. at 1530–34. The deck appears to have been stacked against the defendant in
Basic Books. The court, when examining the third fair use factor (amount and
substantiality), stated that “the portions copied were critical parts of the books copied . . .
since that is the likely reason the college professors used them in their classes.” Id. at
1533. If there ever has been reasoning more circular than this, I have not seen it. By this
logic, every copied portion of the work is the “heart” of the work merely by virtue of the
professor selecting it.
99
Id. at 1535 (“The Classroom Guidelines . . . are a part of the legislative history of the
Copyright Act of 1976.”).
100
Id.
101
See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 1983); Basic Books, 758
F. Supp. at 1535–37.
102
Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1536 (footnote omitted).
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cumulative effect, and notice—but did not comment specifically
on what effect, in terms of fair use, that finding had.103
The court further declined to hold that the Classroom
Guidelines’ “prohibitions” constituted rigid bars to certain uses.104
Finally, when assessing whether the defendant was a willful
infringer, it noted that the defendant’s handbook attempted to
escape any application of fair use by claiming the Guidelines did
not apply.105 But a use “beyond the scope of the Guidelines” did
not render the law a nullity: fair use law still applied.106
The courts in Encyclopedia Britannica v. Crooks,107 American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,108 and Princeton University
Press v. Michigan Document Services,109 also used the Guidelines
103

Id. at 1537. Professor Ann Bartow has stated that courts, as I argue the courts
interpreting the Guidelines repeatedly do, “simultaneously interpret[ed] the Guidelines as
both the minimum and maximum scope of fair use.” Bartow, supra note 5, at 184.
Generally, this type of interpretation starts with a disclaimer that the Guidelines represent
the minimum standard of fair use. See, e.g., Rowley, 695 F.2d at 1178. The court then
finds that the use is not fair because it falls outside the Guidelines’ limits. See id.
104
Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1537. The court was “convinced that . . . the more
prudent path” was to consider the prohibitions in light of the fair use factors, rather “than
[make] a bright line pronouncement . . . that all unconsented anthologies are prohibited
without a fair use analysis.” Id.
105
Id. at 1545.
106
Id. When determining whether the defendant acted willfully, thus triggering higher
statutory damages, the court looked to the “training [the defendant] provided its
employees regarding fair use requirements.” Id. at 1544. It noted that the defendant’s
handbook referenced the Classroom Guidelines and accurately stated that they
represented the minimum amount of permissible copying. Id. at 1545. The handbook
also stated that the Classroom Guidelines “‘[had] little application for the college and
university classroom situations’” because the copying would typically exceed them. Id.
The court found this to be self-serving, stating that the defendant essentially “exempted
itself from the purview of the Guidelines altogether.” Id. This implies that the defendant
is subject to the Guidelines, which therefore have some legal effect. In other words, the
Guidelines play some role in legal analysis, if only to determine good faith.
107
542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). Crooks concerned multiple defendants—
Board of Educational Services, First Supervisory District, Erie County, New York
(“BOCES”) and its individual officers and directors. Id. at 1159. BOCES was an
educational service provider that copied television broadcasts to videotapes and compiled
a library of these recordings. Id. (“BOCES was created under section 1950 of the New
York Education Law for the purpose of providing educational services and specialized
instruction on a cooperative basis to the 19 school districts within its geographic
region.”).
108
60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
109
99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
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as legislative history. The Crooks court stated that, “[w]hile not
controlling[,] . . . the Congressional Reports on the 1976 Copyright
Legislation are helpful in outlining acceptable fair use limits in
educational settings.”110 Specifically, the court quoted the Senate
Report for the proposition that “spontaneity” should be considered,
along with whether the teacher or administration directed the
copying.111
The Texaco court only briefly mentioned the Guidelines as
legislative history, and did not discuss them in its legal analysis.112
MDS, however, did use the Guidelines extensively; it adopted the
Texaco court’s description of the Guidelines’ effect as “‘persuasive
authority,’”113 noting that “[t]he House and Senate conferees
explicitly accepted the Classroom Guidelines ‘as part of their
understanding of fair use.’”114 Like the previous courts, the MDS
court reached the Guidelines only after analyzing the four fair use
factors.115 But it nonetheless stated that they provided “general
guidance” on the issue of fair use,116 classified them as a “safe
harbor,” and found that copying falling well outside their scope
110

Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1175.
Id. at 1175. The court also observed that the Senate Report suggested fair use
inquiries consider the number of copies, the circulation of the copies, and the continued
use or destruction of the copies. Id. at 1175 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 63 (1975)).
Although not referring to either the House or Senate Reports, the court did, when
examining market effect, look at the “‘cumulative effect of mass reproduction of the
copyrighted works.’” Id. at 1169 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 659 F.2d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). One must
remember that the cumulative effect discussed here relates to § 107(4); it is not the same
as the one discussed in the Classroom Guidelines. The court noted that “plaintiffs’
blanket assertion that off-the-air videotaping can never be fair use is not supported by the
House and Senate Reports on the 1976 Copyrights [sic] Act when videotaping is used for
non-profit classroom purposes.” Id. at 1179 n.19. In Crooks, the court found that the
defendant copied generally; that teachers requested the videos; that there was no
provision for returning or erasing the videos after use; and that, “in at least one instance, a
videotape copy was circulated ‘beyond the classroom.’” Id. at 1175. The court held that
the defendant’s use was not fair. Id. at 1179.
112
See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 919 n.5.
113
MDS, 99 F.3d at 1390 (quoting Texaco, 60 F.3d at 919 n.5).
114
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1733, at 70 (1976)).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1391 (“Although the guidelines do not purport to be a complete and definitive
statement on fair use law for educational copying, and although they do not have the
force of law, they do provide us general guidance.”).
111
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“weigh[ed] against a finding of fair use.”117 Even one dissenting
judge, who strongly disapproved of the use of legislative history,
conceded that the Guidelines were a “safe harbor.”118
Similarly, the court in Bridge Publications v. Vien119 applied
the Guidelines after analyzing the four fair use factors.120 As a
result of this analysis, the court found that the “defendant’s use
d[id] not fit within the special [G]uidelines approved by Congress
as to fair use in the educational context.”121
In addition to these cases, one other, which did not involve a
judicial decision, merits attention. Addison Wesley Publishing Co.
v. New York University,122 involved a settlement between a copyshop and a publisher.123 The settlement agreement prohibited the
copy-shop from making copies except in the following cases: (1)
where it secured the copyright owner’s consent;124 or (2) at the
117

Id.
In his dissent, Judge Ryan stated that the majority erred in “using legislative history,
specifically the ‘Classroom Guidelines,’ to decide the issue of classroom use.” Id. at 1398
(Ryan, J., dissenting). He acknowledged that the Guidelines provide a “safe harbor,” but
emphasized that they were not law and should not be treated as such. Id. at 1410–11.
Judge Ryan did not see why legislative history should be consulted at all, suggesting that
the fair use factors did not give rise to any ambiguity. See id. at 1411. The remainder of
this criticism was not directed at the Classroom Guidelines themselves, but their status as
a piece of legislative history. Judge Ryan concluded that
[t]he fact that Congress saw fit, very likely in the interests of political
expediency, to pay unusual deference to the “agreement” of
interested parties about what they would like the law to be, even to
the point of declaring (but not in the statute) that the parties’
agreement was part of the committee’s “understanding” of fair use,
does not affect the rule of construction that binds this court.
Id. at 1412.
119
827 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
120
Id. at 635. In Vien, a former member of the Church of Scientology (“COS”) had
broken away from COS and founded her own religious organization. Id. at 634. As part
of new religion, she developed a “course,” which included written materials that had been
copied from COS’s copyrighted works. Id. COS sued for copyright infringement. Id.
The court applied each of the four fair use factors and then found additionally that the
“defendant’s use d[id] not fit within the special [G]uidelines approved by Congress as to
fair use in the educational context.” Id. at 636.
121
Id. at 636.
122
No. 82 Civ 8333 (ADS), 1983 WL 1134 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983).
123
Id. at *5.
124
Id. at *2. In other words, the copy-center could make copies after requesting and
receiving permission from the copyright owner.
118
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request of New York University (“NYU”) faculty (i) where the
requested copying fell within the Classroom Guidelines,125 or (ii)
where the requested copying had been approved by NYU’s
General Counsel as conforming to NYU’s Policy Statement on
Copying (“Policy Statement”).126
NYU developed its Policy Statement in response to the lawsuit;
it did not previously have such a policy.127 The opening passage of
the Policy Statement explained that it sought to address the
concerns of educators who feared committing copyright
violations.128 It also sought to reduce the University’s exposure to
liability.129 Essentially, the Policy Statement sought to create
certainty where “neither the statute nor judicial decisions give
specific practical guidance on what photocopying falls within fair
use.”130
The Policy itself used the Classroom Guidelines “to determine
whether . . . the prior permission of a copyright owner” must be
sought.131 Under the Policy, which is still in place,132 “[i]f
proposed photocopying is not permitted under the [Classroom]
Guidelines[,] . . . permission to copy is to be sought.”133 When that
permission is denied, photocopying can take place only after a
review by the University’s General Counsel, who will either

125

Id. The copy-center could make copies “at the request of a faculty member of a
non-profit institution” so long as the copying is “in full compliance with the conditions of
Paragraph II and III of [the Classroom Guidelines].” Id.
126
Id. The copy-center could make copies “at the request of a New York University
faculty member [if the] copying has been approved by the General Counsel of the
University in compliance with the University’s ‘Policy Statement on Photocopying of
Copyrighted Materials for Classroom and Research Use.’” Id.
127
Id. at *5. Although NYU did not previously have a formal policy, it had distributed
a document entitled “Interim Guidelines Concerning Photocopying for Classroom
Research and Library Use” on January 18, 1983, which the Policy Statement superseded.
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at *6.
132
N.Y. UNIV., FACULTY HANDBOOK (1999), available at http://www.nyu.edu/oaa/
policies.html#photocopy (discussing the “Statement of Policy on Photocopying
Copyrighted Materials”).
133
Id.
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approve or deny the request.134 Under the Policy, the University
will indemnify or defend faculty where the proposed use falls
outside the Guidelines only if they seek and heed the advice of the
General Counsel.135
Each of these decisions has given the Classroom Guidelines the
appearance of law—creating pseudo law. That is, the Guidelines
became a form of law that lacks controlling weight, but retains
persuasive authority. Rowley emphasized the Congressional
adoption of the Classroom Guidelines and called them
“instructive.”136 It further gave them importance by using the
Guidelines as a separate test under which it evaluated the fairness
of the use.137
Basic Books, MDS, and Vien also elevated the Guidelines
status as pseudo law. Calling the Guidelines “legislative history,”
the Basic Books court stated that they clarified Congress’s
intentions with respect to educational fair use and evaluated the
defendants’ use under them.138 Likewise, the MDS court found the
Guidelines, as legislative history, offered “general guidance,”
which, when applied, weighed against the defendant.139
To a lesser extent, Crooks and Texaco achieved a similar result.
The Crooks court found that the Congressional Reports were
“helpful” in evaluating fair use,140 while the Texaco court found
the Guidelines to be “persuasive authority.”141
Finally, while not a judicial decision, NYU cemented the
Guidelines place as a substantive legal tool for both courts and
educators.142 The consent decree expressly adopted the Guidelines
as a de facto maximum threshold of fair use, requiring consent of
134

Id.
Id.
136
Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983).
137
Id. at 1178–79.
138
See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1544–46
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
139
See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390–92
(6th Cir. 1996).
140
Encyc. Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1175 (W.D.N.Y.
1982).
141
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1994).
142
See infra Part I.C.
135
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NYU’s General Counsel for any copying that exceeded the
Guidelines’ scope.143 The same proscriptions applied to NYU
faculty under the University’s copying policy.144
2. Guidelines as Sub-Factors or Additional Factors Under §
107
Beyond the persuasive authority courts give to the Guidelines,
some also use the Guidelines directly in their fair use
determinations. Because § 107 provides a non-exhaustive list of
fair use factors, courts may develop other factors.145 In this
respect, the courts’ use of the Guidelines represent two possible
scenarios. First, each could represent “sub-factors” included in
analysis of some (or all) of the fair use factors. This is essentially
what the Crooks and Texaco courts did when, discussing the
purpose and character of the use, they referenced the Senate Report
and House Reports.146
The MDS court also took this approach when assessing the
third fair use factor, “‘the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.’”147 Here, the
court observed that “[t]he amounts used in the case at bar . . . far
exceed the 1,000-word safe harbor that we shall discuss in the next
part of this opinion.”148 This type of sub-factor use solidifies the
Guidelines as part of the law—i.e., it adopts them as considerations
under § 107’s fair use factors.

143

See Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82 Civ 8333 (ADS), 1983 WL
1134, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983).
144
Id.
145
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc.,
99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 1996); Texaco, 60 F.3d. at 918–19; Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at
1175.
146
See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 918–19; Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1175.
147
MDS, 99 F.3d at 1389 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(3)).
148
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976)). The reference to the Guidelines here
raises the following questions: Was the court incorporating by reference its analysis in
the following section? If so, how much of its analysis did it incorporate? The best
reading takes the statement at face value, viewing it as an incorporation of only the word
limit(s) set by the Guidelines.
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Second, “other factors” could mean additional factors the court
may consider beyond the four factors articulated in § 107.149 This
is the type of behavior in which the courts in Rowley, MDS, and
Vien appeared to engage.150 Like the use of the Guidelines as subfactors, their use as additional factors does more than create
pseudo law, it adopts the Guidelines as law.151 In other words, the
courts essentially adopted the Guidelines as additional factors
under § 107 when they considered and used them in their fair use
analysis. There is merit to that line of analysis: when the courts
state that the defendant’s use falls outside the Guidelines, and
therefore weighs against fair use,152 they are stating that this
additional factor (the Guidelines) weighs against fair use.
Some courts, however, go further and explicitly treat part(s) of
the Guidelines as an additional factor under § 107. The Basic
Books court did just that when it conducted an analysis under a
section titled, “Other Factors.”153 First, the court noted that the
defendant’s activities “created a new nationwide business” that

149

Simply using additional factors does not violate § 107, which contemplates the use
of factors not listed. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . . .”).
Additional factors, however, must be tied to the law in some way. The Classroom
Guidelines do not exhibit this necessary trait. See Crews, supra note 34, at 618.
150
See supra notes 119, 136, 139 and accompanying text.
151
See Crews, supra note 34, at 618. Here it becomes easy to see how blurry the line
between law and pseudo law is, especially with respect to fair use. While the four fair
use factors are the law, courts are free to consider other factors. What is the difference
between using an additional factor and looking to the legislative history for guidance?
From a practical standpoint, none exists: each is treated as part of the fair use analysis.
The obfuscation is due, in part, to courts’ failure to explicitly state how they use the
Guidelines in their fair use analyses.
152
MDS, 99 F.3d at 1391 (stating that, because the defendant’s use fell outside the
Guidelines, it “weigh[ed] against a finding of fair use”); see Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d
1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that the defendant’s use was not fair under the
statutory factors or the Guidelines); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering the Guidelines’ “prohibitions” on
anthologies in light of the other fair use factors).
153
Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1534–35. This section of the opinion is poorly
organized. The court discusses the Classroom Guidelines under both heading “A.5,”
labeled “Other Factors,” and heading “B,” labeled “The Classroom Guidelines.” See id. at
1534–37. To make matters worse, the court then places the word “Anthologies” in italics
and proceeds to make an analysis of this issue. See id. at 1537. It does not, however, tie
all of this analysis together.
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usurped the plaintiffs’ potential profits.154 Then, the court found
that, because the “Classroom Guidelines express a specific
prohibition of anthologies[,] . . . [t]he fact that these excerpts were
compiled and sold in anthologies weighs against [the]
defendant.”155
The Vien court made a similar maneuver. After addressing
each fair use factor under § 107, it conducted an independent
analysis of the Guidelines, finding that the defendant’s use “[was]
clearly not within the letter or spirit of the Congressional
[G]uidelines.”156 More importantly, however, the court, like the
court in MDS,157 weighed that finding in its fair use determination,
stating that, “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, and after
balancing the four statutory factors, as well as the Congressional
[G]uidelines on fair use in the educational context, the . . .
defendant [was] not entitled to fair use protection.”158
Both Basic Books and Vien did more than just create pseudo
law; they adopted part(s) of the Guidelines as additional factors
under the § 107 analysis.159 This means that, under certain
circumstances, part(s) of the Guidelines should be considered in
the fair use analysis as a separately weighed factor.

154

Id. at 1534. This type of reasoning is problematic because the plaintiffs had not yet
entered the market. Some of the approaches discussed infra Part II address this problem.
155
Id. at 1535. It also bears mentioning that the court rejected fair use in this context
(anthologies) because the defendants “failed to prove [their] central contention[,] which
[was] that enjoining them from pirating plaintiffs’ copyrights would halt the educational
process.” Id. That reasoning is faulty for two reasons. First, fair use, especially in the
educational context, does not hinge on the industry at issue “coming to a halt.” The court
erroneously concluded that, for a use to be educationally beneficial (and fair), the
plaintiff must show that absent that use, the educational system could not function. The
Copyright Act itself belies such a conclusion. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)–(2) (2006)
(exempting from infringement the display or performance of copyrighted materials in
certain educational situations). Education would still continue if § 110 did not exist; the
point is that the absence of that section would hinder education. Second, the court
couched its language in terms of piracy. In that sense, it concluded what it sought to
prove.
156
Bridge Publ’ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 636 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
157
MDS, 99 F.3d at 1390–91.
158
Vien, 827 F. Supp. at 636.
159
See id. at 636; Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1534–37.
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Whether treating the Guidelines as “instructive” (Rowley)160 or
as part of the four fair use factors,161 courts have elevated the status
of this legislative history into pseudo law. When using the
Guidelines in these ways, courts apparently aim to better inform
their decisions—but they never examine the relationship of the
Guidelines to the law of fair use.162 Instead, they treat the
Guidelines as “persuasive” (Texaco)163 or “helpful” (Crooks)164 by
virtue of their status as legislative history.165 In that sense, courts
seem less concerned with the Guidelines’ philosophical and legal
justification than with the courts’ ultimate fair use decision, using
the Guidelines to bolster a decision already reached.
Not only does this blithe use of the Guidelines distort the law,
it means that the precedential value of law, and its subsequent
effect, will have distorted results. In other words, courts’ decisions
using the Guidelines have negative implications for how the
Guidelines are viewed and used by the educational community.
That affects both how teachers educate their students and how
students learn. The next subpart details the educational response to
the courts’ treatment of the Guidelines as pseudo law.
C. The Educational Response: Consequences of Courts’ Decisions
As we have seen, the courts’ treatment of the Classroom
Guidelines, if not always making them (part of) the law, has made
them look like the law—turning them into pseudo law.166 In either
case, the courts have erred. The Guidelines, as repeated by

160

Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983).
MDS, 99 F.3d at 1390; Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919
(2d Cir. 1994); Rowley, 695 F.2d at 1178; Vien, 837 F. Supp. at 636; Basic Books, 758 F.
Supp. at 1534; Encyc. Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1175
(W.D.N.Y. 1982).
162
No court has ever examined whether the Classroom Guidelines have any mooring in
fair use law.
163
Texaco, 60 F.3d at 919.
164
Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1175.
165
One thing the Classroom Guidelines have not done is persuade judges to use them
by virtue of the reasoning upon which they are based. Courts have utilized them because
they are legislative history, not because they have any principled basis in the law.
Thanks to Harold Krent for helping me articulate this point.
166
See Crews, supra note 34, at 618.
161
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commentators and judges, are not the law.167 Beyond that obvious
but overlooked fact, however, is another problem: the Guidelines
do not have much, if any, mooring to the law of fair use.168 That
lacuna—between the Guidelines and the Copyright Act—impacts
the operation of the law. The copying policies adopted by schools,
which frequently are based on the Guidelines, will not be shaped
by the law of fair use—or its purpose. At best, the concepts and
rules in the Classroom Guidelines reflect proxies for legal concepts
found in fair use.169 At worst, they represent solely the interests of
one or more parties to the Agreement.
This acceptance of the Guidelines as some type of legal
authority displaces the law of fair use and “freeze[s] the means for
satisfying the fair use statue.”170 That, in turn, has consequences
for educators. After all, “[h]ow one understands and characterizes
the [G]uidelines . . . will consequently shape the fair use decision
based upon them.”171

167

See id. at 618, 664–68; see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs.,
Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1410–11 (6th Cir. 1996) (Ryan, J., dissenting); Jessica D. Litman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 863 (1987)
(“The legislative history of the 1976 Act contains little evidence of Congress’s specific
intent on any substantive issue. Courts searching for such evidence have ultimately relied
upon an assortment of often conflicting inferences drawn from the absence of such
evidence.”); id. at 865 (“Yet one can read this history in its entirety and find no evidence
that any member of Congress intended anything in particular to follow from many
provisions of the statute.”); id. at 870 (“[A] review of the provision’s legislative history
will show that credit for its substance belongs more to the representatives of interested
parties negotiating among themselves than to the members of Congress who sponsored,
reported, or debated the bill.”); id. at 887–88 (detailing the process of negotiation within
the Ad Hoc Committee and noting that “[p]arties on both sides of the controversy refused
to budge, and the compromise came unglued. At the House and Senate Subcommittees’
insistence, the parties continued to hold negotiations with the hope of reaching another,
more durable compromise. They agreed, finally, on the language. They failed, however,
to agree on what the language meant” (footnotes omitted)); Rothman, supra note 47, at
1904.
168
See Crews, supra note 34, at 616–19. But see, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Too Many
Markets or Too Few? Copyright Policy Toward Shared Works, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 903,
937 (2004) (arguing spontaneous uses as being “fairer” because they “usually have little
impact on copyright owners’ profit and in aggregate provide significant social benefit”).
169
See Meurer, supra note 168, at 936–37.
170
Crews, supra note 34, at 665–66.
171
Id. at 612.
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In giving the Classroom Guidelines the effect or appearance of
law, courts improperly ossified distorted standards (rules?) of fair
use172 and concomitantly fostered uncertainty.173 The ossification
process was gradual but steady. Crooks and Rowley marked the
first judicial embrace of the Classroom Guidelines and set the stage
for the NYU settlement, which “[sent] out a clear warning as to
what the publishers believe[d] the obligations that colleges and
universities have concerning the duplication of copyrighted
works.”174 Actually, it did more than that; it created a baseline
standard, and precedent, for educational fair use, which all other
educational institutions felt pressured to follow.175 Who could
blame them? The publishing companies had “sent [out] hundreds
of letters to colleges and universities throughout the country urging
them to adopt the guidelines or face a risk of litigation.”176
Fear litigation they did: after this broadcast, even though the
settlement was not law, “a significant number of universities had
similarly restrictive Guidelines[-]driven photocopy policies in
place.”177 The resulting standard, which the Association of
American Law Schools (“AALS”) and the American Association
of University Professors (“AAUP”) opposed,178 followed the
Rowley court’s use of the Guidelines as a limit on photocopying.179
172

Ossification does not refer merely to the development of a rule that is difficult to
change. Instead, it describes the process by which courts have improperly relied on the
Guidelines to erect pseudo law, which has almost no basis in fair use law. See supra Part
I.B.
173
See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007) (“[Fair
use] is so case-specific that it offers precious little guidance about its scope to . . .
educators . . . who require use of another’s copyrighted expression in order to
communicate effectively.”).
174
Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Photocopying Copyrighted Course Materials: Doesn’t
Anyone Remember the NYU Case?, 50 EDUC. L. REP. 317, 320 (1989); see Marcus v.
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983); Encyc. Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks,
542 F. Supp. 1156, 1175 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
175
Crews, supra note 34, at 640.
176
Id.; see also Bartow, supra note 5, at 170.
177
Bartow, supra note 5, at 170; see also Rothman, supra note 47, at 1953–54 (“The
settlement in the NYU lawsuit, involving copying of materials for classroom use, led
many universities and copy stores to license material, even though there was no
governing case law on the legitimacy or legality of copying works for use as course
materials.” (footnote omitted)).
178
See Steinbach, supra note 174, at 320.
179
Crews, supra note 34, at 650–51.
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The NYU case and the Association of American Publishers’
(“AAP”) subsequent lobbying efforts, however important, did not,
by themselves, confirm legal status of the Classroom Guidelines;
that was space the Basic Books and MDS courts willingly filled.
The former did so by expressly analyzing the Classroom
Guidelines in its “other factors” section,180 and the latter did so by
confirming the use of the Classroom Guidelines as a tool for
evaluating fair use.181 These decisions quashed any doubts that the
Classroom Guidelines would be used as a basis for a fair use
determination in educational context.182 Additionally, Basic Books
and MDS, as well as Texaco, did more than merely confirm this
standard—they legitimized industry clearance practices and made
them part of the fair use calculus.183
This distorted ossification has negative effects for educators
and educational institutions. First, it creates a fair use system that
is asymmetrical, failing to consider the educational (students’,
teachers’, administrators’, and school districts’) interests. The
“legalization” of the Guidelines as a maximum standard—or
perhaps a rule—means the courts adopted the industry “clearance
culture,”184 framing the fair use debate in terms of market failure
and industry standards instead of the statutory factors.185 This
180

See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535–37
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
181
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390–91 (6th
Cir. 1996) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
182
See Rothman, supra note 47, at 1954 (“[T]he practices that followed in the wake of
a single settlement and a single court case further entrenched the custom and also
reinforced legal precedents.”).
183
See id. at 1935, 1954; see also Bartow, supra note 5, at 185 (noting that, after the
Basic Books decision, “the Association of American Publishers (A.A.P.) cited [Basic
Books] with relish in a letter to a commercial photocopying enterprise in College Park,
Maryland[,] . . . [in which] the A.A.P. threatened ‘enhanced monitoring of anthologies at
your facility for copyright infringement’ and ‘a suit seeking a substantial recovery like
that in the [Basic Books] case’”).
184
See Rothman, supra note 47, at 1911–18; see also Bartow, supra note 5, at 151
(“Publishers . . . have used favorable court decisions and the threat of expensive litigation
to coerce commercial photocopiers to pay permission fees for the privilege of making any
copies at all, whether or not the use might be a fair one, and in some cases even when the
work is not eligible for copyright protection.”).
185
See Bartow, supra note 5, at 151 (“[O]ver the past decade[,] the scope of educational
fair use has been dramatically compressed by judges who ignore the external benefits of
fair use, and respond only to the lost dollars publishers ascribe to the doctrine.”); Paul
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means teachers’ arguments that uses are fair because they are
educational (an express feature of § 107), transformative, or
something else, are less relevant.
This focus on market failure, however, is flawed because it
presumes (i) that market failure is an adequate barometer of fair
use in the educational context;186 (ii) that transaction costs or social
value are adequate measures of the market;187 and (iii) that the
possibility of licensing weighs against a finding of fair use.188
None of these statements is necessarily true;189 and their
acceptance places educators seeking to utilize fair use in an
unenviable position. Their conduct is evaluated against standards

Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 133, 134–43
(2003); Meurer, supra note 168, at 908 (criticizing judges for relying too much on
transaction costs and curing market failure); Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the
Rule of Reason, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317, 333 (2009) (“Copyright is
justified . . . by a fear of market failure created by uncontrolled copying, and resulting in
sub-optimal incentives to create new artistic and literary works.”). See generally Wendy
J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1631 (1982).
186
See Bartow, supra note 5, at 181 (noting in Basic Books the “court’s overarching
position with respect to market effect was that rather than facilitating educational fair use
. . . Kinko’s was usurping royalties that rightfully belonged to publishers in the form of
profits on book sales, or permission fees”); id. at 189 (“[The MDS] court unmistakably
contemplated reducing the fair use inquiry to market effect alone.”).
187
See Gordon, supra note 185, at 1628 (“A particular type of market barrier is
transaction costs. As long as the cost of reaching and enforcing bargains is lower than
anticipated benefits from the bargains, markets will form. If transaction costs exceed
anticipated benefits, however, no transactions will occur. Thus, the confluence of two
variables is likely to produce a market barrier . . . .”).
188
See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882, 895–96 (2007) (“[W]hen a court is determining whether a given use
of copyrighted material is fair, one important factor is whether there already exists a
licensing market for the use in question. If such a market does not exist, then the fair use
claim gains ground. If the market does exist, then the fair use claim loses ground.”); see
also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 969, 971 (2007) (“[A] copyright owner can nearly always argue that she suffered
harm, if only because the defendant could have paid a license fee for the use being
challenged.”).
189
See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 188, at 982 (“[M]arket failure is not an external
phenomenon that justifies fair use after the proper scope of copyright protection is
determined. Rather, market failure is one basis for finding fair use because it represents a
situation in which a copyright owner suffers no real harm as a result of defendant’s
allegedly infringing activity.”).
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designed to serve industry or market interests, not educational
ones.
Under such standards, many educational uses are not fair
simply because they do not fulfill market objectives or conform to
industry practices. As Professor Jennifer Rothman has put it,
“[f]ailing to conform with industry practices is generally viewed
by [the] courts as ‘unfair.’”190 The asymmetric nature of the
Classroom Guidelines also puts industry interests ahead of
teachers’ interests and prevents teachers from using copyrighted
materials to effectively educate students.191 Additionally, focusing
on indicia like the market neglects the statutory language, which
the dissent in MDS noted expressly allows for teachers to make
copies.192 Under these circumstances, “[t]he four factors to be
considered, e.g., market effect and the portion of the work used,
are of limited assistance when the teaching use at issue fits
squarely within specific language of the statute, i.e., ‘multiple
copies for classroom use.’”193
There are other negative consequences as well: the treatment of
the Guidelines as law has a “chilling” effect on teachers and
students by enhancing uncertainty.194 Although the Guidelines
190

Rothman, supra note 47, at 1937.
Even Crews, who decries the Guidelines, notes their importance in the courts and
practice:
The [G]uidelines are . . . a compelling tool for educators who seek to
apply fair use and create policies. The [G]uidelines have the
appearance of having an official status, and they are widely accepted
by the publishing industry and other proprietor groups who may be
potential plaintiffs in copyright actions against the educators. If the
objective of an educator making policy is to avoid litigation, adopting
and following the [G]uidelines certainly offers the prospect of
discouraging a lawsuit.
Crews, supra note 34, at 693.
192
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1394 (6th Cir.
1996) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
193
Id. at 1395 (emphasis in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)).
194
Professor Michael Carroll has recognized such uncertainty. See Carroll, supra note
173, at 1115 (stating that the Classroom Guidelines “do provide clarity for a subset of
educational uses, but, because these guidelines serve only as a floor, many colorable fair
uses fall outside their ambit and remain subject to the standard four-factor uncertainty”
(footnote omitted)); id. at 1116–17 (describing examples of fair use uncertainty for
educators); id. at 1090 (“[Fair use] is so case-specific that it offers precious little
guidance about its scope to . . . educators . . . who require use of another’s copyrighted
191
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seem to give educators a measure of certainty, their status as actual
law is not settled.195 The uncertainty of fair use and the Guidelines
is exacerbated by the enforcement tactics of copyright owners, who
attempt to cement the Guidelines as maximum standards.196
Because cases like NYU, MDS, and Vien treat the Guidelines as
legal rules (or inflexible and maximum standards),197 some
teachers treat them as the law while others do not, relying instead
on the doctrine of fair use.198 This uncertainty—both as to the
legal status of the Guidelines as well as fair use itself—can lead to
one of two consequences: “Depending on the magnitude and the
context of such uncertainty concerning legal rules, affected parties
may either over- or under-comply with the stated rule.”199
This means that, depending on how risk-averse teachers are,
some will infringe more200 and some will infringe less.201 A
expression in order to communicate effectively.”); id. at 1114 (“If the oft-litigated issue
of parody remains uncertain ex ante, a second candidate for fair use clarity might be
educational uses.”). See generally Gibson, supra note 188, at 898–99 (explaining how
“doctrinal feedback” can create fear-induced licensing markets that self-perpetuate and
expand).
195
While the Guidelines are not settled law, copyright owners and interest groups
continue to endorse Guidelines. See, e.g., Lois F. Wasoff, Fair Use Guidelines for
Educational Multimedia, 517 PLI/Pat 111, 124 (1998).
196
See L. Ashley Aull, The Costs of Privilege: Defining Price in the Market for
Educational Copyright Use, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 573, 601 (2008) (“[T]he
enforcement strategies of copyright owners themselves impact prices [of educational
use]—both by manipulating uncertainty and by changing the chance of suit against
particular groups of users.”); id. at 603–05.
197
See supra Part I.B.1.
198
See Aull, supra note 196, at 602.
199
Id. at 602; see Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93
VA. L. REV. 1483, 1497–98 (2007) (“[L]aw and economics scholars have long observed
that vague standards cause overdeterrence.”).
200
At the beginning of the copyright law unit of my Education Law course, I ask
students to raise their hand if they think they ever have violated copyright law. Without
fail, nearly every person raises their hand, and yet none can articulate why, legally
speaking, they may have infringed a particular work. This raises four points. First,
teachers have little knowledge of what constitutes fair use (discussed below). Second,
they think that fair use is so restrictive that it denies them even basic rights, such as using
a picture in a Power Point presentation, which it clearly does not. Third, almost no
teachers have read their school’s copyright policy. Fourth, because they perceive
copyright law as rigid and do not even remotely understand its contours, or attempt to do
so, they continue to use copyrighted works in ways they think violate copyright law. All
four of these points are extremely worrisome and, in and of themselves, should motivate
a new solution to educational fair use.
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greater reliance on the Guidelines as the law—and worse yet, the
upper bound of the law202—would lead to fewer fair uses, even
when justified, for fear of infringement.203 The NYU settlement
and the subsequent university copyright policies developed
thereafter are evidence of this.204
Others who rely more on the fair use factors, by contrast, will
have greater space in which to teach using copyrighted materials,
though they may infringe more. This infringement also may be
kept quiet to avoid litigation205 and, in the process, produce
instructors who teach students that violating the law is acceptable,
201

Aull, supra note 196, at 602 (stating that parties “may either become more riskaverse than warranted (relying less upon fair use) or less risk-averse than warranted
(relying excessively upon fair use)”).
202
This conception of the Guidelines makes sense because “even the risk-averse actor
presumably will not seek a license in the face of clear legal precedent that obviates the
need to do so.” Gibson, supra note 188, at 905. That would explain, in part, why
educational institutions use the Guidelines as a maximum standard or as a rule. The cases
treat the Guidelines as the maximum extent of the law, and so educational institutions do
not seek licenses in the face of this “clear precedent.”
203
See Gibson, supra note 188, at 900; see also Aull, supra note 196, at 602–04
(“[P]ublishers and other owners’ actions can impact the price of educational use.”).
Explaining how doctrinal feedback can lead to a fear of infringement that would limit fair
use, Gibson states:
One of the interesting things about the doctrinal feedback
phenomenon is that it works an expansion of the copyright
entitlement in an inadvertent, accretive manner. The whole idea is
that risk-averse behavior prevents fair use claims from being
litigated, so a licensing culture emerges based on very few and very
infrequent guidelines from the positive law. Instead of looking to
courts and statutes for guidance, practitioners look to the internal
practices of the relevant industries and then apply the same marketreferential standards that they would expect courts to apply if they
were ever to litigate.
Gibson, supra note 188, at 900.
Gibson’s subsequent statement “that those typically blamed for copyright’s
growth—courts and legislatures—play at best a secondary role in this insidious means of
expansion,” however, is only partially true. Id. at 900. He is right that “[d]octrinal
feedback has little to do with case law and statutes, except insofar as reported decisions
entrench the statutory ambiguities that give rise to the risk aversion in the first place.” Id.
at 900–01. But that answer does not do justice to the decisions themselves, which do not
merely entrench statutory ambiguities; they set the Guidelines as the maximum standard
for educational fair use.
204
See Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82 Civ 8333 (ADS), 1983 WL
1134, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983); Carroll, supra note 173, at 1115–16.
205
See Gibson, supra note 188, at 899.
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as long as they do not get caught. But infringement is different
from litigation because the parties may not enforce their claims.
Thus, there may be some truth to the fact that non-enforcement
against individual teachers may make a use “free[r].”206 But that
same non-enforcement also may make uses costly. Because there
are so few court decisions, all of which treat the Guidelines as (part
of) the law, the slight risk of enforcement may be enough to chill
fair use.207 Even if the uses were “freer,” however, educational
institutions have copyright policies that take the Guidelines and
court decisions seriously;208 the cases discussed in this Article
206

Explaining how copyright owners sometimes choose not to enforce their claims,
Aull notes
If enforcement were such that individual educators were never sued,
then in fact their privileges would be free. It is not completely
unheard-of that producers would choose this course of action: in
other contexts, theorists have suggested that copyright owners
purposefully fail to bring suit against a particular class of infringers,
in order to undercut competitors without offending antitrust statutes
and to maintain market power by encouraging dependency on their
products (particularly software) by non-business users.
Aull, supra note 196, at 605 (footnotes omitted).
207
See Gibson, supra note 188, at 890 (describing how “even a risk-neutral actor with a
good fair use claim would choose to secure a license rather than take the small risk of
incurring a severe penalty”); id. at 888–900 (describing how doctrinal feedback works
with respect to licensing, which may lead to the possibility that “X, being risk-averse and
aware of the severe consequences of an adverse ruling, decides not to take that chance
and so seeks and pays for a license from Y instead”).
208
E.g., UNIV. OF CAL., UC SYSTEMWIDE COPYRIGHT POLICIES AND RESOURCES, UC
COPYRIGHT, 1986 POLICY AND GUIDELINES ON THE REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED
MATERIALS FOR TEACHING AND RESEARCH (1986), available at http://www.universityof
california.edu/copyright/systemwide/ucpolicies.html (click through “1986 Policy on the
Reproduction of Copyrighted Materials for Teaching and Research”) (using the
Classroom Guidelines as the per se maximum and stating that, “[i]f the copying is not
within the Guidelines, permission should be obtained from the copyright owner before
any copies are made[,] [and] [i]f it is unclear whether copying would require such
permission guidance should be requested from the Office of the General Counsel”); CAL.
UNIV. OF PA., FACULTY HANDBOOK 92 (2009), available at http://www.cup.edu/
nu_upload/faculty_handbook_2009.pdf (wrongly stating the law in its policy, which
says, “If a faculty member wishes to reproduce copyrighted materials for class use—
whether they are printed or non-print materials such as maps, computer software, and
illustrations; whether or not they may be in print; whether the materials are photocopied
or retyped; whether the materials are sold or distributed gratis to students—permission
must be sought beforehand from the publisher; and in most cases a fee for permission
to use them must be paid beforehand. Failure to do so is in violation of federal law.
Information about how to obtain copyright permission, according to guidelines of the
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show how publishers and copyright owners can shape use and
“chill” fair use.209
Commentary and recommendations on fair use confirm this
suspicion. One commentator suggests to teachers methods of
“protect[ing] yourself.”210 Among them, he advocates following
attorney-approved guidelines, if available; drafting a copying
policy that uses the Classroom Guidelines “and a check of current
case law;” educating teachers on the copying policy developed;
and securing permission to use a work, which he erroneously
describes as “often a simple matter of calling the publisher’s office
and asking.”211
Another commentator notes that “[t]here are two sure methods
by which the professor will limit liability.”212 The first requires the
professor to “stay within the boundaries of the Guidelines.”213 The
second, which kicks in only when the first is “not feasible,” is to
“request copies or anthologies from a commercial copy center that
will handle all necessary permissions.”214 Another author states
that the Guidelines “should be used to assist in determining
whether copying procedures or policies are in keeping with the
copyright laws.”215 This author also treats the Guidelines as law.216
Association of American Publishers, may be obtained at the office of the Provost or at the
Book Store.” (emphasis in original)).
209
See supra Part I.C; see also Aull, supra note 196, at 603–04 (noting that “publishers
and other owners’ actions can impact the price of educational use” by choosing who and
when to sue).
210
John William Maddox, Copyright Violation and Personal Liability in Education: A
Current Look at “Fair Use,” 1995 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 97, 103–04.
211
Id. at 104. Andre Hampton describes how difficult securing permissions can be in
his article, Legal Obstacles to Bringing the Twenty-First Century into the Law
Classroom: Stop Being Creative, You May Already Be in Trouble, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 223, 236–40 (2003) (discussing how securing permissions can be difficult for
audiovisual works).
212
Kasunic, supra note 7, at 292. Kasunic also says that educators should consider the
four fair use factors before photocopying. Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Mark L. Merickel, The Educator’s Right to Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, 51
EDUC. L. REP. 711, 717 (1989).
216
Id. at 718–19 (“If we look back to the ‘Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom
Copying,’ we will see that Part III.B and C state that ‘there shall be no copying of or from
works intended to be ‘consumable’ in the course of study or of teaching.’ This rule
clearly includes workbooks.” (emphasis added)).
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These commentators’ advice reflects their understanding of
how the courts have treated the Classroom Guidelines—as positive
or pseudo law. Even Professor Kenneth Crews, who adamantly
opposes the Guidelines, both their concept and their use by the
courts, recognizes that they have import in practice.217 In other
words, these commentators base their advice on the Classroom
Guidelines as an authoritative legal source. This commentary also
illustrates how the chilling effect trickles from the courts (e.g., the
NYU case) to practical advice (e.g., lawyers and commentators) to
implementation (e.g., school policies). Because of this acceptance,
Professor Ann Bartow has suggested that non-compliance with the
Guidelines may render uses falling outside them “willful.”218
Finally, the courts’ treatment of the Classroom Guidelines
fosters a misunderstanding of the law, which may encourage
ignorance or distrust.219 The uncertainty discussed above confuses
217

Noting how educators may use the Guidelines as an aid, Crews states:
The guidelines are . . . a compelling tool for educators who seek to
apply fair use and create policies. The guidelines have the
appearance of having an official status, and they are widely accepted
by the publishing industry and other proprietor groups who may be
potential plaintiffs in copyright actions against educators. If the
objective of an educator making policy is to avoid litigation, adopting
and following the guidelines certainly offers the prospect of
discouraging a lawsuit.
Crews, supra note 34, at 693.
218
Bartow, supra note 5, at 206 (“Moreover, capitulation by educational institutions to
publishers’ demands may render teaching professionals willful, rather than innocent
infringers, thereby increasing their personal liability.”).
219
My own experience teaching fair use to educators has been frustrating. When I
explain to the students that the Guidelines are not law, they stare at me quizzically.
“What, then, are they?” they ask. “What do they mean?” As I strain to emphasize that
they are merely suggestions made to teachers, the students press me further. “So can I
make more than one copy per student?” one woman asks. “Of course!” I reply. “After
all, these are just guidelines, and who among you hasn’t needed an extra copy for that
absent-minded student?” But then I am always met by (rightly) quizzical looks: “So what
are we supposed to do?!” I cannot give them a definitive answer—I can tell them only
they should try to get permission to use works, and failing that, to make sure their
material relates to the curriculum that they teach. Aside from those maxims, and a few
others—including do not copy whole books verbatim—I struggle to give them the
answers for which they are searching. In the end, we always come back to the four fair
use factors, which are designed to be interpreted by judges, not educators. Additionally,
some students, exasperated, refuse to try to understand the concept of fair use. That
acceptance of ignorance fosters ignorance among students.
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teachers and students.220 Beyond the uncertainty, and perhaps
what leads to it, is the confusion among teachers about whether the
Guidelines are law. Even if we accept the Guidelines as law,
teachers have great difficulty applying them. Further complicating
matters is the “prohibitions” section of the Guidelines,221 which at
least one court applied flexibly.222 On this point, teachers do not
understand how the “rule” stating “prohibitions” could be anything
other than mandatory. As a result of this misunderstanding (and
many do not even exhibit this level of misunderstanding),
ignorance or frustration becomes prominent. Ignorance of the law
is a detriment to society—and in the educational system, a
detriment to students as well as the educational system in general;
the sad irony is that it is the law itself that causes ignorance and
misunderstanding.223

220

See supra notes 191, 194 and accompanying text.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 69–70 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5683–84.
222
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1537 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (“Defendant urges the court to seek a less rigid view of the meaning of the
Guidelines. We are convinced that this is the more prudent path than a bright line
pronouncement . . . that all unconsented anthologies are prohibited without a fair use
analysis.”).
223
See Goldstein, supra note 185, at 134 (emphasizing that fair use is indeterminate
because it “is a constitutive doctrine,” which “entails a reconstruction of copyright, a
weighing of the benefits to be secured from excusing a particular use against those to be
secured from barring it[,]” and because “the doctrine is historically and technologically
contingent”). I add that the doctrine, as by now should be apparent, is contextually
contingent: whether a use is fair depends on when, how, and under what circumstances it
is used. Even publishers acknowledge that “the whole subject [of fair use] is . . .
confusing,” preventing any firm rules; “no consensus exists among the publishers
surveyed about fair use.” Mortimer D. Schwartz & John C. Hogan, Copyright Law and
the Academic Community: Issues Affecting Teachers, Researchers, Students, and
Libraries, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1147, 1176 (1984). Schwartz and Hogan made this
observation based on the results of a survey submitted to “commercial publishers,
university presses, scholarly and scientific journals” inquiring about word count in
determining fair use. Id. at 1163.
221

C02_SIMON_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

494

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/31/2010 1:05 PM

[Vol. 20:453

II. SO IT’S BROKEN, NOW LET’S FIX IT: EXPLORING
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF
EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE
The search for a new model of educational fair use is driven by
the doctrine’s uncertainty and the failure of the Guidelines, which
are neither calibrated to the necessities of teaching nor based on
the law. To what extent educational uses of copyrighted materials
should be “free” is a matter of debate.224 One scholar has framed
the debate over access to copyrighted works for educational
purposes in terms of morality and distributive justice.225 Others
have rightly noted that educational fair uses have far-reaching
effects—on students, teachers, education, and society as a
whole.226
One author has downplayed the benefit of educational fair use,
claiming that it is favored because many people feel, intuitively,

224
Perhaps this difference of opinion centers on divergent cultural perspectives, akin to
those articulated by Professor Lawrence Lessig in REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE
THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (Penguin Press 2008).
225
See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “From Below”: Copyright and Capability
for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 818–19, 836–37 (2007) (noting that, “[f]rom a
distributive justice standpoint, fair use is a choice in favor of access to a knowledge good
that recognizes socially beneficial uses that may not always be better internalized by the
rights holder” and, further, educational fair use is markedly different from other fair uses
because of its “positive spillover effect on society as a whole”).
226
Kasunic, supra note 7, at 290–91. Contextualizing the effects on students, teachers
and society, Goldstein notes that
[t]he value that a schoolteacher personally derives from photocopying
a magazine article for his class may be lower than a bargain with the
copyright owner would require. But if the benefits to be received by
his students—and, though more distant, by society from having wellinformed citizens—could somehow be measured, taxed, collected,
and distributed, the aggregate could well exceed what the copyright
owner would require.
Goldstein, supra note 185, at 137–38; see also Chon, supra note 225, at 837; Gordon,
supra note 185, at 1630 (noting that markets may not work in education because
“teaching and scholarship may yield significant ‘external benefits;’” because “all of
society benefits from having an educated citizenry and from advances in knowledge, yet
teacher salaries and revenues from scholarly articles are arguably smaller than such
benefit would warrant”; and because, “[w]hen a defendant’s works yield such ‘external
benefits,’ the market cannot be relied upon as a mechanism for facilitating socially
desirable transactions”).
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that educational works should be free to use.227 She has argued
that educators have used rhetoric to reinforce this misguided
claim.228 “Fair use,” she and others commonly claim, is a
“privilege,” not a right.229 Although the author is partially correct
to assert that “neither traditional nor modern copyright cases fully
recognize an educational, status-based exemption to intellectual
property rights,”230 her characterization of “fair use” as a privilege
is wrong. A copyright itself is a privilege; it is a gift of positive
law.231 Fair use, then, should be seen as just as much a right as the
owner’s copyright itself.232
227

See Aull, supra note 196, at 576.
See id. at 580–81.
229
Id. at 582; see also Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1521 (agreeing
with the view that copyright gives the author rights and fair use is merely a “Hohfeldian
privilege” (citing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913))). I argue infra note 232 that
the copyright and the fair use doctrine represent competing rights (or privileges), and at
least one court has endorsed such a view. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) (“I believe that fair use should be considered an
affirmative right under the 1976 Act, rather than merely an affirmative defense, as it is
defined in the Act as a use that is not a violation of copyright.” (citing Bateman v.
Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996))). Just to give a preview, a
copyright owner has a right to copy its protected expression—which implies, in
“Hohfeldian terms,” that the user has a “correlative duty” not to copy the protected
expression. Hohfeld, supra, at 31 (“Recognizing, as we must, the very broad and
indiscriminate use of the term, ‘right,’ what clue do we find, in ordinary legal discourse,
toward limiting the word in question to a definite and appropriate meaning. That clue lies
in the correlative ‘duty,’ for it is certain that even those who use the word and the
conception ‘right’ in the broadest possible way are accustomed to thinking of ‘duty’ as
the invariable correlative.”). In other words, the right to copy imposes a correlative duty
on the unauthorized user not to copy. But a similar statement can be made of fair use
when conceived as a “right”: the right to copy (or access) a protected expression imposes
a correlative duty on the copyright owner not to interfere with that copying (or
accessing). This is precisely the basis from which the fair use model developed in Part
III.B works. In this way, I fundamentally disagree with David R. Johnstone’s analysis in
Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under U.S. Copyright Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 345, 368–70 (2005).
230
Aull, supra note 196, at 579. But see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (expressly stating that
fair use includes “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright”); id. § 110 (delineating status-based
exemptions from infringement for certain educational uses of materials).
231
See Tom W. Bell, Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 523, 529–31 (2008) (describing copyright as “[a] statutory exception to common
law rights and obligations that grants special powers and immunities to copyright
holders,” and rejecting the characterization of copyright as Hohfeldian property); id. at
228
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535 (“Even as a matter of positive law, the [Copyright] Act’s protections provide
copyright holders with only limited use rights. Copyright holders must forbear not only
unauthorized uses of their works, but even unauthorized uses that profit others.”); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 110; David A. Simon, In Search of (Maintaining) the Truth: The Use of
Copyright Law by Religious Organizations, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 41–50, on file with author), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1465203 (abstract).
232
Perhaps the copyright and the fair use doctrine should be seen as “dual rights” or
“dual privileges”—and I think that is how they are conceived. That conception is visible
in the way a fair use analysis is conducted: judges attempt to balance the copyright
owner’s interest against the public’s interest. Cf. Bohannan, supra note 188, at 985–87
(arguing that the balancing approach—where courts weigh the interests of the copyright
owner against the public—is wrongheaded). Darren Hudson Hick makes a cogent
argument that fair use cannot possibly be a right—and therefore must be conceived of as
a privilege—in his article, Mystery and Misdirection: Some Problems with Fair Use and
Users’ Rights, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 485, 491–92 (2009). Essentially, Hick
claims that describing fair use as a right means that a non-copyright owner would have
the right to use, and possibly access, an author’s unpublished work. See id. at 492–93.
He claims that is absurd, and that, even if we describe fair use as a right as applied only
to published works, this description fails. See id. at 493–95.
Hick, however, misconstrues the nature of the fair use right. The principle of fair
use, like the principle of copyright ownership, derives from the copyright law itself.
Copyright law, in turn, is based on creating incentives for authors for the public’s benefit.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The author’s “right” to his work is not a natural one—it
is a statutory grant designed to encourage creation. See Bell, supra note 231, at 529–31.
To that end, Hick’s statement about unpublished works assumes too much; it implies
that the author does have a right to that work, Hick, supra, at 493, perhaps even a moral
right, which, of course, the author does not. But see 17 U.S.C. § 106A (providing rights
of attribution and integrity to authors of a “work of visual art”). The author’s “rights,”
however one defines them, are based on the incentive theory of copyright. See, e.g.,
Bohannan, supra note 188, at 983. In effect, they are privileges granted to the author.
Fair use “rights” are based on the public interest and the recognition that copyright
ownership does not mean absolute and exclusive ownership. Fair use is a privilege or
right in the same sense as the copyright itself. Thus, it is plausible to conceive of both the
copyright and fair use as competing rights or privileges.
Hick comments that “it is difficult to understand how granting one group (authors) a
right thus gives parallel rights to another group (users).” Hicks, supra, at 494. I am not
sure where the difficulty lies. The Copyright Act grants authors rights (or privileges) in
their work, and it also grants users the right (or privilege) to fairly use those works
without the permission of the copyright owner. Thus, it is not a matter of granting to a
class of individuals a right that somehow, concomitantly but without explanation, births
to another class a different and conflicting right. It is a matter of the Copyright Act
granting rights to both users and owners based on two different aspects of the same
underlying theory. In any case, all of copyright law is, in effect, a privilege. (Note that
fair use is explicitly categorized as neither a right nor a privilege by the text of 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.)
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This Article rejects the fair use-as-a-privilege view;233 and,
beyond that, it accepts the contention that educational fair use is
different from other kinds of fair uses given its nature, purpose,
and effect. This view works from the fundamental premise that, in
education, the non-use of a work can be more detrimental to
society than a use would be to the copyright owner.234 Because
educational uses differ from all other uses, but not all educational
uses are “fair,” the courts have coped by adopting the Classroom
Guidelines.235 This mistake has led to the problems identified in
Part I;236 principally, creating legal uncertainty for educators who
wish to make copies or otherwise invoke fair use for educational
purposes. Scholars have recognized this uncertainty in education:
for example, Professor Pamela Samuelson, who has argued that
fair use is more predictable than many would like to believe,237 has
noted that, out of all the different categories of fair use, “[t]he only
clusters of fair use cases in which it is quite difficult to predict
whether uses are likely to be fair is in the educational and research
use clusters.”238
In attempting to correct this uncertainty, courts have chilled
fair use, diverged from the law, and impeded the mission of
educators across the country.239 Authors and publishers have
further pushed educational fair use in the wrong direction,
emphasizing industry “clearance culture” and insisting on making

233

See Aull, supra note 196, at 60l; supra note 232 and accompanying text.
Kasunic, supra note 7, at 290–91 (“If photocopying were unavailable, educators
would likely do without certain relevant works rather than demand that students purchase
them. While educational photocopying certainly results in some loss to authors and
publishers, this loss must be weighed against the loss to students and the educational
system if works were not used by professors. Educators and students would do without
information that could have benefitted [sic] their studies. In short, neither the public nor
the copyright owner gains from the non-use of copyrighted works.”).
235
See id. at 280–81.
236
See supra Part I.C.
237
Samuelson, supra note 30, at 2541 (“This Article argues that fair use law is both
more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have perceived once one
recognizes that fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns, or what this Article will
call policy-relevant clusters.”).
238
Id. at 2542 n.28.
239
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 429
(2007).
234
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the Guidelines the upper limit of the law.240 In short, the current
mechanisms governing educational fair use are malfunctioning and
are on the verge of breaking.
Some have argued that such certainty can never be achieved in
the realm of fair use.241 They argue that fair use, by its very nature
as a legal standard, will leave teachers grabbing smoke.242 Indeed,
some argue that it is our expectation of certainty that dooms our
quest for a solution.243 They suggest that we “[a]ccept the fact that
fair use analysis will always be fact intensive, and predictability
always will be an elusive goal.”244
I reject this approach in education. To accept the current state
of the law, or something similar, would be to further endorse
industry custom, allowing copyright owners to “leverage the
vagueness of the law,”245 which, in turn, would force educators
farther and farther away from legitimate uses of copyrighted
works. As Professor Jason Mazzone has observed, “[f]air use is
free use”:246 it “is a use that does not require permission because it
is not infringement.”247 We should not let the challenges of
uncertainty, and the attendant browbeating publishers, bully this
concept into the darkness of circular arguments about licensing.248
To the contrary, this challenge is taken head on by proposing a
new model for educational fair use. Before reaching this new
model, however, this Part explores several potential changes that
scholars have proposed to render fair use more palatable.249 These

240

See Rothman, supra note 47, at 1911–20.
Martin, supra note 79, at 347.
242
Joseph P. Liu, Fair Use: “Incredibly Shrinking” or Extraordinarily Expanding?, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 578 (2008).
243
See Martin, supra note 79, at 353, 392–93.
244
Id. at 392.
245
Mazzone, supra note 15, at 398.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 404.
248
See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 188, at 971 (“Fair use turns primarily on whether the
use causes harm to the copyright owner, but the copyright owner can nearly always argue
that she suffered harm, if only because the defendant could have paid a license fee for the
use being challenged.”); Gibson, supra note 188, at 906.
249
For many scholars “palatable” means copyright veers in the direction of the
Constitution, instead of away from it. See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 980.
241
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include changing the elements of copyright infringement,250
modifying the constituents of fair use or their application,251
adopting a code of best practices to govern educators’ conduct,252
and creating new apparatuses to administer fair use.253 After
reviewing and evaluating these choices, this Article proposes a
model for fair use in education based on the framework of an
administrative agency, which offers the best solution to the
problems of uncertainty in the context of education.
A. New Infringement Elements
Recent literature has attacked copyright for straying from its
Constitutional roots, advocating a refocusing or restructuring of the
infringement analysis.254 Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh, for
example, has argued that, to properly calibrate copyright to its
incentive-based design, copyright infringement should be based on
the reasonable foreseeability of the copier’s use at the time of
creation.255 Balganesh’s theory is premised on the idea that
copyright incentives should play a role in the infringement
analysis; this inclusion limits the “windfall” a copyright owner
may receive when it reaps benefits from uses of the copyrighted
material that were unforeseen (in terms of their form or purpose) at
the time of the work’s creation.256 To accomplish this goal,
Balganesh proposes that “foreseeable copying” should “operate as
a third element in the determination of copying”: in addition to
proving valid ownership and copying, the plaintiff would have to
250

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.1–2.
252
See infra Part II.B.3.
253
See infra Part II.B.4.
254
See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 980.
255
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 1569, 1581–89, 1603–25 (2009) (detailing the courts’ failure to implement
copyright law’s incentive structure when deciding doctrinal issues, including fair use, and
describing a new model of fair use based on foreseeability, which better addresses this
goal).
256
Id. at 1571. Professor Justin Hughes correctly points out that Balganesh is not
advocating “windfall profits from unexpected hits be curtailed because such proceeds are
reasonably unforeseen.” Justin Hughes, Copyright and Its Rewards, Foreseen and
Unforeseen, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 81, 82 (2009). He notes that Balganesh avoids this by
“defin[ing] financial returns as ‘unforeseen’ . . . in terms of purpose or technology.” Id.
251
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prove that “the defendant’s use (that is, copying) of the protected
work was foreseeable to the plaintiff—in form and purpose—when
the work was created.”257 This objective theory258 relieves fair use
of its duty to discern which uses are “transformative” enough to
render a use non-infringing.259
Though it does have difficulties,260 Balganesh’s proposal is an
insightful and well-reasoned one. Applying it to educational uses
of copyrighted works, however, shows that it is no substitute for a
fair use inquiry.261 Nearly all educational uses will infringe under
257

Balganesh, supra note 255, at 1605 (emphasis omitted). Under this test, the law
would mirror that of the “eggshell plaintiff” in tort. Id. As a result, “it should matter little
to the foreseeability determination that the defendant copied the entire book, or made a
million copies of it, rather than a few.” Id. Hughes has responded that this proposal has
structural flaws, especially in light of express Congressional language that contemplates
copyright persist in unforeseen technologies. Hughes, supra note 256, at 87–88.
258
Balganesh’s theory is based on objective foreseeability. Balganesh, supra note 255,
at 1611 (“It is worth emphasizing that even though it may appear as if the foreseeability
inquiry is one of subjective intent—that is, whether one or both parties actually expected
the grant to cover a use—in reality, the determination is always objective.”). This
standard would ascribe certain baseline characteristics to the plaintiff-creator. See id. at
1611–13 (“Such a standard would presume creators are, at a minimum, informed—in the
sense that the creator knows of the different mediums in existence in which the work can
be employed—and rational—in that the creator intends to either directly or indirectly
control the markets for those different mediums.” (emphasis added)).
259
Id. at 1606–07 (“Under current doctrine, questions of this nature[, i.e., those
involving transformativeness,] are relegated to the fair use inquiry. Given that fair use is
an affirmative defense, the burden then falls to the defendant to show how his actions (of
copying) were not harmful to the plaintiff. It places the entire focus on the defendant,
glossing over the uses that the plaintiff might have legitimately expected to control in
creating the work.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
260
Wendy Gordon has noted the merit in Balganesh’s view while concomitantly
criticizing it in several respects. See Wendy Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and
the Harm-Benefit Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 65–66, 72, 74–80 (2009)
(criticizing Balganesh’s theory of foreseeability, supplementing it to protect authors from
“new technologies that cannibalize[d] their existing markets,” and discussing the harmbenefit distinction, which teaches us that “an owner will respond less readily to
opportunities to maximize the beneficial use of her property than she will to opportunities
for avoiding harms to it”).
261
Balganesh does not argue that his infringement analysis should supplant fair use,
and I do not seek to attribute that view to him here. He does mention, however, that his
proposal would move some fair use questions into the infringement analysis. Balganesh,
supra note 255, at 1606. Hughes argues that part of Balganesh’s proposal actually
transplants the fourth fair use factor into the infringement analysis. Hughes, supra note
256, at 90–91. While Balganesh’s inclusion of “purpose” into the foreseeability calculus
makes his proposal different from the market effect—which considers only technology—
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this proposal, especially when teachers are making direct copies
for classroom use.262 Put another way, much of teachers’
infringement is foreseeable.263 But finding that a teacher or
student has infringed copyrighted material says little about whether
the use is fair. Therefore, merely re-crafting the infringement
analysis does not solve the problem of educational fair use.
Most recently, Christopher Sprigman has modified Balganesh’s
proposal using themes from antitrust law, arguing that the
“foreseeability requirement . . . will not in itself supply an
administrable theory of copyright harm.”264 This, he argues,
results from the Supreme Court’s approach to the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”)265 in Eldred v.
Ashcroft,266 which illustrates that “[w]hat is ‘foreseeable’ in any
particular copyright case is uncertain and readily manipulable.”267
Hughes argues that this proposal, coupled with the transformative inquiry in the first fair
use factor, essentially is part of the current fair use inquiry. Id. at 91.
Though he disagrees with the reasoning on which it is based, Hughes does note a
principal difference between the Balganesh proposal and these two parts of fair use:
The chief difference concerns market substitution. While the
Balganesh proposal would excuse technologies and purposes that are
unforeseen even when they have an adverse impact on existing and
foreseen markets, in the standard analysis a new technology’s adverse
impact on the existing and foreseen markets would weigh strongly
against fair use.
Id. at 91 (footnote omitted). To the extent that this can be read to imply that fair use’s
role should be diminished, this Article disagrees. Furthermore, contrary to some courts’
views, see Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1400 (6th
Cir. 1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530–31
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), transformativeness can exist when portions of several works are copied
and juxtaposed—that is the whole basis for teaching; teachers often (and rightly) use
sometimes unrelated materials in conjunction with one another for pedagogical purposes.
262
See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 5, at 178 (discussing how the court in Basic Books
erred by failing to realize “the incongruity of applying transformative use analysis to the
context of course packet duplication[, the purpose of which] . . . is to expose students to a
variety of viewpoints, which are arguably most pedagogically useful when
unadulterated”).
263
There will be some uses that are not foreseeable at the time of creation. For
example, when I use clips from South Park in my Education Law class to illustrate the
(un)acceptable methods of teaching, the use, at least in its purpose, is not foreseeable.
264
Sprigman, supra note 185, at 322.
265
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006)).
266
537 U.S. 186 (2003) (deciding the constitutionality of the CTEA).
267
Sprigman, supra note 185, at 322.
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As a result, “where the effect of the infringing conduct is
ambiguous” in terms of harm,268 Sprigman would require the
plaintiff to plead and prove (“actual or likely”)269 harm—here
defined in terms of market failure and creation incentive270—as an
affirmative element of his infringement case.271
By contrast, in cases where “we know . . . [that the infringing
conduct] will harm author incentives over the run of cases, . . . we
should preserve copyright’s current strict liability rule,” and
“perhaps . . . strengthen it by limiting the availability of the fair use
defense in these cases of ‘per se’ copyright liability.”272 One per
se rule would presume harm for “consumptive” infringement:
“infringement involving the reproduction and distribution of copies
that are either exact or near enough so that they are almost certain
to compete with the original work for patronage.”273 One example
of this is the “reproduction and distribution of exact copies of a
copyrighted song.”274
Sprigman’s proposal, like Balganesh’s, faces problems in the
educational setting. First, his proposal involves both rules and
standards, arguing for some per se rules of infringement and a rule
of reason for infringing conduct that has ambiguous effects on the
creation incentive.275 The rule-based approach does provide some
certainty, but it does so in the wrong place. Under this proposal,

268
Id. at 323, 328 (noting that “in most copyright cases it is the plaintiff that has
superior access to information about harm—harm to himself, directly, and, by extension,
harm to other authors similarly situated” (emphasis added)).
269
Id. at 330.
270
Id. at 339 (“The plaintiff might seek to prove, for instance, that there is significant
cross-elasticity of demand between the original and the derivative, and therefore allowing
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of the derivative will in fact divert enough of
the sales that the original author might otherwise have enjoyed that the court is able
reasonably to conclude that the loss, if assessed ex ante, would have affected the author’s
incentive to create.”).
271
Id. at 330 (“Employing this liability standard would present greater complexity—the
plaintiff’s prima facie case in every rule of reason infringement action would include not
just proof of infringing conduct, but an assessment of whether harm is likely.”).
272
Id. at 323.
273
Id. at 335. Sprigman does provide several caveats to this approach, but none of
them negate the points made infra.
274
Id.
275
See id. at 324–38.
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“consumptive” uses are per se infringing.276 That means that a
large amount of a teacher’s uses will be infringing. Furthermore,
like Balganesh’s proposal, it focuses on changing the infringement
analysis and therefore does little with fair use.277 Thus, even if
teaching uses were somehow taken out of the per se category of
infringement, teachers would still face the problem of fair use: if
the defendant managed to show some harm, the fair use inquiry
would be tainted by this first-order assumption.278
B. Modifying the Fair Use Analysis
Because modifications to the infringement cause of action will
not suffice to accommodate educational fair use, a modification to
the fair use analysis is the next logical place to look for a solution.
Scholars already have labored in this area, proposing changes to
the fair use inquiry.279 Some of these proposals have been directed
at refocusing the fair use inquiry while others have set out to
redefine it.280 These approaches follow one of four patterns: the
implementation of burden-shifting;281 the re-conceptualization or
modified application of the fair use factors;282 the use of a code of
best practices; and the use of a new entity to determine fair uses.283
1. Burden-Shifting Approach
In a paradigm similar to Balganesh, Professor Christina
Bohannan has advocated incorporating foreseeability and harm
into the fair use analysis.284 This approach to fair use would
require “courts . . . [to] presume harm only where the defendant’s
use usurps the copyright holder’s most foreseeable markets, or
those markets which a reasonable copyright owner would have
taken into account in deciding whether to create or distribute the
276

See id. at 335–36, 338–39, 342.
See id. at 340; see also Balganesh, supra note 255, at 1603–13.
278
See infra notes 303–14 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Matthew Sag’s
reconceputalization of fair use).
279
See generally Bartow, supra note 5; Bohannan, supra note 188, at 184.
280
See generally Balganesh, supra note 255; Bohannan, supra note 188.
281
See infra Part II.B.1.
282
See infra Part II.B.2.
283
See infra Part II.B.4.
284
See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 987–1002.
277
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copyrighted work.”285 She argues that courts, when examining fair
use, actually have used some variant of this harm formulation.286
This approach faces several difficulties. First, it over-protects
users, even in education. Her model would restrict cognizable
harm to only a use that “usurps the copyright holder’s most
foreseeable markets, or those markets which a reasonable
copyright owner would have taken into account in deciding
whether to create or distribute the copyrighted work.”287 That
bifurcated approach gives unduly broad protection to users. The
“usurpation” requirement necessarily excludes cases where a use
does not usurp, but instead (substantially) dilutes, the most
foreseeable market. In education, this would protect an author
only if teachers’ photocopying, for example, took the place of the
copyrighted work. That is not likely to happen, even if several
school districts photocopied an entire fiction novel for every
eighth-grade class. This type of copying, however, is unfair.
The second requirement, which can be satisfied in two ways—
the most foreseeable market or the market reasonably factored288—
also has backwards effects in education, exempting from
infringement questionable uses. Assuming market usurpation,
would every author who pens a novel, for example, “reasonably
take into account”289 the fact that their work might be used, in
whole or in part, in classrooms? If so, that assumes that every
author reasonably thinks that (i) her work is of a certain quality
and (ii) likely will yield the author profit from its use in a
classroom. Those are not reasonable assumptions as applied to the
objective, ordinary author;290 thus, Bohannan’s proposal would
exempt from copyright infringement nearly all fiction books used
in a classroom setting.

285

Id. at 989. I will refer to these market requirements as the “most foreseeable
market” and the “market reasonably factored.”
286
See id. at 1002–31.
287
Id. at 989 (emphasis added).
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
If these are reasonable assumptions for an author to make, nearly all uses of his or
her work will be presumptively unfair.
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Second, this approach over-protects authors: if the copyright
owner proves usurpation plus the existence of the most foreseeable
market or the market reasonably factored, harm is presumed.291
After such a showing, the burden would shift to the defendant to
show that no harm occurred.292 But when the burden shifts, the
defendant’s fate already will be determined because it likely will
have no empirical data to the contrary.293 Why is this a problem?
If harm is found (by usurpation of either the most foreseeable
markets or the markets reasonably factored) in education, it is rare
that the school will have any evidence whatsoever of market
effects. Thus, it will not be able to meet its burden of showing no
harm. Furthermore, using the fair use factors at this point will be
less effective because, as Professor Matthew Sag points out, their
use depends on the first-order presumption of harm.294
Finally, and most importantly, this model does little to create
certainty for educators, which has been the primary problem with
the fair use inquiry. Instead of implementing firm rules, Bohannan
introduces a different type of standard which focuses on (at least
as) amorphous legal concepts (as the fair use factors).295 Under
this approach, in addition to looking at their own uses of the
copyrighted works, teachers and lawyers will begin guessing
whether that educational use is a type the author reasonably
factored into their decision to create the work. Further uncertainty
is introduced when Bohannan suggests that courts should consider
how a defendant’s use can increase sales.296 How, for instance,
291

See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 1028.
Id.
293
See id.
294
See Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s
Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 395 (2005).
295
See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 988–90.
296
See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 1028–30. Although evidence of increased sales
can be obtained, litigants must wait to do so until after the infringing work is produced.
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the evidence of “relevant market harm” was limited “due to the preliminary
injunction status of the case”). In cases of injunctions, the court would be speculating as
to whether the work would increase or decrease sales—and that approach does not seem
to find support in Bohannan’s proposal, which at times seems to require proof of actual
harm. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 188, at 1015 (discussing MDS and stating that
“[t]he case should have been remanded for fact findings on this issue so that harm could
be determined”).
292
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can Generic School determine whether its use will have a positive
effect on the sale of the copyrighted work? This new inquiry,
while valuable for the fair use inquiry generally, lacks the
clarifying mechanism or quality that educators so insatiably covet.
2. Re-Conceptualization or Modified Application
Beyond Bohannan’s approach, other tactics, such as a retooling
of fair use, also have been proposed. Professor Joseph P. Liu has
suggested that the four fair use factors be reduced to two; retaining
only the purpose and character of the use and the impact of the use
on the market.297 These two factors would be balanced directly
against one another,298 with courts “look[ing] at whether a work is
non-commercial, whether it is transformative, and more generally,
whether the use serves a positive social purpose” and comparing
that purpose to “the potential for the use to harm” the current and
future market(s) for the work.299
Liu’s thought experiment may create more certainty, but it does
so in the wrong direction. Depending on how much weight each
sub-factor is given, the results will likely come out against most
educational fair uses. This results from eliminating two important
factors for educational uses: the nature of the copyrighted work,
and the amount and substantiality of the portion used.300 Many of
the works used by teachers are factual in nature, and the amount of
the work used may be incredibly small or at least not significant.
When, for example, a teacher copies portions of a history textbook
or several sections of a long article and uses them in class, the
nature of the work (factual) and the amount used (e.g., two
chapters) should be considered.
Furthermore, the sub-factor analysis shows that two factors do
not greatly reduce uncertainty; in reality, courts are applying
various factors.301 This approach probably would not produce
297

Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 572 (2008)
[hereinafter Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use].
298
Id. at 578.
299
Id.
300
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use, supra note 297, at 572.
301
See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1267–68 (11th
Cir. 2001) (the court used several factors to determine the outcome of the case).
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outcomes substantially different than the current cases dealing with
educational fair uses. Furthermore, it leaves the status of the
Guidelines intact, and focuses exclusively on two factors that have
little relevance, in their traditional sense, in educational fair use
(market harm and transformativeness) while excluding the two
factors that have the most relevance in education (nature of the
work and the amount and substantiality of the portion used).302
Also working within fair use’s confines, Professor Matthew
Sag has argued for a re-conceptualization of the factors and how
courts apply them.303 First, Sag argues that “fair use is a structural
tool that allows copyright to adapt to changing circumstances,”
and, as a result, it “must remain a somewhat open-ended standard
developed by the judiciary through . . . common law
adjudication.”304 The revisions to fair use that Sag proposes seek
to change the current judicial practice of “treating the factors as
outcome-determinative as opposed to question-framing, [which]
masks a priori assumptions and distorts judicial reasoning.”305
Based on this idea—“that the factors . . . provide [only] a
framework for their analysis by raising certain second[-]order
questions”—Sag argued that courts should consider three firstorder assumptions when deciding fair use.306
First, courts should consider the idea/expression dichotomy,
which is linked to the core notion about what should be
copyrightable.307
Second, courts should consider consumer
autonomy: this idea, derived from the first-sale doctrine, states that
consumers have a right to manipulate copyrighted works once
purchased.308 Third, the principle of medium neutrality, which
302

Although “factors two and three may be of doubtful relevance in all cases,” Liu,
Two-Factor Fair Use, supra note 297, at 577, they are important in educational fair use
cases. This is true even if “courts . . . have repeatedly recognized the limited relevance of
factors two and three.” Id. The objection I raise here is not—as Liu predicts it might
be—based on reductionism. Id. at 584. It is not paucity or simplicity of defense this
objection fears; it is the lack of consideration for educational fair uses and their express
statutory mooring.
303
See Sag, supra note 294, at 382–85.
304
Id. at 384.
305
Id. at 386.
306
Id. at 395.
307
See id. at 425–27.
308
See id. at 428–32.
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states that the fairness of a use does not change depending on the
medium of expression,309 should inform courts’ fair use
determinations.310
Sag’s proposed first-order assumptions that would guide the
fair use analysis, while well reasoned, do little to inform courts of
what constitutes educational fair use. Part of this problem results
from his proposal’s exclusion of statutorily-preferred uses—such
as teaching, which includes making multiple copies for classroom
use.311 The principles of idea/expression and medium neutrality
have less obvious application to many educational uses of
copyrighted works, where the mere fact that the use is educational
is the central purpose for deeming it fair. Many times educational
uses will not be transformative, strictly speaking—that is what §
107 recognizes when it states that making “multiple copies for
classroom use” is fair use.312 Thus, a first-order principle that
focuses on the idea/expression dichotomy will not inform an
analysis of whether photocopying several articles for students is
fair use—the expression is copied.313
Consumer autonomy also does not change the educational fair
use calculus: copyright owners’ inability to control the consumer
uses of the copyrighted material (and consumers’ attendant
freedom to use the work) says nothing about educational
309

Id. at 432 (“Medium neutrality is the principle that a use should not receive less
protection, simply by virtue of being expressed in a different medium.”).
310
See id. at 432–34.
311
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
312
Id.
313
The idea/expression first-order assumption may be beneficial for judicial analysis.
If, for example, a teacher photocopies 25% of five articles for her students (one copy per
student), the court might examine more closely both whether the copyrighted work falls
within copyright’s “core” protective purposes, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (examining the second fair use factor), and whether the teacher
appropriated the “heart” of copyrighted work’s protected expression. Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (concluding that the court of
appeals erred in overruling the district judge’s finding that the defendant took “‘the heart
of the book’”). There, the court may focus on the ideas the articles portrayed, rather than
the expression themselves, to determine whether a use was fair. In making such a
determination, the court must be vigilant and avoid the trap of circularity to which other
courts have fallen victim. E.g., Basic Books, Inc., v, Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 69 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5682.
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copying.314 For these reasons, Sag’s approach, while useful, does
not apply to educational fair uses.
In addition to the modifications proposed by Liu and Sag,
Professor Laura A. Heymann has proposed “refocus[ing] the [fair
use] inquiry, and . . . realign[ing] it with the ultimate question the
fair use doctrine asks.”315 She attempts to do this by “tying the
transformativeness inquiry to” the factor that considers the purpose
and character of the use.316 This approach also would require
taking the reader’s perspective to determine transformativeness,
focusing on interpretation instead of intent.317
At first glance, this approach seems better tailored to education
because it would focus on the school, the teacher, or the student in
determining transformativeness.318 But Heymann notes that this
perspective would not change the result reached in Sony Corp. of
America v. University City Studios, Inc.,319 or American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.320 because “[i]n neither case
should the transformative inquiry be dispositive or relevant—both
cases are predominately about displacing the copy in which the
work is instantiated and, thus, are both better analyzed with respect
to other fair use factors.”321 If that is the case, then numerous
types of copying done by teachers will be analyzed under the
current fair use factors. We therefore arrive back where we
started: staring the uncertainty of the factors and the Guidelines
square in the face.
314

See Sag, supra note 294, at 429 (“The first sale doctrine combined with the absence
of any ‘use’ right in copyright allow a strong degree of autonomy for consumers;
copyright owners are generally unable to control the use (as opposed to copying) of their
works by the public.”).
315
Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response,
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 448 (2008).
316
Id.
317
Id. at 453.
318
See id. (stating that the determination would be based on how a reasonable reader
would interpret the use of the work).
319
464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (finding that “time-shifting”—taping television programs,
using a video cassette recorder, to watch them later—was transformative and constituted
fair use).
320
60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Texaco’s making of copies cannot properly be
regarded as a transformative use of the copyrighted material.”).
321
Heymann, supra note 315, at 457.

C02_SIMON_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

510

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/31/2010 1:05 PM

[Vol. 20:453

Professor Glynn Lunney has, after reexamining Sony, argued
that the Supreme Court articulated a “presumption in favor of fair
use and a broad conception of the public interest that fair use
protects.”322 Working from that starting point, Lunney claims that
“transformativeness” is not controlling or even entitled to much
weight; the crux of the fair use analysis turns on the evidence
supplied by the copyright owner: once the defendant invokes fair
use, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing, “by [a]
preponderance of the evidence, that the net benefit to society will
be greater if a use is prohibited.”323 In other words, the copyright
owner must show “concrete evidence of ‘a demonstrable effect
upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted
work’” for the use to be infringing.324 In Lunney’s “ideal world,”
where courts had “perfect information, [they] could resolve the fair
use issue by determining precisely the social value of additional
authorship resulting from prohibiting a use and then comparing
that value to the social value of allowing the use to continue.”325
While it has been criticized as mischaracterizing the judicial
treatment of fair use,326 Lunney’s approach moves us in the right
direction. Requiring the copyright owner to prove that the harm
outweighs societal benefits captures some educational uses. At the
very least, it would force courts to consider how educational uses
can be beneficial to society without being transformative and,
therefore, that educational uses can be fair without satisfying the
market harm approach.327
322

Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV.
975, 977 (2002).
323
Id. at 977.
324
Id. at 1014 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 450).
325
Id. at 998–99.
326
See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 985–87.
327
Professor Lunney briefly explores this type of analysis in his discussion of how the
market-failure approach did not appropriately address the societal concerns in Texaco.
See Lunney, supra note 322, at 1021–22. He points out that, in Texaco, the heightened
costs for the research institution—which would have to increase its subscriptions to
access research materials—either would be internalized by the company (in which case it
detracts from their ability to do research) or would be passed along to consumers (in
which case it would raise the cost of access to new technology and socially beneficial
products). Id. (“To cover the fixed costs of innovations, patents, secrecy, or other means
of obtaining a lead-time advantage must offer research institutions some market power in
the exploitation of their discoveries in order for their research to prove profitable. As a
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Unfortunately, this scheme—either in the abstract or as applied
generally across fair use categories—does not solve the problems
educators face. Like with many of the other approaches discussed,
teachers still cannot predict which uses will cause market harm328
and which uses will have societal benefits that outweigh the
additional authorship produced from prohibiting a use.329 Consider
a teacher who copies several songs, poems, and pieces of various
articles. It is not feasible to suggest that any reliable data on the
harm of this use would exist, or that a court could properly weigh
the harm and benefit of the use. In this sense, the unpredictability
result, while research institutions may be able to pass some of these licensing fees along
to consumers, part of the fees will come out of the rents the research institutions would
otherwise earn on their discoveries. As these rents would otherwise go towards the costs
of the research itself, using some part of these rents to pay licensing fees for copies of
scientific journal articles means that research institutions will have to cut expenses
elsewhere. As a practical matter, this means that institutions like Texaco Research will
have to reduce their expenditures on research personnel, supplies, or facilities in order to
come up with the licensing fees that the American Geophysical majority made possible.
The American Geophysical decision thus increased payments to publishers, but such
increased payments will come at the expense of the authors and their research.”).
Applying this observation to education, the costs would be borne by the taxpayers, no
matter how they are defined (e.g., school district, students, teachers), which diverts
resources away from teaching and student education. If “[i]ncreasing the revenue of
publishers at the expense of the authors and their underlying research scarcely seems
likely ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science,’ as the Constitution requires,” id. at 1022
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8), it is hard to fathom that doing the same thing to
educators would command a different conclusion.
328
Bohannan may be overzealous in her criticism of Lunney’s approach as “both underand over-protect[ing]” copyright because it does not “pay[] sufficient attention to proof of
harm.” Bohannan, supra note 188, at 986. Bohannan claims this approach over-protects
because it is “virtually always possible to imagine some abstract social value associated
with a defendant’s use of copyrighted material.” Id. It under-protects, she says, because
it assumes all uses cause harm, which they do not. Id. at 986–87. But these are problems
with the current fair use factors, as courts can easily over- or under-protect a work
depending on what kind of value-judgments they make about the defendant’s use and the
fair use factors. Additionally, Lunney’s approach is not relegated to abstract values. He
does retain a focus on harm, emphasizing that to discern the balance, courts should
examine whether the use reduces “revenue associated with the copyrighted work; and, if
so, how, if at all, that reduction would likely affect the production of copyrighted works.”
Lunney, supra note 322, at 999.
329
Bohannan criticizes Lunney’s approach for its abstractness and impracticality, as
well. Bohannan, supra note 188, at 986 (“[T]he balancing approach leaves courts too
much discretion, producing incorrect and inconsistent results. When dealing with uses of
copyrighted material, there is likely to be substantial disagreement over which values are
at stake and how they should be measured.”).
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and impracticality of Lunney’s approach make it unsuitable for
educational fair use.
The proposals, however, do not cease there. Professor Ann
Bartow has suggested a “judicial resuscitation” where the courts
would modify the four fair use factors to deal explicitly with
educational uses.330 As to the purpose and character of the
secondary use, “there should be a STRONG presumption in favor
of educational use,” which could be rebutted “only if the ‘noneducational’ work is lengthy and available for purchase at a
reasonable price, and a substantial portion, perhaps one third or
more, of the work is reproduced, therefore effecting an
unequivocal market substitution.”331 With respect to the nature of
the copyrighted work, “reasonable permission fees should be
permissible only if the work” is aimed at the educational market, is
in print, and “there is an actual, demonstrable market substitution
problem.”332 The amount and substantiality inquiry, too, would be
modified.333 It would build off the second factor and require per
page fees if the work is aimed at the educational market; but
substantiality would not be used to assess this factor.334 Finally,
Bartow would require publishers to prove lost sales or profits
instead of relying on circular licensing arguments.335
Bartow’s approach, like Lunney’s, focuses more on providing
greater movement for users within the doctrine of fair use.336 Her
presumption of educational uses as fair addresses some of
educators’ concerns by shifting the burden of proof.337

330

Bartow, supra note 5, at 227.
Id. at 227–28.
332
Id. at 228.
333
See id.
334
Id.
335
See id. at 228–29.
336
See Bartow, supra note 5, at 151 (stating that the “scope of educational fair use has
been dramatically compressed by judges who ignore the external benefits of fair use”);
see also Lunney, supra note 322, at 977 (“Sony stands not for the proposition that fair use
is justified only in those exceptional cases where a licensing scheme or some other
market mechanism is impractical. Rather, Sony stands for the recognition of fair use as a
central and vital arbiter between two competing public interests.”).
337
See generally Bartow, supra note 5, at 150 (stating that fair use “is the ‘most vital
piece of the law that fulfills copyright’s constitutional mandate’” (quoting Ann Shumelda
331
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Additionally, the requirement of licensing only for those works
that are aimed at the educational market makes good sense:
because the creation of those works depends on revenues from the
educational market, their use in education should come at a cost.338
Despite these benefits, none of them provides the amount of
certainty educators desire.
Under this proposal, although
educational uses are supposed to be presumed fair, they may not
be; and that determination is not one that educators can make. Put
another way, given the courts’ history with educational fair use, it
is not clear how strong a presumption this would be in practice.
Additionally, a strong presumption is an amorphous standard.
Bartow speculates as to the limits of the presumption, but the
demarcation point—where a use is rebutted because it is too
substantial, even for education—is likely to be a fact-sensitive
inquiry. In that sense, the fair use factors still provide the general
framework of analysis, which means that, while there is less
uncertainty, it still exists in great quantities.339
Professor Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin A. Goldman have
taken a different approach. They propose creating “fair use
harbors”: Congress, they argue, should “enact[] clearly defined,
nonexclusive fair use safe harbors.”340 Although uses falling
within the harbors “would be considered per se fair[,] . . .

Okerson, Buy or Lease? Two Models for Scholarly Information at the End (or the
Beginning) of an Era, DAEDALUS, Fall 1996, at 55, 63)).
338
It is a different and interesting question whether educators could use such works for
a purpose other than the one which the creator contemplated. If, for example, a teacher
wrote a critical essay of consumable workbooks by using some portions of the
workbooks, and distributed the essay to students studying English, that use probably
should not be unfair. See, e.g., Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs. v. Substance, Inc., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 919, 921–22, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding a teacher liable for copyright
infringement where the teacher, who also was the editor of a newspaper, reproduced
copies of entire standardized tests in the newspaper and criticized them therein). The
same could be said of an art teacher who makes a collage from copyrighted materials
intended for science classes (e.g., diagrams of covalent bonds, graphs, etc.). For it to be
feasible, modifications to this licensing approach would have to be made.
339
Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use, supra note 297, at 572.
340
Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1502. Professor Bartow also has
suggested that the Guidelines might be rewritten to better accommodate educational fair
use. See Bartow, supra note 5, at 225–26 (“Congress could continue to categorize
educational copying within the rubric of fair use, but discard or amend the current
Guidelines and promulgate educational fair use with a far wider scope.”).
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[u]ses . . . fall[ing] outside of them would be analyzed under
existing doctrine.”341
In proposing this model, the authors meet several potential
objections. First, they attempt to preempt the challenge that a fair
use harbor will become a ceiling instead of a floor.342 They
specifically mention the Classroom Guidelines’343 treatment by
courts as an example of this objection.344 According to the
authors, several “important differences” exist “between the
Classroom Guidelines and [their] proposed safe harbors.”345 First,
the Classroom Guidelines “were negotiated, in effect, not to reflect
a minimum level of utility, but rather as a sort of middle ground
compromise. Given this status, it was easier for parties on all sides
to fall into the trap of letting the floor become the ceiling.”346 That
explanation, however, is not entirely convincing. Even though the
Guidelines were the result of a compromise, they expressly stated
that they represented the minimum allowable fair use;347 the fact
that they were negotiated should not make a significant difference,
as Congress enacts all laws only after negotiating and horsetrading.
Second, because they “lacked the force of law[,] . . . the
Guidelines became a convenient benchmark for litigation.”348 This
argument is more convincing349—courts misapplied the
Guidelines, sometimes using them as a ceiling either because they
used them merely to justify a conclusion already reached or

341

Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1502.
Id. at 1524 (quoting Gibson, supra note 188, at 398).
343
They do note that the Classroom Guidelines were not “bright-line” safe harbors. Id.
at 1525. Other scholars have noted that the Guidelines mix rules and standards. E.g.,
Mazzone, supra note 15, at 413–27 (introducing his two Models and noting that rules or
standards can be used accordingly).
344
Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1525.
345
Id.
346
Id.
347
Eric D. Brandfonbrener, Fair Use and University Photocopying: Addison-Wesley
Publishing v. New York University, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 669, 686 (1986).
348
Id.
349
While this makes more sense, there is still at least one argument in response: if the
Guidelines lacked the force of law, that provides a reason for them not to become “a
convenient benchmark for litigation.” In other words, lawyers would rather rely on law
to give legal advice, or file lawsuits, than they would rely on legislative history.
342
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because they used them sloppily.350 In that sense, “safe harbors”
with the force of law would provide more certainty for educators;
they would clearly articulate some limit of acceptable copying.
The safe-harbor proposal would not, however, provide
practical certainty: educators would have the benefit of a safe
harbor, but it would be one that was designed to apply broadly to
all uses of works. That does not help educational uses, which we
have seen frequently use more of a work than other uses.
Furthermore, failing to tailor these safe harbors to education risks
that educators will retain the same fears and uncertainty as before:
because they do not know and cannot ascertain how far outside the
Guidelines they may venture, they will likely stay within them. In
other words, the Guidelines, despite trying to increase fair use,
may chill it.
Finally, the authors state that “even if the critics are absolutely
correct, we still believe that on the whole our proposal will
improve the current state of affairs.”351 In other words, the use of
this standard may harm some parties, but, overall, it will be a boon.
Nevertheless, despite David Hume’s comment about the error of
induction,352 the best evidence of how something will work in the
future is how it has worked in the past. As we have seen, and as
these authors readily admit, the Classroom Guidelines have been
used as a ceiling rather than a floor;353 the authors do not provide
strong reasons for thinking that a law to the same effect would
have contrary results.

350

See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1496, 1504.
Id. at 1526 (emphasis added).
352
See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 17 (Forgotten
Books 2008) (“Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not
ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like
nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it
can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and
distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is
no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation,
that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were
it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly
conceived by the mind.”).
353
See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1525.
351
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3. Best Practices
Although novel, reformulating fair use is not the only
mechanism scholars have proposed to improve it. A recent
movement, spearheaded by Professor Peter Jaszi, has proposed a
solution geared toward scholars’ observations—like those of
Jennifer Rothman and Lawrence Lessig—that copyright has
created a “clearance culture” by adopting the custom of copyright
owners.354 The solution is a “code of best practices”:355 general
principles of conduct educators should follow when using
copyrighted materials (specifically visual media).356
This code of best practices is built on observations about the
problems teachers face when instructing students about, and in the
process using, film media.357 Over one hundred and fifty members

354

CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN
FAIR USE FOR MEDIA LITERACY EDUCATION 14 (2008), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.
org/files/pdf/Media_literacy.pdf [hereinafter CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION] (“Most
‘copyright education’ that educators and learners have encountered has been shaped by
the concerns of commercial copyright holders, whose understandable concern about
large-scale copyright piracy has caused them to equate any unlicensed use of copyrighted
material with stealing . . . . This code of best practices, by contrast, is shaped by
educators for educators and the learners they serve, with the help of legal advisors.”); see
also Michael Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 396–416 (2005) (arguing that § 107 should be rewritten
to reflect a standard of fairness based on social practices). See generally CTR. FOR SOCIAL
MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES FAQ (2007),
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/faqapr07.pdf [hereinafter FAQ].
355
The “code of best practices” will be referred to as the “CBP.”
356
CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 9; see FAQ, supra note 354. There
also is a code of best practices for documentary filmmaking. CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA,
AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST
PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/public
ations/statement_of_best_practices_in_fair_use/. Film scholars too have developed their
own code of best practices. SOC’Y FOR CINEMA & MEDIA STUDIES, STATEMENT OF BEST
PRACTICES FOR FAIR USE IN TEACHING FOR FILM AND MEDIA EDUCATORS (2005),
http://www.cmstudies.org/documents/SCMSBestPracticesforFairUseinTeachingFinal.
pdf.
357
See PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N,
COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE AND MOTION PICTURES (2007), http://www.centerforsocialmedia
.org/files/pdf/fairuse_motionpictures.pdf [hereinafter PETER JASZI, COPYRIGHT AND
MOTION PICTURES]. The CBP for documentary filmmakers was designed to respond to
problems documentary filmmakers faced. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR.
FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE
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of various educational institutions convened ten times to create the
CBP.358 Legal scholars subsequently reviewed the CBP prior to its
adoption.359
While there appears to be little data on the effectiveness of the
CBP in education, the CBP for documentary filmmakers has
enjoyed success.360 Jaszi and Professor Patricia Aufderheide
publicized this CBP, and gradually copyright owners began to
accept its validity.361 Even insurance companies “[that] offer
errors and omissions insurance to filmmakers” came around,
“offering to cover fair use claims.”362
Despite its success, the CBP has limits, particularly the one
directed at media education.363 Its creators explicitly note that it
“does not tell [educators and students] the limits of fair use
rights.”364 It avoids this rigid approach and “[i]nstead . . .
describes how those rights should apply in certain recurrent
situations.”365 That means that the CBP will not cover all
situations, and thus “[e]ducators’ and students’ fair use rights
may . . . extend to other situations as well.”366
While the CBP offers practical value by providing a set of
principles by which educators can act, its lack of certainty leaves
us in a similar space as the Guidelines. The first principle (and
attendant limitations) of CBP for media education, for example,
illustrates the vagueness that would create uncertainty for
educators in other situations:
CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 4
(2004), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf.
358
CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 2.
359
Id.
360
See CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC’N, SUCCESS OF THE
STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES, http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/success_
of_the_statement.pdf; JASZI, COPYRIGHT AND MOTION PICTURES, supra note 357, at 30–
32; Pat Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Fair Use and Best Practices: Surprising Success,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2007, at 26, available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia
.org/files/pdf/IPTodaySuccess.pdf.
361
See JASZI, COPYRIGHT AND MOTION PICTURES, supra note 357, at 3032.
362
Id. at 32.
363
See CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 1.
364
Id.
365
Id.
366
Id.
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PRINCIPLE: Under fair use, educators using the
concepts and techniques of media literacy can
choose illustrative material from the full range of
copyrighted sources and make them available to
learners, in class, in workshops, in informal
mentoring and teaching settings, and on schoolrelated Web sites.
LIMITATIONS: Educators should choose material
that is germane to the project or topic, using only
what is necessary for the educational goal or
purpose for which it is being made. In some cases,
this will mean using a clip or excerpt; in other
cases, the whole work is needed. Whenever
possible, educators should provide proper
attribution and model citation practices that are
appropriate to the form and context of use. Where
illustrative material is made available in digital
formats, educators should provide reasonable
protection against third-party access and
downloads.367
It is not clear how this type of principle helps teachers
determine the proper amount they can use. Think back to the
example given at the beginning of the Article—a teacher wants to
photocopy and distribute three short chapters of a particular book.
How would a principle like this one help her? Could she use less
of the copyrighted work to make the same point? What if she
could but the effectiveness of the message would be decreased?
Could she use information in the public domain instead? These are
questions without definite (or readily discernable) answers under a
CBP. These broad principles do not provide the certainty
educators are seeking.
Further complicating the issue is the legal status of CBPs.
They are not the law—they are suggested customs that educators
develop. Although they may become the law at some later point,
for now they are just suggested principles by which to develop
customs—and there is no guarantee they become accepted
367

Id. at 1011 (emphasis added).

C02_SIMON_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

TEACHING WITHOUT INFRINGEMENT

3/31/2010 1:05 PM

519

custom.368 Furthermore, given the dearth of case law, identifying
the point at which they become de facto law—if that happens—
will be difficult. More importantly, if our goal is to change the
current custom or culture, the question becomes, why wait? And,
for that matter, why risk it? Why risk any liability from a
preemptive attack in the form of a lawsuit by publishers or
copyright owners? This type of attack, if waged soon enough,
could place us in constraints more restrictive than the Guidelines.
The lack of legal authority, as well as this “time lag,” represent a
challenge to the CBP’s approach.
Additionally, the CBP notes that “[a]lthough professional
groups create such codes, no one needs to be a member of a
professional group to benefit from their interpretations.”369 This
certainly is a beneficial effect of the CBP, but it also raises the
issue of which organizations should be charged with creating a
CBP. Moreover, it highlights an important reality: as the CBP’s
popularity grows, numerous groups and organizations will propose
codes for various uses. In a world replete with non-organizational
actors, how can teachers reliably use a particular set of codes or
principles?
Certification may be one method of controlling which codes
are authoritative—but then the certification institution becomes a
non-binding committee on fair use. The certification decisions will
represent what a small cadre of individuals think fair use should
be—and this certification, at least at first, has no legal effect.370
There is still no certain way of discerning which codes are the
“best” or the “most legal.” One would expect, not only infighting
among various groups for authoritative control of the process, but
also opposition from groups with opposing interests, such as
publishing houses. These groups likely would create their own set
368

While the documentary CBP has enjoyed success, there is no guarantee that
educational CBPs will have similar success. But see Hume, supra note 352, at 17.
369
CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 7.
370
This type of situation has pushed the author in the direction of an administrative
agency, which would act as this certification entity, but do so with the force of law. This
also raises a question of fairness: how can we be sure that the CBP will be “fair” without
any opposing voice? As the adoption of clearance culture has shown, “unfair” practices
can be adopted quickly and become fair. Without any opposing viewpoints in education,
there is some risk that unfair practices will become customary.
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of codes. Then, if a court were faced with a lawsuit and ended up
looking to “custom” to determine fair use, there likely would be
numerous codes from various institutions. This discussion
demonstrates that the benefits of a CBP are inversely related to the
number of CBPs available.
That uncertainty again highlights the main problem with
shifting the balance of “cultural power” using guidelines.
Clearance culture represents the current law—courts apply circular
licensing arguments and the Guidelines.371 But CBPs are not law,
and beyond how much practical effect they have—as not all CBPs
will be as successful as those for documentary filmmakers—
further questions remain about what legal authority they have.
Currently, they are not the law;372 and there is no reason to think
that courts would consult non-judicial CBPs to create new federal
common law.
Despite this uncertainty, some might argue this kind of
vagueness—vagueness based on CBPs—is desirable. In this way,
educators have space in which to work without having the rigidity
of rules. It also provides flexibility so that, when customs change,
they will still be legal. But this argument still leaves educators
wanting more. As discussed above, CBPs are not current law, and
their legal status remains uncertain until cases are litigated.373
Additionally, they provide no substantive guidance about what,
specifically, educators can do with copyrighted works. Without
specific rules about what uses are fair, educators will still be
guessing as to the fairness of their uses. In other words, the CBP
illustrates the need for a new solution, one that takes into account
the changing fair use principles but also ex ante certainty for
educators.
To achieve flexibility and certainty, this Article advocates a
separate standard for educational fair use—one that is broader and
more expansive than the type used for other uses.374 In other
371
See Bohannan, supra note 188, at 971; see also Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra
note 199, at 150509.
372
See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 139091
(6th Cir. 1996).
373
See id.
374
See infra Part III.
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words, educational fair use would apply in certain educational
contexts. The CBP, however, advocates universal application of
the fair use doctrine. The CBP for media education, for example,
includes “Principle Three: Sharing Media Literacy Curriculum
Materials”:
PRINCIPLE: Educators using concepts and
techniques of media literacy should be able to share
effective examples of teaching about media and
meaning with one another, including lessons and
resource materials. If curriculum developers are
making sound decisions on fair use when they
create their materials, then their work should be
able to be seen, used, and even purchased by
anyone—since fair use applies to commercial
materials as well as those produced outside the
marketplace model.375
This Article argues that this view is misguided because
educational fair use is unique; it is different from other kinds of
fair uses.
Section 110 of the Copyright Act illustrates this difference by
exempting certain educational uses of works—i.e., those in the
This exemption indicates something about
classroom.376
educational fair use—Congress rightly thought educational fair use
was different from other kinds of uses and so should be given
broader scope. As a corollary, some uses of copyrighted works
375

CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 1112.
17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006). One might think that § 110 might, then, be a good place to
build a new fair use model. Why not just expand § 110 to cover situations we think are
fair? There are several problems with this approach. First, § 110 is an exemption,
deeming non-infringing all uses that fall within its ambit. But an educational fair use
model must account for the reality that not all educational uses are fair—thus, expanding
§ 110 could not cover every use. Therefore, this approach would capture some uses, but
would leave the remaining uses in the legal vagueness that currently exists. Additionally,
expanding § 110 would be extremely onerous, requiring Congress to articulate specific
categories of per se fair uses—this may quickly begin to break down into complicated
rules about copying. Finally, exemptions created by Congress are difficult to enact, and,
once enacted, they could not sufficiently react to changing educational circumstances.
An administrative agency, as proposed infra, could create better rules for fair use (and
exemptions where appropriate) while retaining the ability to modify these rules based on
changing technologies and circumstances.
376
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will be fair in an educational context but not in other contexts.
Thus, a student may be able to create a particular movie or song
using copyrighted materials for class but may not be able to
distribute that work outside the educational setting.
Finally, the language of this CBP principle requires educators
to make a legal judgment, evaluating whether “curriculum
developers are making sound decisions on fair use.”377 This is
undesirable. As we have seen, educators are not equipped to make
legal judgments—and they should not be burdened with this
responsibility. For all of these reasons, the CBP approach does not
solve the problems of educational fair use.
4. New Entity to Decide Fair Uses
In addition to the best practices approach, others have argued
for a more general solution: creating new entities to decide which
uses are fair. Retaining the four fair use factors but reformulating
the process of adjudication, Professor Michael W. Carroll has
suggested a new apparatus to better serve the doctrine of fair
use.378 He advocates that Congress create a “Fair Use Board,”
which would be analogous to the Copyright Royalty Board,379 in
that “the Copyright Office would have authority to adjudicate fair
use petitions and, subject to judicial review, issue fair use
rulings.”380 Fair use arbiters would issue rulings, all of which
would be non-binding, that determine the fairness of a use.381 A
fairness finding would immunize the user from liability for
infringement, and even if the arbiter made a finding of unfairness,
377

CODE FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, supra note 354, at 1112.
See Carroll, supra note 173, at 1087.
379
Id. at 1124. The Copyright Royalty Board is explained supra note 45.
380
See Carroll, supra note 173, at 1090, 112328. Professors Mark Lemley & R.
Anthony Reese have proposed a similar solution. See Mark Lemley & R. Anthony Reese,
Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1345, 1413 (2004). They suggest allowing copyright owners with the option to
combat infringement over peer-to-peer (“P2P”) networks in “an administrative dispute
resolution proceeding before an administrative law judge in the Copyright Office.” Id.
This proposal, like the others described in this Part, is unworkable because, among other
reasons, it does nothing to shift the burden off the educational user and retains the
unpredictable fair use factors. For a more detailed explanation of why these models do
not work well in educational fair use cases, see supra Part II.B.1–3.
381
See Carroll, supra note 173, at 112627.
378
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the “petitioner [would] retain[] all other defenses to copyright
infringement.”382 Either party could appeal the ruling to the
Register of Copyrights and then to any federal circuit court.383 He
notes that this is a standard-based approach, as it advocates the
application of the fair use factors on a case-by-case basis.384
Professor David Nimmer has sketched a similar approach to
the administration of fair use.385 This proposal, like Professor
Carroll’s, would use the Copyright Office to run “an expedited,
voluntary, inexpensive, non-binding procedure to obtain an
impartial” fair use determination.386 The individual seeking to use
a copyrighted work would file a petition and pay a $1,000.00
(which can increase by an additional $9,000.00) filing fee.387 A
response from the opposing party and a reply from the petitioner
would be allowed, and both parties would agree on an arbiter.388
Rulings would have no precedential effect but could be used in
determining damages, remedies, and attorneys’ fees.389
While Carroll’s and Nimmer’s proposals are laudable, they do
not alter the doctrine of fair use or its legal application. One
benefit of these models would be using “[t]he threat of
administrative fair use adjudication [to] redistribute the balance of
bargaining power in some measure, [which] should increase the
range of an aggressive copyright owner’s zone of possible
agreement.”390 There may be some increase in users’ bargaining
power, but that redistribution does not change the balance of the
fair use inquiry, which retains the unruly application of the fair use
factors. In other words, this model does nothing to modify how
courts analyze fair use.

382

Id. at 1123.
Id. at 112627.
384
See id. at 1123, 1128 (accepting the option that “reduce[s] the costs of obtaining a
fair use determination ex ante under the current legal standard”). Carroll’s approach will
be called “micro-adjudication.”
385
See David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 11–15 (2006).
386
Id. at 11.
387
See id. at 1214.
388
See id. at 1314.
389
See id. at 1415.
390
Carroll, supra note 173, at 1129.
383
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Another purported benefit of this model is the reduction in
litigation costs—but those costs will still be substantial.
Additionally, the petition fee and process may deter schools or
teachers from petitioning for fair use.391 Over and above a filing
fee, costs will rise because lawyers will likely be(come) a
necessary component to argue the user’s case, or at the very least
to balance out the likely presence of a lawyer on behalf of a
copyright owner.392 Despite the fact that these micro-decisions
will be “published on the Copyright Office website,” they would
be non-precedential;393 therefore, they are unlikely to tell the user
anything more than the judicial decisions that have utilized the
Guidelines.394 In fact, these decisions may even continue the
391

Given the unpredictability of the outcome and the costs associated with filing and
adjudicating a petition (possibly more than $10,000.00), a school is likely to face
resistance from the community. Schools may be able to pool money together to advance
certain claims, but that seems unlikely given the number of educational uses and the
variety of teaching techniques.
392
Carroll makes the inspirational statement that “the goal should be a procedure that
would not require a petitioner or a copyright owner to be represented by counsel to
achieve substantively just outcomes.” Carroll, supra note 173, at 1127. It seems difficult
to achieve a “substantively just” outcome in a morass of legal concepts without the aid of
attorneys or some other assisting advocate. Realizing this, I think, Carroll tempers this
statement by permitting “copyright agents” to represent the parties. Id. These agents will
add costs and, like in Social Security disability benefits cases, maybe lawyers. See 42
U.S.C. § 406(a)(1) (2006) (providing the Commissioner of Social Security the power to
“prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents or other persons,
other than attorneys as hereinafter provided, representing claimants before the
Commissioner of Social Security”); id. § 406(b) (providing for attorney representation).
Indeed, it seems likely that lawyers will become involved, not only because the copyright
owner—who typically will represent a well-funded and litigious interest—is likely to
have a lawyer, but also because the individual filing with the Fair Use Board will likely
be a lawyer acting on behalf of the user.
393
Carroll, supra note 173, at 1126; Nimmer, supra note 385, at 14 (stating that “[t]he
Register of Copyrights shall make publicly available on a website or otherwise, all
petitions, responses, and rulings submitted” and that “[t]he court shall not be obligated to
accord any weight to the Fair Use Arbiter(s)”).
394
There is also a possibility that such a system would create more uncertainty. Given
that the fair use factors are so unruly to begin with, categorizing non-binding, advisory
opinions to craft a legal opinion about what is fair use to copy seems far-fetched. Cf.
Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 199, at 1525 (stating that, because they “lacked
the force of law[,] . . . the Guidelines became a convenient benchmark for litigation”).
Decisions will not necessarily follow any particular pattern, and many decisions in noneducational settings will have an uncertain impact on educators as lawyers will try to
analogize non-educational decisions to educational ones. Given this possibility, Carroll’s
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judicial tradition of using the Guidelines.395 For these reasons,
educators may view the petition process as too costly and
uncertain, especially given that, beyond the petition process, a
lawsuit may await. As a result, educational users will continue
their current practice of restrictive use of copyrighted materials.
Professor Jason Mazzone also has entered the fray, presenting
two models that would allow an agency to “administer fair use.”396
They differ from those proposed by Carroll and Nimmer, both of
which involved a form of micro-adjudication,397 because they use
the informal rulemaking process—otherwise known as notice-andcomment rulemaking—to regulate and administer fair use.398
Mazzone’s first model (“Model One”) requires three steps:
Congress would declare it “unlawful to interfere with fair uses of
copyrighted works;”399 create an agency to enforce this statute; and
state expressly “that federal fair use law, including [the agency’s]
regulations, preempts state laws of contract limit[ing] fair uses of
copyrighted works.”400
Under this model, the agency would “specify . . . the uses that
constitute fair uses of copyrighted works within specific

statement that “intermediaries should accord a favorable fair use ruling the same weight
as a license from the copyright owner” falls under greater scrutiny. Carroll, supra note
173, at 112829.
395
After all, such administrative decision-makers must rely on previous case law.
396
See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 415. Professor Joseph Liu also has urged a greater
role for rulemaking in copyright, suggesting that more authority might be delegated to the
Copyright Office—using the Librarian of Congress’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) rulemaking-authority as evidence of the feasibility of this approach. See
Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 14850 (2004) [hereinafter
Liu, Regulatory Copyright]. Liu notes that the Copyright Office, as it currently stands, is
ill-equipped to deal with the additional rulemaking duties. Id. at 15657. Nevertheless,
he notes that, “by increasing the expertise of the Copyright Office, granting it more
substantive authority, and ensuring that a wide range of copyright interests are
represented, these reforms would ideally place more emphasis on the Copyright Office as
a nexus of coherent copyright policymaking.” Id. at 159. This type of authority, he says,
may give “the existing institutional structure . . . a strong, informed, centralized
policymaking body” that it currently lacks. Id.
397
See Carroll, supra note 173, at 1087; Nimmer, supra note 385, at 11–15.
398
See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 416, 419.
399
Id. at 415.
400
Id.
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sectors.”401 It would, like other agencies under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”),402 have the ability to adjudicate disputes,
and have a corresponding appeals process that ultimately could
reach federal court.403 The agency would have enforcement
authority, like the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).404
Mazzone also advocates judicial deference to the regulations
developed by the agency in copyright infringement lawsuits.405
Mazzone’s second model (“Model Two” or “EEOC Model”)
employs a federal agency, which has “more general responsibility
in copyright infringement claims” than the agency in Model
One.406 It mirrors the current structure and function of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).407 Model Two
requires a copyright owner who alleges infringement to file a
complaint with the agency.408 The respondent would have a
limited-time opportunity to assert a fair use defense, after which
the complainant could file in federal court.409 If a timely defense is
asserted, the agency, like the EEOC, would investigate to
determine whether infringement has occurred.410
Mazzone’s Models have a combination of several desirable
qualities that the other proposals possess in isolation or altogether
lack. First, these Models are rule-based:411 this bodes well for
educators who desire certainty. An agency that can administer
rules that specify what uses are per se fair is a valuable tool that
eliminates much guesswork for educational institutions; and it also
provides flexibility because the agency may adopt some standards
or rule-standard hybrids.412 Second, while an administrative
decision regarding a regulation is not binding on the courts, the
401

Id.; see Samuelson, supra note 30, at 258087 (detailing the cluster Samuelson calls
“uses that promote learning”).
402
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2006).
403
Mazzone, supra note 15, at 417.
404
Id. at 418.
405
Id.
406
Id. at 419.
407
Id. at 419–20.
408
Id. at 419.
409
Id.
410
Id. at 419–20.
411
See id. at 415.
412
See id. at 425–27.

C02_SIMON_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

3/31/2010 1:05 PM

TEACHING WITHOUT INFRINGEMENT

527

regulations are; i.e., the regulations have the force of law, and
administrative interpretations of those rules will be given
deference.413 That means that the rulings will be followed by
publishers and educational institutions alike. Third, the process by
which the rules are formulated is not subject to judicial reasoning
that employs the fair use factors.414 The notice-and-comment
rulemaking process allows for greater flexibility in developing
rules, which will have greater specificity.415 The regulations,
interpretations, and policy statements, coupled with subsequent
decisions by the courts, will provide the stability and certainty that
educators seek.
These Models, therefore, are a good place to start; but they
need to be developed and tailored to the educational setting.
Therefore, the next Part, using Mazzone’s Model One as a rough
sketch, draws a fuller picture for administering educational fair
use.
III. A NEW MODEL FOR EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE
Mazzone’s model provides a foundation from which further
discussion can take place. This Article, like Mazzone’s, advocates
creating an agency to administer fair use. It also agrees with
Mazzone that Congress should give the agency power to specify
fair uses within “specific sectors.”416 This Part, however, takes
413

See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)
(“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” (footnotes omitted)).
414
See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 418 (“In determining whether a particular use is fair
and therefore renders the defendant’s copying noninfringing, courts would defer to [the
Office for Fair Use]’s regulations.”).
415
See id. at 433–37.
416
Id. at 415.
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that proposition one step further and proposes the creation of an
executive agency devoted exclusively to administering fair use
within the education “sector.” The reason education deserves
special treatment is a matter of policy: the foregoing analysis has
shown that education is uniquely important, and different from
many other types of fair uses;417 and educators are not likely to
agree with publishers on what is fair.418 An agency is needed to
administer copyright specifically as to fair use.419
This executive agency, which I call the Copyright Regulatory
Administrative Body (“CRAB”), will create a workable, flexible,
and coherent legal framework for educators to assess whether their
uses are fair. Because it is limited exclusively to educational fair
uses, it will not face the myriad problems that the administration of
fair use generally would. Interest groups, for example, will be
more easily identified, isolated, and controlled in this closed,
“educational universe” of fair use.
Explaining the creation of the CRAB and how it will operate
takes several steps, and requires us to work backwards. First, the
structure and operation of the CRAB will be outlined, with
attention given to mitigating the disproportionate influence of
special interest groups and agency “lock-in.” This will include
explaining why Mazzone’s EEOC Model should be rejected in
favor of a modified form of Model One. Describing the structure
and content of the agency first allows us to understand what type
of language Congress will employ to do this. Therefore, after

417
See Bartow, supra note 5, at 211 (“If the creation of course packets or making of
multiple copies promotes scholarship, and advances the goals of higher education by
optimizing access to the ideas contained in the copied, copyrighted works, a broad
construction of educational fair use is more than justified.”).
418
Professor Samuelson has stated that “[n]either Congress nor the courts have been
able to definitively resolve the intense controversy over learning-related uses, even after
more than forty years of debate.” Samuelson, supra note 30, at 2620. She also argues
that “educational and research uses . . . have become so ubiquitous and widely tolerated
that they may have, in effect, become fair uses after all.” Id. Even if that is true, it does
not mean that the current educational uses are broad enough. Teachers may now be more
restricted to the customs imposed by industry clearance practices.
419
This model heeds the call of Samuelson and others that “commentators should stop
wringing their hands about how troublesome fair use law is,” and proposes a meaningful
solution that addresses this worry. Samuelson, supra note 30, at 2621.
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articulating the CRAB model, the Congressional language that
should be used to create the CRAB is explored briefly.
A. Rejecting Model Two
Mazzone gives us two Models from which to work.420 The
best choice, at least for educational fair use, is an agency based on
Model One. The reason lies both in the adverse effects that Model
Two would have on educational institutions, as well as the
beneficial results of Model One.
Giving the CRAB EEOC-like powers would encourage
publishers and copyright owners to pursue claims they normally
would not. If, for example, the CRAB was given investigatory
powers similar to the EEOC, publishers would be more likely to
pursue infringement claims against the educational institutions
that, in the past, have been left largely un-sued.
The reason lies in the cost and publicity for both educational
institutions and copyright owners. Under the EEOC model, if the
CRAB investigates an infringement claim, the cost is borne
entirely by the CRAB and the educational institution; the CRAB
bears the expense, investigates, and makes particular findings.421
Additionally, this type of system makes the educational institutions
look like bad social actors. This system is set up to investigate
possible infringement or “wrongdoing” on the part of schools.422
Thus, for an educational institution, much like for an employer
under investigation by the EEOC, a finding of infringement is
detrimental, but a non-finding does not resolve the claim itself; the
copyright owner still can file a lawsuit in federal court.423

420

Mazzone, supra note 15, at 415.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (2006) (describing the powers of the EEOC, which
include making technical studies and intervening in a civil action); id. § 2000e-5
(describing the EEOC’s powers, including bringing a civil action in federal court or
referring the matter to the attorney general); id. § 2000e-8 (describing EEOC’s
investigative powers).
422
See generally id. § 2000e-5(b).
423
29 C.F.R. § 1614.110 (2009) (providing that after a final agency action by a judge or
otherwise, the EEOC must provide the complainant with notice of their right to appeal
the final action to the EEOC and “right to file a civil action in federal district court”).
421
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Beyond creating an incentive to file complaints, Model Two
imposes significant costs on educational institutions. Any time the
CRAB received a complaint, it would be obligated to investigate
that complaint and make a determination of infringement.424 Every
investigation requires lawyers, who, in turn, use discovery. That
discovery costs money for educational institutions. The EEOC, for
example, has broad investigative powers and routinely requests
documents from employers.425 These requests are handled by the
employers’ lawyers. Under the CRAB, the transaction costs—
these include legal costs, search and information costs associated
with gathering the required documents, and lost productivity—
imposed by investigations would be significant,426 especially
considering how easy filing a complaint may be for a publisher or
copyright owner.427 Employers, for example, face substantial costs
when a charge is filed with the EEOC:
Winning [an EEOC charge] avoids court-imposed
remedies, but it does not free the employer from the
transaction costs of conducting litigation. The
424

Mazzone, supra note 15, at 419.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (describing the EEOC’s investigatory power); id. § 2000e-9
(describing the EEOC’s subpoena power). The EEOC, by statute, is authorized to access
“any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to
unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to the charge
under investigation.” Id. § 2000e-8(a). To obtain this evidence, it may issue subpoenas.
Id. § 2000e-9. Using this power, the EEOC has “access to virtually any material that
might cast light on the allegations against [an] employer.” EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 446
U.S. 54, 68–69 (1984).
426
See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE
L.J. 611, 615–16 (1989) (defining “transaction costs” to include “get-together costs,”
“decision and execution costs,” and “information costs”); David Sherwyn et al., In
Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing
Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 73, 81 (1999) (“Responding to a charge costs an employer who does not have in-house
counsel thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees.”); id. (“Additional employer costs include
the loss of productivity of other employees involved in the case, adverse publicity, and of
course, liability.”).
427
Under the EEOC regulations, individuals who feel they have been discriminated
against under Title VII “must consult a Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order to
try to informally resolve the matter.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). At that initial meeting, the
Counselor informs the complainant of their rights and responsibilities. Id. §
1614.105(b)(1). Barring a different choice, the last Counselor conducts a final interview
with the complainant within thirty days, id. § 1614.105(d), after which time the
complainant may file its complaint alleging discrimination. Id. § 1614.106(b).
425
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employer must retain lawyers, respond to an EEOC
investigation of the employee’s complaint, conduct
and respond to discovery, and pay other litigationrelated expenses. The employer must also bear the
cost of any time which human resources personnel,
managers, and other employees dedicate to
depositions, document requests, meetings with
lawyers, and appearances in court.428
The costs would be similar—though reduced—for educational
institutions responding to the CRAB’s investigations.429 These
costs also may be detrimental to student learning and society.
Educational institutions will be forced to spend money locating
material and outside counsel instead of spending it to educate their
students. A less educated citizenry means a less productive and
competitive citizenry. Additionally, teachers, administrators, and
possibly students would spend time with lawyers or engage in
other non-educational activities necessitated by investigations.
These monetary risks would encourage schools to settle with
copyright owners.430 Thus, the CRAB, if based on the EEOC
Model, would encourage resolution of claims through mediation or
settlement simply to avoid educational costs.431 Doubtless such
428

Seth D. Harris, Law, Economics, and Accommodations in the Internal Labor
Market, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 1, 60–61 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
429
Under this Model, investigations of educational institutions may be less costly or
complex than investigations of employers. For example, in an EEOC investigation, the
employer typically disputes the reasons for an adverse action, the details of the
employment policy, to whom the policy applies, and the treatment of other similarly
situated employees. In the educational context, these issues may not be as complex since
schools will have copying policies in place and teachers’ conduct is not being compared;
the issues are related more to infringement and use. Those are factual issues, but not
nearly as complex as in employment discrimination actions. How much less these
investigations would costs schools is beyond the scope of this Article. Thanks to Jason
Mazzone for raising this point.
430
See Sherwyn, supra note 426, at 81–82 (“Because defending discrimination lawsuits
in federal court can cost an employer hundreds of thousands or even over one million
dollars, employers are induced to settle a case regardless of the worthiness of the
plaintiffs’ allegations.” (footnotes omitted)).
431
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(b)(1)–(2) (requiring that the EEOC must explain to
complainant her rights, which include alternative dispute resolution as well as counseling
activities); Sherwyn, supra note 426, at 80 (“The agency with which the employee files a
charge will investigate the allegation and try to settle the matter by having the employer
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negotiation and settlement will mean concessions by the school,
which likely would include licensing fees or completely ceasing to
copy the work altogether. That result would be contrary to the one
sought by creating an administrative agency. As noted before, fair
use is use without authorization; it is free.432 Encouraging
settlements on these claims would discourage fair use and further
entrench the current clearance culture.
Additionally, positive publicity for copyright owners can be
bad publicity for schools. The public nature of the CRAB’s
decisions, if modeled after the EEOC, would negatively affect
schools, regardless of the outcome.433 If the determination is
favorable to the educational institution, the copyright owner may
still pursue litigation. If the determination is unfavorable to the
educational institution, that prods schools into the licensing or
other agreements that fair use may not require, or else risk
litigation. If the case is litigated after an unfavorable decision, the
school’s decision not to comply is disclosed.434 Noncompliance
makes schools look like bad actors. Again, the EEOC provides a
rough analogy: “[EEOC] [l]itigation also publicly discloses the
employer’s decision to deny an accommodation and thereby
increases the likelihood that prospective employees in the external
labor market will learn about the decision.”435 This negatively
impacts schools’ reputations and reinforces the industry culture,

remunerate and/or reinstate the employee.”); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, EEOC Investigations—What An Employer Should Know, http://archive.
eeoc.gov/employers/investigations.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010) (“In many cases, you
may opt to resolve a charge early in the process through mediation or settlement. At the
start of an investigation, EEOC will advise you if your charge is eligible for mediation,
but feel free to ask the investigator about the settlement option. Mediation and
settlement are voluntary resolutions.” (emphasis in original)). But see 29 C.F.R. §
1614.105(b)(1) (noting that a complainant must be advised of “the right to file a notice of
intent to sue pursuant to 1614.201(a) and a lawsuit under the ADEA instead of an
administrative complaint of age discrimination under this part”).
432
See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 398.
433
See generally U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Questions and
Answers—Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
foia/qanda_foiarequest.cfm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010) (advising that EEOC Orders,
Directives, and Decisions can be publicly viewed and copied at EEOC District Offices).
434
See Harris, supra note 428, at 60.
435
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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which emphasizes payment-for-use in lieu of fair use. All the
more reason for copyright owners to file complaints.
Thus, Model Two encourages copyright owners to file
complaints with school districts across the country. One can
imagine a scenario where copyright owners and publishers file
complaints far and wide. In investigating these complaints, the
CRAB will necessarily impose substantial costs—monetary,
reputational, and educational—on educational institutions. In
other words, Model Two’s design prejudices educational
institutions by forcing them to combat infringement claims. That
starting position casts them as wrongdoers. Both of those
outcomes do not further the goals of fair use or education. Thus,
Model Two is rejected as a platform on which to build the CRAB.
B. The CRAB: Structure, Organization, and Powers
Although Model Two cannot solve the educational fair use
problem, Model One may do so with further explanation and
adaptation. To review, Model One started with three separate acts
of Congress:
First, Congress [passes a statute] . . . that make[s] it
unlawful to interfere with fair uses of copyrighted
works and subject[s] offenders to civil penalties. . . .
Second, Congress . . . create[s] an agency . . . to
enforce this statute. . . .
Third, Congress . . .
specif[ies] that federal fair use law, including [the
agency’s] regulations, preempts state laws of
contract that limit fair uses of copyrighted works.436
The basic principle in this scheme starts from the right place:
by affirmatively placing the obligation on copyright owners to
comply with fair use laws, educational institutions have more
space within which to teach.437 Because the burden is on the
copyright owners not to interfere with fair use, educational
institutions will not face investigative costs. Additionally, as
described below, the agency itself will be able to enforce its
436

Mazzone, supra note 15, at 415.
This conception of fair use better reflects the view that copyright and fair use each
represent dueling rights. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
437
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regulations against copyright owners seeking to frustrate or
interfere with educational fair use.
With that guiding principle, the CRAB, like Mazzone’s Model
One, would operate by both notice-and-comment rulemaking,
informal adjudication, and enforcement mechanisms.438 The
differences between the CRAB and Model One lie in the details; in
that sense, the CRAB may be seen merely as an outgrowth of
Model One.
1. Negotiated Rulemaking Versus Informal Rulemaking
Model One assumes that a regular, informal rulemaking
process under 5 U.S.C. § 553 of the APA would be the best course
of action.439 It does not consider a negotiated rulemaking process
under 5 U.S.C. § 561.440 To understand the difference, and the
template after which the CRAB should be modeled, we should
understand each individually. During this discussion, the benefits
and drawbacks of each will be briefly discussed.
Informal rulemaking, also known as notice-and-comment
rulemaking, provides a procedure that is designed to include public
participation.441 In the first step of this process, the agency
publishes a general notice of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register.442 Next, the agency must provide “interested persons an
opportunity to participate” in rulemaking by submitting comments,
data, views, or argument.443 The agency then publishes the rule at
least thirty days before it takes effect.444 Although notice-andcomment rulemaking encourages participation in the rulemaking
438

See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 415–18.
Id. at 415–16.
440
5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006).
441
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407
F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[the notice-and-comment
requirements] are designed (1) to ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure
to diverse public comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties, and (3) to give
affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence in the record to support their
objections to the rule and thereby enhance the quality of judicial review” (citation
omitted)).
442
5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
443
Id. § 553(c).
444
Id. § 553(d).
439
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process, public participation is limited.445 Prior to publishing the
notice of the rule provided by the agency, for instance, an agency
typically spends a large amount of time and research developing a
rule.446 This extensive development results, in part, from the “hard
look” standard of judicial review, which encourages the agency to
build a substantial record.447 In this process, the agency becomes
cognitively committed to the proposed rule, an effect known as
“lock-in.”448 Agency lock-in makes the agency less receptive and
responsive to public comments; few agencies actually change rules
in response to public comments.449 This effect can be mitigated

445

See Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and
Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 597–99 (2002).
446
See id. at 597 (“The timing of rulemaking encourages agency lock-in by
concentrating the bulk of decisionmaking in the pre-notice period. Notice occurs after
the agency has completed substantial amounts of development, analysis, and review.”).
447
See id. at 621 (“[T]he nature and timing of notice and comment rulemaking can
result in a premature psychological commitment to a position. Due to judicially-imposed
requirements, political and executive controls, and agency management practices, the
bulk of regulatory decisionmaking and theory-formation occurs when the agency
prepares a proposed rule for publication, long before the public has a formal opportunity
to comment.”). The “hard look” standard of review is derived from several cases,
including Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), but was coined by Judge Leventhal. Matthew C.
Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 753, 754 n.1 (2006). Essentially, hard-look review requires the court, when
reviewing the agency’s explanation for its decision, to “consider whether the decision
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment.” Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43 (internal citations omitted). To satisfy
this requirement, the agency must develop a record such that the court can determine
whether
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Id. In other words, this approach emphasizes “the adequacy of the record and the quality
of the agency’s explanation.” Stephenson, supra, at 758.
448
Stern, supra note 445, at 592 (“Agency lock-in, or resistance to modification of
proposed rules during the notice and comment process, impinges on the participatory and
deliberative ideals of rulemaking. Agency lock-in can occur when agency staff develop a
strong psychological commitment to a proposal or when certain interest groups
communicate their views in advance of the notice of proposed rulemaking.”).
449
See id. at 598–60 (reviewing empirical studies).
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where an agency views its own decision to propose a rule as less
than final.450
Another form of rulemaking is called “negotiated rulemaking,”
which adds a new component to the front end of the rulemaking
process.451 This process involves interest groups during the
formation process of the initial proposed rule.452 Negotiated
rulemaking begins when the “head of the agency determines . . .
[it] is in the public interest.”453 The agency head, when making
this determination, must consider numerous factors, including the
need for the rule, the identifiable interests affected by a rule, the
ability to achieve balanced representation in the committee, the
likelihood of a timely consensus, and the costs and resources
available.454
To aid in determining the identity of the interested parties, as
well as these parties’ concerns, the agency may use a
“convener.”455 The convener will then issue a report of his
findings.456 If the agency decides not to establish a committee, it
must publish notice.457
If the agency decides to establish a negotiated rulemaking
committee, it must publish notice of its intent to do so, which
includes a description of the rule’s subject and scope; the interested
450

See id. at 599.
See 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006).
452
See Stern, supra note 445, at 642.
453
5 U.S.C. § 563(a).
454
Id. § 563(a)(1)–(7) (“(1) there is a need for a rule; (2) there are a limited number of
identifiable interests that will be significantly affected by the rule; (3) there is a
reasonable likelihood that a committee can be convened with a balanced representation of
persons who—(A) can adequately represent the interests identified under paragraph (2);
and (B) are willing to negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus on the proposed rule;
(4) there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee will reach a consensus on the
proposed rule within a fixed period of time; (5) the negotiated rulemaking procedure will
not unreasonably delay the notice of proposed rulemaking and the issuance of the final
rule; (6) the agency has adequate resources and is willing to commit such resources,
including technical assistance, to the committee; and (7) the agency, to the maximum
extent possible consistent with the legal obligations of the agency, will use the consensus
of the committee with respect to the proposed rule as the basis for the rule proposed by
the agency for notice and comment.”).
455
Id. § 563(b).
456
Id. § 563(b)(2).
457
Id. § 565(a)(2).
451
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parties; the people representing such interests and the agency; the
proposed agenda and schedule for the committee; a description of
administrative support for the committee; a solicitation for
comments on the proposal to establish the committee; and an
explanation of how to nominate another or apply for
membership.458 The cap on participants is twenty-five unless the
agency head decides more are necessary.459 While the committee
may establish its own operating rules,460 its operation and existence
terminates “upon promulgation of the final rule under
consideration, unless the committee’s charter [otherwise
provides].”461 The resulting rule is then subject to the standard
notice-and-comment rulemaking process under § 553.462
The chief goals of negotiated rulemaking—reducing litigation
and time used to create a rule—have been called into question by
empirical research.463 It is clear that, while “[a]ny agency action
relating to establishing, assisting, or terminating a negotiating
rulemaking committee” cannot be reviewed in court, the
subsequent rule published can be.464 Negotiated rulemaking may
not actually reduce time spent or litigation.465

458

Id. § 564(a).
Id. § 565(b).
460
Id. § 566(e).
461
Id. § 567.
462
Id. § 553; see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1257 (1997) (“The
committee meets publicly to negotiate a proposed rule. If the committee reaches
consensus, the agency typically adopts the consensus rule as its proposed rule and then
proceeds according to the notice-and-comment procedures specified in the APA.”
(footnotes omitted)).
463
See Coglianese, supra note 462, at 1261; id. at 1271–86 (reviewing the time-savings
of negotiated rulemaking); id. at 1289–1309 (reviewing results of frequency of litigation
in negotiated rulemaking).
464
5 U.S.C. § 570.
465
See Coglianese, supra note 462, at 1261; id. at 1332 (“Negotiated rulemaking has
long been regarded as necessary to avoid litigation and conflict. My analysis shows that
this is not the case. Litigation is not the inevitable product of agency rulemaking. Many
agencies, after all, do not face much conflict between interest groups. Among those
agencies that do face conflicting interest groups, public managers appear much more
adept than ordinarily assumed at anticipating interests and managing conflict in the
normal rulemaking process.” (footnotes omitted)).
459
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2. Modified Process of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
While negotiated rulemaking may narrow issues and focus
deliberations, it too closely resembles the Ad Hoc Committee that
developed the Classroom Guidelines.466 There are differences,
including the comment period and nomination and objection
process for group members;467 but these differences do not change
the fundamentals: interest groups, including copyright owners and
publishers, will push a narrow scope of, and educational
institutions will be forced to compromise on, fair use.468 That did
not work out well for educational institutions in the past,469 and
there isn’t much reason to suspect any different result this time
around.
Because the dynamic of the group-model negotiated
rulemaking does not differ from the dynamic of the Ad Hoc
Committee,470 this Article rejects it as a plausible approach.
Instead, it accepts informal rulemaking as a better starting place for
developing the CRAB.
Informal rulemaking, however, does not adequately address the
concerns of educational institutions because the agency is subject
to capture and lock-in.471 Thus, it must be adapted. This Part does
not purport to completely remodel the APA or provide a complete
account of how this new model would work. Instead, it will offer
some suggestions that can assist the CRAB in achieving its goals.
First, to avoid agency lock-in,472 the notice-and-comment
process should be a three-level, two-tiered, open process. “Three
level” means that three independent groups will operate within the
CRAB to propose a rule. These groups can function in one of two
ways. In the first scenario (“Sequential Groups”), Group 1
466

See supra Part I.A.2.
Compare Part III.B.1, with Part I.A.2.
468
See supra Part I.C (discussing how universities were forced to accept the Classroom
Guidelines at the threat of litigation).
469
See supra Part I.
470
One important difference between the two is that, in negotiated rulemaking, a
member of the agency participates. 5 U.S.C. § 565(b) (2006) (“Each committee shall
include at least one person representing the agency.”).
471
See Stern, supra note 445, at 596–97.
472
See id.
467
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prepares the initial rule. Group 2 will review Group 1’s proposed
rule and data and present potentially opposing views.473 Group 3
will review both Group 1’s and Group 2’s data and proposed rules,
and then adopt its own rule.
In the second scenario (“Competing Groups”), Groups 1 and 2
operate on the same time frame and propose competing rules based
on the same data. Group 3 then reviews the data and both
proposals, and it can accept or reject one, reject both, create a
mélange of the two, or create its own rule.
“Open” means that the CRAB will receive comments and
suggestions on a rolling basis. These comments and suggestions
should be related to areas in which new fair use rulemaking should
take place. For example, the AALS might submit a comment on
the need for fair use regulations concerning casebook copying.
“Open” also means that there should be a streamlined and easily
accessible comment process, as described below.
“Two-tiered” means employing two notice-and-comment
periods. The first period will be a notice of general nature
(“General Rule Notice”), stating, for instance, that the CRAB is
contemplating a rule regarding educational photocopying of
textbooks. After the CRAB publishes the General Rule Notice, the
public will be able to comment on the topic.
After the first comment period closes, the CRAB’s three-level
process will resume under either the Sequential Group scenario or
the Competing Group scenario. Under the Sequential Group
scenario, Groups 1 and 2 will sift through the comments and
present counter-arguments to the others’ proposal(s). After this
process, the CRAB’s Group 3 will develop a more concrete rule,
and the effect of lock-in will be both reduced and beneficial.474
473

The ability of agencies to argue different views may be able to reduce the likelihood
of agency lock-in. Id. at 626–27.
474
Lock-in, while detrimental, also has benefits, such as preventing agency capture. Id.
at 596 n.41 (“In an earlier era of regulatory history, commentators may have viewed lockin as a positive attribute of agencies because of the overwhelming concern with ‘agency
capture.’ Lock-in does prevent capture by powerful interest groups, at least in cases
where the agency was insulated from interest group pressures before publication of the
proposed rule.”). Additionally, the lock-in effect would be reduced because the initial
rule is developed in response to the public comments, and thus the agency would not
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After Group 3 proposes and publishes a rule, the notice-andcomment period begins again. After the close of that period, the
three-level system activates, eventually producing a final rule as
promulgated by Group 3.

view itself as entirely committed to the rule, especially knowing another round of
comments (likely) from a similar group of people would follow.
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FIGURE 1
THE CRAB RULEMAKING PROCESS:
SEQUENTIAL GROUPS
The CRAB Meets
and Confers

The CRAB Group 3 Reviews Group
1’s and Group 2’s Rule

The CRAB Proposes a General
Statement of the Rule (Similar
to Policy Statement)

The CRAB Group 3 Publishes a
Proposed Rule

Comment Period on
Proposed Rule

Comment Period
on General Rule

The CRAB Group 1
Reviews Comments

The CRAB Group 1
Proposes a Rule

Proposes a Rule

The CRAB Group 2 Reviews
Group 1’s Rule and Data;
Proposes a Rule

The CRAB Group 2 Reviews
Comments and Group 1’s Rule
and Data; Proposes a Rule

The CRAB Group 3 Reviews
Comments, Group 1’s Rule, Group
2’s Rule

The CRAB Group 3
Publishes Final Rule
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Under the Competing Groups scenario, the comments are
processed differently, with Groups 1 and 2 independently
developing and proposing rules. Each Group submits its rule to
Group 3, which considers, along with the comments, both Groups’
rules. Group 3 then proposes its own rule, which may entail some,
all, or none of the other Groups’ proposed rules.
FIGURE 2
THE CRAB RULEMAKING PROCESS:
COMPETING GROUPS
The CRAB Meets
and Confers

The CRAB Group 3 Reviews
Group 1’s and Group 2’s Rule

The CRAB Proposes a
General Statement of the
Rule (Similar to Policy
Statement)

The CRAB Group 3 Publishes
a Proposed Rule

Comment Period
on Proposed Rule

Comment Period
on General Rule

The CRAB
Group 1
Independently
Proposes a
Rule

The CRAB
Group 2
Independently
Proposes a
Rule

The CRAB
Group 1
Independently
Reviews
Comments
Proposes a
Rule

The CRAB Group 3 Reviews
Comments, Group 1’s Rule,
Group 2’s Rule

The CRAB Group 3
Publishes Final Rule

The CRAB
Group 2
Independently
Reviews
Comments
Proposes a
Rule
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3. Group Identification and Involvement
As part of the “open” component of the modified rulemaking,
there must be a proper framework for making, receiving, and
sorting through comments. History teaches us that copyright
owners and publishers will be represented adequately in the noticeand-comment process.475 Aside from the lessons of the Ad Hoc
Committee, the current participation of interest groups in Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) anti-circumvention
rulemaking shows that their involvement will be robust.476
The concern, then, should be about educators’ participation.
To solve part of the participation problem, existing educational
groups or associations should participate and communicate with
one another in the process.477 Additionally, new educational
associations should be formed. In particular, each state should
form an educational committee comprised of educators and
lawyers who will convene to discuss issues of fair use in their
classrooms. Further, each state might be a member in a national
organization, which would consist of a standing committee that
could solicit comments and a convening committee that would
475

See infra note 476 and accompanying text.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been particularly vocal in this regard,
criticizing the Librarian of Congress for not taking consumer comments seriously and
acquiescing to moneyed interests. FRED VON LOHMANN & GWEN HINZE, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, DMCA TRIENNIAL RULEMAKING: FAILING THE CONSUMER 3–4
(2005), available at http://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA/copyrightoffice/DMCA_rulemaking_
broken.pdf (“[D]uring the 2003 rulemaking, 51 initial comments requesting exemptions
were filed, and 337 reply comments were filed. Of these, 254 reply comments were filed
by consumers in support of the consumer-oriented exemptions proposed by the EFF and
Public Knowledge (PK). . . . In the end, none of the 4 classes of consumer-oriented
exemptions requested by EFF and PK were granted. In each case, the Register and
Librarian of Congress determined that any harm to consumers was ‘de minimis’ based on
the evidence presented by proponents.”).
477
At primary and secondary education levels, some of these organizations include the
National Association of Education School Principals, http://www.naesp.org (last visited
Sept. 1, 2009); the American Association of School Administrators, http://www.aasa.org
(last visited Sept. 1, 2009); and the National Association of Secondary School Principals,
http://www.nassp.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). At the post-secondary and graduate
education levels, these include the National Association of Colleges and Employers,
http://www.naceweb.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2009); the Association of American
Universities, http://www.aau.edu/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2009); and the American
Association of Law Schools, http://www.aals.org/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
476

C02_SIMON_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

544

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/31/2010 1:05 PM

[Vol. 20:453

hold meetings semi-yearly to discuss fair use issues in educational
institutions.
Additionally, electronic rulemaking should be used to facilitate
group involvement. In his article, Mazzone cites an article by
Professor Beth Noveck in which she describes how the online
structure of e-commenting and e-rulemaking can have a great
effect on participation.478 Several of her suggestions to increase
involvement bear mentioning here. First, she discusses the merits
of creating a listserv, run by the CRAB to which individuals and
groups can subscribe.479 Subscribers could receive updates and
proposed rules via email, which would facilitate rule making being
accessible to all.480 Second, Noveck suggests using a Rich Site
Summary (“RSS”) feed to provide notice to institutions and
individuals, thereby soliciting comments and suggestions.481
These two suggestions are in addition to the existing practices of erulemaking that use websites.482 Third, the model by which
comments are received and reviewed is critical.483 While this
Article is not meant to detail all of those requirements, Noveck’s
article is a smart place to start.
4. Adjudication
In addition to rulemaking, the CRAB also should have
adjudicative powers, as Mazzone suggests.484 The basics of his
proposal do not need much tinkering. Essentially, Mazzone
proposes an informal adjudication process that would entitle a
party to judicial review of a “final agency action.”485 Appellate
courts reviewing agency actions would conduct a review consistent
478

Mazzone, supra note 15, at 416 & n.81 (citing Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic
Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 480–92 (2004)).
479
See generally Noveck, supra note 478, at 471–74.
480
See id.
481
See id. at 477–79 (noting that an RSS can facilitate discussion).
482
See id. at 444.
483
See id. at 479–91 (describing numerous methods of improving online commenting,
including rule descriptors, taxonomies, threaded comments, and comment
authentication).
484
Mazzone, supra note 15, at 419 (suggesting that CIRO, an organization created
hypothetically by Mazzone for the same purposes as CRAB, should have adjudicative
power).
485
See id.; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2006).
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with the “arbitrary,” “capricious” and “hard look” standard
currently used by federal courts.486 To be reviewable, of course,
the party seeking review must first exhaust all administrative
remedies, including a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
and an appeal to the CRAB Appeals Review Council.487
5. Enforcement
Under Model One, Mazzone advocates that the agency have
enforcement powers like the FTC.488 The CRAB should have
similar enforcement powers. The CRAB’s enforcement power
would necessarily be coupled with an investigative power similar
to the FTC, which includes compulsory powers to collect
information and documents.489 These powers provide judicial
deference—a court cannot review the FTC’s action until it issues
an order to cease and desist.490 All appeals travel from the agency
to the federal circuit courts.491
The primary benefit of the CRAB’s FTC-like enforcement
powers will, however, come from its deterrent effect on copyright
owners.
Like employers responding to EEOC complaints,
copyright owners responding to FTC investigations face
486

See 5 U.S.C. § 706; supra note 447 and accompanying text.
See supra Figure 1.
488
See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 436.
489
See 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2009) (“Commission investigations and inquiries may be
originated upon the request of the President, Congress, governmental agencies, or the
Attorney General; upon referrals by the courts; upon complaint by members of the
public; or by the Commission upon its own initiative. The Commission has delegated to
the Director, Deputy Directors, and Assistant Directors of the Bureau of Competition, the
Director, Deputy Directors, and Associate Directors of the Bureau of Consumer
Protection and, the Regional Directors and Assistant Regional Directors of the
Commission’s regional offices, without power of redelegation, limited authority to
initiate investigations.”); id. § 2.7 (detailing compulsory process in investigations).
490
15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2006) (“Any person, partnership, or corporation required by an
order of the Commission to cease and desist from using any method of competition or act
or practice may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States,
within any circuit where the method of competition or the act or practice in question was
used or where such person, partnership, or corporation resides or carries on business, by
filing in the court, within sixty days from the date of the service of such order, a written
petition praying that the order of the Commission be set aside.”); FTC v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 245 (1980).
491
15 U.S.C. § 45(c)–(d).
487
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substantial costs in responding to and complying with
investigations.492 As an additional deterrent, those subject to
CRAB investigations, like those subject to FTC investigations,
would face criminal and civil penalties.493 This deterrent effect is
tempered by the “high standard”494 that the FTC not commence an
investigation unless it has “reason to believe that . . . any unfair
method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or
affecting commerce” is being used and a proceeding would be in
the public interest.495
In addition to providing this deterrent effect, it also places
educational institutions in a good bargaining position vis-à-vis
publishers and organizations should licensing or other negotiations
need to take place. Finally, it reduces litigation costs for
educational institutions because the FTC brings actions on their
behalf.496
C. The Congressional Language and Grant of Authority
The CRAB is conceived of as an executive agency.497 As such,
Congress must create it.498 The language used to complete this
task is important, and could determine the “fairness” of particular
uses. Considering the purpose, structure, and function of the
CRAB, several aspects of the statutory language deserve attention.

492

See David P. Wales, Reflections on Procedure at the Federal Trade Commission:
Remarks of J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, 1715 PLI/Corp
799, 808 (2009) (“The adjudicatory proceedings which follow the issuance of a
complaint may last for months or years. They result in substantial expense to the
respondent and may divert management personnel from their administrative and
productive duties to the corporation.”).
493
15 U.S.C. § 50 (describing the civil and criminal penalties for violating reporting
requirements or refusing to comply with certain FTC requests).
494
See Wales, supra note 492, at 808–11 (detailing four consequences of this “very
high standard”).
495
15 U.S.C. § 45(b); see Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 246 n.14.
496
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
497
As noted infra Part IV.A, Congress may choose to create the CRAB as part of the
Copyright Office, an existing legislative agency.
498
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 327
(Aspen Publishers 2006) (noting that Congress has delegated broad power to federal
agencies to make, enforce, and adjudicate rules).
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The language of the statute Congress enacts must be specific to
education. In other words, it must create the CRAB explicitly to
regulate educational fair use. While “educational fair use” may be
a term with numerous definitions, it can and should be limited by
Congress. In describing the statute’s purpose, for example,
Congress can expressly state that it designed the statute to free
educational institutions from fair use’s shackles of vagueness, to
encourage student learning, to facilitate teaching, and to encourage
the use of copyrighted materials without fear of litigation. The
purpose of the statute will then guide the CRAB’s regulations and
adjudications.
Second, Congress can make specific findings about educational
uses of copyrighted works. This common component of statutes
would further explain why Congress decided to delegate its
lawmaking authority to an agency, and would provide a backdrop
for evaluating particular agency actions.
In this case,
Congressional findings could detail, among other things, the
number of schools that have Educational Guidelines-based
copyright or copying policies; the importance of fair use in the
educational setting; the importance of education; teachers’ lack of
knowledge and understanding regarding copyright law; fair use’s
vague nature; the deterrent and detrimental effects of limiting
educational uses; and the need for more certainty among
educational users of copyrighted works.
Third, Congress can broadly define the term “educational
uses”—i.e., describe the general nature of the fair uses
contemplated by Congress. This definition should not be overly
specific. The CRAB, to fulfill its mission, must develop the details
of which uses constitute educational fair uses and cannot be
interfered with; a specific definition risks constraining the CRAB’s
reach and effectiveness. The specific limitations on educational
fair use should probably be created by the CRAB, though they also
might be included in an express grant of authority from Congress.
The definition might look something like this: “‘Educational
uses’ are uses of copyrighted material by students, teachers, aides,
administrators, or other similar individuals in preparation for
teaching, in conjunction with teaching, for teaching purposes, or as
part of teaching activities.” This definition is not meant to be the
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only definition in the statute, or even one of any possible
definition. It is meant merely to illustrate how Congress might
broadly define educational uses and the power of the CRAB.
In crafting this and other definitions, Congress should
remember the Ad Hoc Committee’s statements that “good teaching
practice may not always be legal copyright practice,”499 and that “it
is legally risky for teachers to rely wholly on fair use.”500
Congress’s mission should go beyond the Ad Hoc Committee,
which recognized “the need to legitimize current and developing
reasonable educational practices so that teachers will not be forced
either to drop them or to continue them ‘under the table.’”501
Current educational fair use practices and customs are
unsatisfactory and insufficient.502 New rules recognizing the need
for educational freedom should be created. In other words, certain
uses that publishers have tried to label as infringement should be
made fair by the statute and its definitions.
Further questions may arise about what substantive statements
Congress should make in its delegation. Mazzone, for example,
has suggested that Congress should look to the courts for guidance
on what constitutes fair use.503 This Article rejects that approach,
arguing instead that Congress should abrogate the Classroom
Guidelines and the judicial treatment thereof. Congress may look
at the case law—not necessarily for substantive guidance on
educational fair use, but to understand how it might classify
educational uses. Samuelson has provided a good base by
grouping cases into categories, one of which includes educational
fair use.504 These cases might show Congress the benefits and
drawbacks of classifying certain uses as “educational.”505
Additionally, Congress should shy away from any statement
that defers to the judiciary’s interpretation of fair use as applied to
educational works—although incorporating the doctrine generally,
499
500
501
502
503
504
505

Rosenfield, supra note 38, at 6.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 7.
See supra Part I.
Mazzone, supra note 15, at 426–27.
Samuelson, supra note 30, at 2582.
Id. at 2587.
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as does the Copyright Act, should not present a problem. Past
judicial treatment of the Guidelines has resulted in a distorted
standard of educational fair use. Thus, judicial deference can be
harmful to the CRAB, the mission of which would be expressly
and specifically defined by Congress. To develop fair and sound
regulations concerning educational fair use, the CRAB should
promulgate regulations using its procedures as defined above,
referencing the case law only to ensure that its regulations find
grounding in the fundamental principles of fair use law.506
D. The Regulations Envisioned
It would be best to end with a brief and general description of
the CRAB’s regulations. Many of the points made here will be
addressed in Part IV, so they will be only sketched here. The first
question is what kinds of regulations the CRAB would promulgate.
Most regulations should be maximum limits, or rules, on uses of
copyrighted works in education. These should be simple to
understand and apply, using plain language percentages and
including simple methods of computation.507 Not every regulation
needs to be in the form of a rule, and the CRAB should be free to
promulgate standards or rule-standard hybrids to address specific
concerns.508 Rules should address all kinds of copying, from
photocopying, to recording televisions shows, to uploading content
506
The CRAB should also make rules specific to issues in education involving the
electronic classroom. Posting materials on Blackboard, see Blackboard, http://www.
blackboard.com/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2010), for example, may present unique situations.
Some rules might apply equally to paper copies and photocopying. A rule allowing a
teacher to photocopy for students a percentage of a book, for example, might apply
equally to posting that material for students online. Specific questions about posting
materials online for students is outside the scope of this Article’s discussion.
Nevertheless, these are issues the CRAB should and could address.
507
Word counts may be too onerous, so a page count may be a better way to determine
percentage limits. The formulas for computation should include both short-hand
measurements and more detailed approaches. For example, one rule could specify a
certain percentage of copying. While the rule should contain a detailed description of the
calculation procedure, it also should include a rough rule-of-thumb, such as, “When
photocopying portions of science textbooks for classroom use, you generally cannot copy
more than one chapter from a book and distribute it to your students.” To ensure that
such a short-hand rule corresponds to the percentage in the actual rule, it should be based
on objective evidence of the typical length of a chapter in a science textbook.
508
As discussed infra Part IV.C, rules themselves are not always as rigid as they seem.
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on Blackboard.509 As to specific rules themselves, those are
outside the scope of this Article. To make them easy to read, the
regulations should be grouped into two indices, one grouped by
subject matter and one grouped by keyword.
IV. OBJECTIONS
The administrative approach is not impervious to criticism, and
it is likely to meet substantial resistance for a variety of reasons.
This Part explores four possible objections to the CRAB model:
(A) the CRAB is overly specific; (B) the CRAB unnecessarily
increases costs; (C) the CRAB’s regulations are too rigid and do
not provide educators with enough flexibility; and (D) the CRAB,
paradoxically, creates more uncertainty because of the technical
and confusing nature of agency regulations.510
509

Some of the regulations, like those that apply to photocopying, also may apply
directly to posting materials on Blackboard. The amount of a book that can be
photocopied and distributed to students, for example, probably should be the same
amount that can be posted on a secure Blackboard–type site. To the extent that online
materials need to be password protected or otherwise protected from unauthorized
copying, the CRAB should promulgate separate regulations regarding technological
protections.
510
Two other objections are raised and briefly discussed in this footnote. First, one
might suggest we also ought to incorporate a “good faith” component into fair use. Put
another way, if the educator is copying in good faith, their copying is per se fair. That
approach is untenable, however, because of the nature of a good faith standard. Good
faith, of course, must be defined against a backdrop—what constitutes good faith in one
context may not in another, and all the facts surrounding the copying need to be included.
That raises two problems. First, under current standards, some may consider the
Guidelines as the good faith standard, or are at least highly relevant in the good faith
determination. Bartow, supra note 5, at 205–06; see also Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (using the Classroom
Guidelines in its “innocent infringer” discussion of statutory damages). Second, even if
the Guidelines are not used, the good faith standard will need to be articulated, and it will
be amorphous. The unpredictable nature of such a standard will do little to remedy the
uncertainty surrounding which uses are fair.
The second objection says that a better solution would provide blanket immunity to
educational uses of copyrighted materials. This would, the argument goes, save lots of
costs and headaches. That solution is easy, but it fails to take into account the legitimate
interests of copyright owners. This would destroy, for example, the incentive of authors
who create copyrighted works expressly for educational use. If the authors’ incentives
are destroyed, they likely will no longer create these educational works. The results of
this could be disastrous—no materials would be created exclusively for educational use
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A. Specificity Requirement
Creating an administrative agency specific to education is
unique. It differs from Mazzone’s proposal because it is not
designed to address all possible fair uses;511 it is confined to a
specific universe of uses. While this specificity will provide
clearer direction for educators, one may object that the creation of
such a specific agency is unnecessary; if we are going to accept an
administrative agency, why not create one that administers fair use
generally?512
There are several responses to this objection. First, as we have
seen, educational fair uses pose particular problems.
The
Guidelines, for example, are not the law but have been treated as
such, creating uncertainty and asymmetric rights for educators.513
Additionally, not just any agency will do.514 The nature of
educational uses of copyrighted materials requires particular
tailoring that sufficiently considers the value of educational uses.
Thus, the body administering fair use must be specifically tailored
to education to obviate these problems.
If still not satisfied, then the next option would be to implement
a Mazzonian approach but define specific categories of uses, as
Professor Samuelson already has shown us is possible.515 Thus,
the administering agency would delegate powers and create
regulations specifically as to each category of fair use. Mazzone
briefly suggested that the agency’s “regulations would specify,
consistent with the provisions of § 107 of the Copyright Act, the
because no author could ever recover the costs of publishing the book. Therefore, broad
immunity for educators is not a viable solution. It is another issue altogether whether the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against educators. See Bartow, supra note 5, at 223–24.
511
See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 433 (arguing for the creation of an administrative
agency because “[r]egulations issued by an administrative agency . . . work wholesale . . .
[and] apply to all users”).
512
If we need specificity of this nature, for example, why not create “a separate agency
for environmental problems in Hawaii because Hawaii has a different ecosystem.” E-mail
from Harold Krent, Dean and Professor of Law, Chicago–Kent College of Law, to David
A. Simon, Law Clerk, Hon. Martin C. Ashman (Aug. 7, 2009, 16:51 CST). Thanks to
Harold Krent for raising this objection.
513
See supra Part I.C.
514
See Mazzone, supra note 15, at 420 n.99 (citing commentators’ criticisms of the
effectiveness of Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy).
515
See Samuelson, supra note 30, at 2541.
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uses that constitute fair uses of copyrighted works in specific
sectors.”516 But the description ends there. “Specific sectors,” as
referred to by Mazzone, probably means § 107’s express
mentioning of “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . .
scholarship, or research,”517 though he does not explicitly say so.
Those categories are good places to start drawing categorical lines,
but Samuelson’s article is another.
In other words, the categories should focus on the use of the
work, not the work itself. Regulations concerning use of several
articles or a movie clip in a classroom would fall under the
“educational” category of uses, rather than specific categories
concerning articles or movies with rules pertaining specifically to
the use of those types of materials. Thus, rules and regulations
would address how much of a movie or book you could copy in the
educational setting. There might be, for instance, regulations
regarding the use of multiple articles when creating a “course
pack,” or regulations concerning the use of copying photographs
for classroom or educational use.
Thus, under this scheme, educational fair uses would occupy
one area that the fair use administration would regulate. In this
case, the CRAB’s contribution would not go to waste. The agency
could still implement the CRAB model to the degree it aligns with
the overall language, purpose, and structure of the legislation
creating the agency. It may even function as a sub-agency within
the larger one, such as the Copyright Office.
That raises another issue: even under such an approach, one
might wonder why we need a new agency at all. Why not, for
example, use the FTC or some other extant administrative body?518
The reason lies in expertise. The FTC is an administrative body
with a specific task519—to expect them to immediately understand,
regulate, and enforce copyright law and the nature of the interests
at stake is impossible.

516

Mazzone, supra note 15, at 415.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
518
Thanks to Harold Krent for commending to my attention this point.
519
See Federal Trade Commission—About Us, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009).
517
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Perhaps, as Professor Liu suggests,520 the Copyright Office
offers an existing institution in which to implement the CRAB.
But, as Mazzone points out, the Copyright Office has come under
scrutiny for favoring the interests of copyright owners.521 Even so,
there may be measures that Congress could take consistent with the
CRAB proposal to limit capture, which have been outlined in the
modified rulemaking process.522 Thus, if the objection is centered
on newness of the agency, it is possible to move the CRAB into the
Copyright Office with legislation like that already articulated: the
structural differences from the DMCA-rulemaking also would
reduce, if not eliminate, many of the obstacles to public
participation as well as the risk of capture.523 The primary
additions to the legislation would be centered on where the CRAB
would reside and the additional powers it would have. Congress
would have to clearly articulate those powers.
B. Increased Costs
The argument about costs is a familiar one—especially given
the scholarly embrace of the law and economics movement.524
Using an agency to administer fair use will increase the raw costs
of copyright law. A new agency means new staffing and operating
expenditures. The modifications proposed to the notice-andcomment rulemaking process will add further costs. Copyright
owners—and some users—may also face increased costs. But raw
costs are only one part of the equation. Conceiving of them as the
only result of the agency would be a mistake for several reasons.

520

See Liu, Regulatory Copyright, supra note 396, at 148–50.
Mazzone, supra note 15, at 429.
522
These mechanisms were outlined in supra Part III.B.2, which describes the modified
notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
523
The Electronic Frontier Foundation has criticized the DMCA as being too technical
and inaccessible to the ordinary consumer by placing too many requirements on DMCAcreated exceptions. See LOHMANN & HINZE, supra note 476, at 2–4. Many of these
problems, most of which deal with defining works and demonstrating non-infringing use,
would not be required under the CRAB’s rulemaking.
524
See David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both
Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 381 (2002) (quoting JOHN THIBAULT &
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE : A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 123 (1975)).
521
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First, it fails to account for the current costs imposed on
educational users. There are real benefits lost when teachers
decide against using certain copyrighted materials because they
think it is illegal. And, in many cases of educational copying,
there are no costs imposed upon the copyright owner, in terms of
either revenue or ability to control copying or distribution. There
are even greater costs when institutions that educate our nation’s
young people internalize that fear. As has been detailed,
universities implement restrictive policies that stifle education and
creative growth.525 Not only does this impede teaching and student
learning, it also impresses upon teachers and students a constrained
view of copyright law and one’s ability to create.526 For teachers,
this means less effective instruction will likely result. For students,
it (wrongly) teaches them that many novel and creative uses of
copyrighted materials are illegal.527
Second, the imposition of cost should not be viewed as a
wasteful economic burden but a necessary price for an invaluable
and inexhaustible good: education. Taking this approach means
making a “normative judgment about the value of fair use and
about the value of fair use clarification.”528 It also means making a
value judgment about the importance of education vis-à-vis private
profits of copyright owners.529 Carroll argues that clarifying fair
use acts as a “free speech safeguard” because it quashes much of
the uncertainty surrounding fair use—warming, instead of chilling,
speech.530 But it is more than that. Implementing policies that are
education-friendly will allow educators to teach effectively and

525

See supra Part I.C.
See generally LESSIG, supra note 224.
527
See id. at 293 (describing copyright law as creating a generation of criminals); Lisa
Dush, Beyond the Wakeup Call, in COMPOSITION & COPYRIGHT: PERSPECTIVES ON
TEACHING, TEXT-MAKING, AND FAIR USE 114, 122 (Steve Westbrook ed., SUNY Press
2009) (noting that in the study the author conducted, students “spoke of ‘thinking twice’
before they used a copyrighted text in their own compositions, . . . but then used the
copyrighted text anyway”).
528
Carroll, supra note 173, at 1138.
529
See id. at 1114. It is ironic that the Constitution secures copyrights in authors’
works for the benefit of the public only to severely restrict the use of those works in
education.
530
Id. at 1138.
526
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develop students who will use copyright and fair use laws to their
advantage, producing social benefits.
C. Rigidity of Regulations
Besides costs, some may turn a skeptical eye to prescriptive
rules that educators must follow under the CRAB. Such
skepticism derives from the notion that educators should not be
required to consult a rulebook to determine how to teach.531 They
need a flexible approach to fair use, not rigid rules. This objection
has merit—there are benefits to standards like the CBP.532 To the
extent that standards can be used, the CRAB is free to adopt them.
But, as we have seen, standards can take teachers only so far—and
while CRAB-promulgated standards, unlike ordinary CBPs, would
have certain legal effect, they would still be vague.533
To solve this problem, the CRAB should promulgate more
rules than standards—setting maximum limits on specific types of
educational fair uses. Despite the argument that rules are too
restrictive, the CRAB’s rules could ameliorate this problem by
requiring only substantial compliance—or enforce the rules in a
manner that does not require literal compliance. This, of course,
occurs in many other situations, and the speed limit is a good
example. Sure, a sixty miles-per-hour speed limit requires you to
drive at that speed or below; but police generally allow a five to
ten miles-per-hour window in which to speed—legally. The
degree to which speeding is allowable, as any person who has
received a speeding ticket can attest, varies by municipality,
county, city, and state.
The CRAB’s rules could do the same. Imagine, for example, a
rule that permitted teachers to photocopy for their students no more
than 25% of any literary book. What happens when a teacher
decides to use two chapters (totaling fifty-five pages) of a book
containing 200 pages (27.5%)? If the CRAB’s rules required only
substantial compliance, then this use might be fair. Whether it is
531

This was the general tenor of several objections this Article received at the 2009
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference.
532
See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
533
See, e.g., supra note 367 and accompanying text.
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fair would depend on the custom developed in education. In this
way, the rules could incorporate some of the beneficial flexibility
of the CBP while providing the certainty educators seek.534
This example also provides an opportunity to speak briefly
about the effect of maximum rules. If we twist the facts of the
aforementioned example just slightly, and say the teacher wanted
to use seventy-five pages of the book for a total of 37.5%, the use
would be unfair. What then? The answer is simple—the teacher
could not use the approximately twenty additional pages. Sure,
this would affect some educational fair uses and force teachers to
choose sections of some works over others, but it does not deprive
them of all of their uses.535 Indeed, the CRAB’s rules should be
drafted to permit uses that generally would allow the educator to
use a particular type of material to educate their students on the
point they desire.536 While the allowable percentage for usage of a
book may not be 25%, some percentage should suffice.
D. Complexity of Regulations
Another objection to the CRAB or any rulemaking procedure is
that the regulations, not to mention the process of developing them,
is complicated. As to the complexity of the process, one must
assume that groups will form to better address the agency’s
rulemaking process. Accepting the administrative model means
sacrificing the typical case-by-case method of fair use
adjudication. Not everyone will be satisfied with the rules and
regulations, but the avenues of participation are open.
Participation also requires organization and action—educators
cannot expect the process will mobilize itself and completely and
exhaustively protect teachers’ rights without any input whatsoever.

534

Special thanks to Professor Peter Lee for giving me this idea in a discussion we had
about one of his current projects.
535
It seems that there is a fear of secure limits on fair use, perhaps because of the
current culture given the Guidelines. But, at some point, there has to be a limit on
educational fair use. Why not promulgate it?
536
I realize this is a vague statement that tells us very little. But this Article is not
meant to detail the specifics of each and every rule. Rather, its purpose is to propose a
model upon which certain types of rules can be based. Rules should be designed to
maximize education and respect the legitimate rights of copyright owners.
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The rules themselves present a greater difficulty. Taking one
look at the EEOC’s rules and regulations is intimidating. The
Code of Federal Regulations looks like a book and reads like an
ancient Greek manuscript. The CRAB’s regulations would
mitigate these problems in at least two ways.
First, because the CRAB is specific to education, the number of
regulations will be far fewer than in employment law. Second, the
CRAB regulations should be written with an emphasis on
common-sense organization and design. As noted above, these
regulations should be written practically and include short-hand
rules that educators can consult and understand easily. Unlike the
Guidelines, the rules should focus on direct percentages and
numbers, rather than adopt amorphous notions of “spontaneity.”537
A rule governing photocopying textbooks for students, for
example, might allow 15% of any textbook to be photocopied
without permission or payment. This type of rigidity will actually
provide for greater flexibility: rather than remaining in the straight
jacket of the Guidelines and uncertainty, rules demarcate clear
maximum boundaries for educators. As noted above, these
boundaries can still accommodate some uses that may modestly
fall outside a strict limit on a particular use.
Second, if necessary, would be “A Manual on Educational Fair
Use” (“The Manual”). The Manual would lay out permissible uses
in lay terms, and would also illustrate how the regulations should
work in practice by using examples and commentary.538 The
Manual may incorporate additional situations and short-hand rules
if necessary.
There may also be educational programs designed to teach
educators about fair use and encourage them to exercise their rights
as provided by law. Finally, the CRAB should administer a
website where teachers could find answers to frequently asked
questions, as well as provide an e-mail address and telephone
number at which a “Fair Use Genius,” who would direct the

537

See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
The actual regulations themselves, depending on the kind of regulation (i.e., rule,
standard, rule-standard hybrid), may benefit from this approach.
538
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individual to certain regulations,539 could be reached. This website
should also contain the regulations and indices complete with
hypertext, which would allow teachers to “click through” and
easily navigate the regulations. The regulations should be
hyperlinked to, or contain, the commentary and examples where
necessary. Additionally, the website should contain the Manual
and other webpages containing information about how the CRAB
works, the procedures that need to be followed, how to obtain
permissions should they be necessary, contact information, and
other educational materials.540
CONCLUSION
The U.S. copyright doctrine of fair use has been both revered
for its benefits and criticized for its vagueness.541 Indeed, fair use
has received much attention in literature.542 Despite this attention
generally, however, few observations exist about educators’ and
educational institutions’ struggles with the doctrine.
For educators, issues began to percolate in 1955, when
Congress decided to reform the copyright laws.543 Eight years
later, these Congressional efforts resulted in the Ad Hoc
Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations on
Copyright Law Revision, which was comprised of numerous
individuals from various organizations, including educational
organizations, publishers, and copyright owners.544 Between 1963
539

These individuals, like the “Geniuses” who work at Apple Stores, will not have
sophisticated, technical knowledge about the regulations themselves or how they operate.
They will merely be giving non-legal advice; that is, pointing people in the right
direction.
540
In some ways, the EEOC’s website may be a good place to learn the Dos and Don’ts
of website construction and the accessibility of legal concepts to educators. See United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Homepage, http://www.eeoc.gov/
(last visited Aug. 26, 2009).
541
Compare supra note 103 (stating that the rules have been interpreted as the
minimum and maximum), with supra note 91 and accompanying text (stating that a court
has revered the benefits of the fair use laws).
542
See generally Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291 (1999)
(providing a broad overview of the case and literature on the fair use doctrine).
543
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
544
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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and 1976, the Ad Hoc Committee met numerous times, consulting
with various interest groups.545 Although educators originally
sought a broad-based, educational fair use exemption, the Ad Hoc
Committee issued, in 1976, an agreement on educational fair
use.546 This agreement contained Classroom Guidelines for uses of
copyrighted works, which purported to state the minimum, not the
maximum, standards for educational fair use.547
Even though the Guidelines were not optimal, at the very least
they promised educators a certain amount of legal certainty that
had eluded them in the past. But as educational fair use was
litigated, that promise was left largely unfulfilled. Even though the
Guidelines were not the law, courts used them in their fair use
analyses.548 Some treated the Guidelines as pseudo law;549 some
treated them as additional factors under § 107;550 some treated
them as sub-factors within the four factors listed in § 107;551 and
some did a combination of the three.552
As a result of this judicial treatment, the Guidelines effectively
became part of the law. Publishers used these decisions to bully
educational institutions into conforming to the Guidelines as a
limit on fair use even though they are not the law, have no basis in
law, and were intended to be a floor, not a ceiling.553 The courts’
treatment of the Guidelines has improperly ossified educational
fair use into restrictive, per se maximum allowances, preventing it
from retaining the trademark flexibility that has made the doctrine
so useful.
Ironically, fair use has chilled fair uses.
Educational
institutions, now fearful of infringement, avoid the specter of
liability by severely restricting their use of copyrighted works.554
This has negative consequences for student learning, as well as
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.2.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.2.
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their perception of the law. Furthermore, past judicial treatment of
the Guidelines fosters misunderstanding of copyright law among
educators. Without knowing the actual bounds of the law,
educators’ misperceptions and copyright owners’ customs seeped
into the educational culture, restricting teaching and student
learning, and generally impeding the educational mission. The
Guidelines also created an asymmetrical legal environment that
catered only to copyright owners’ interests, with the courts
adopting industry standards in lieu of fair use.
Based on these failings, a new model for fair use was explored.
The recent literature contains proposals to either modify or reconceptualize copyright infringement or the fair use inquiry.555
Some scholars have even specifically taken issue with the current
fair use framework. They proposed a variety of options, including
reallocating the burden of proof;556 eliminating some of the fair use
factors;557 re-conceptualizing the factors by using substantive
copyright law doctrine to inform their application;558 using a code
of best practices;559 and creating a new entity to adjudicate or
administer fair use.560 Examination of these proposals revealed
that they suffer deficiencies when applied to educational fair use:
none sufficiently accounted for the value fair use provides, or the
uncertainty it forces educators to confront.561 As a result, these
approaches were not used in developing a model for fair use.
Based on these findings, this Article concluded that the best
approach was to create a new entity to regulate educational fair
use. To that end, a new mechanism for administering educational
fair use, which built on Professor Jason Mazzone’s previous
work,562 was proposed. It suggested a Congressionally-created
administrative agency—the CRAB—that would regulate
educational fair use. The structure and operation of this agency
were then detailed. The CRAB would engage in a modified
555
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notice-and-commenting rule making process, which would reduce
agency capture and lock-in. Additionally, the CRAB would utilize
informal adjudication and enforcement mechanisms.
After defining the structure and function of the CRAB, the
Article described the statutory language that would create the
agency. This language limited the concept of educational uses
without limiting the CRAB’s authority to regulate them. It then
raised and responded to four possible objections: the CRAB entails
too much specificity; the CRAB unjustifiably increases costs; the
CRAB’s rules are too rigid; and the CRAB creates more, rather
than less, complexity. The responses to these objections explained
how the CRAB’s specificity and rigidity were actually advantages;
how the increased costs, when viewed in context, are necessary to
improve education; and how the fear of complexity was overstated.
To recap, this Article has shown that the current state of
educational fair use is troublesome. After examining possible
solutions to this problem, a new model for educational fair use was
proposed: the CRAB. Ultimately, the CRAB’s goal is to provide
educators with the identifiable standards and rules by which they
can operate, to maintain fidelity to the law of fair use, and to
facilitate the learning process without fear of litigation by
publishers and copyright owners.

